


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23 MAY 1988



# ***JPRS Report***



## **Soviet Union**

### ***Political Affairs Preparations for the 19th Party Conference***

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# Soviet Union

## Political Affairs

### Preparations for the 19th Party Conference

JPRS-UPA-88-018

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23 MAY 1988

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**IZVESTIYA Explains to Readers Why  
Conference Will Meet**

*PM311325 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Mar 88  
Morning Edition p 2*

[Candidate of Historical Sciences E. Guseynov article:  
"Party Conferences—From the 1st to the 19th"—first  
two paragraphs are reader's letter]

[Text] "The 19th party conference is to be held in June  
this year. We are impatiently looking forward to this  
event. However, what is surprising is this: Why was it  
decided to convene a conference, exactly? The last  
conference was almost half a century ago, in 1941. I  
would like to know in a bit more detail about the history  
of conferences and the kind of questions they discussed.  
I think other readers would also be interested in this."

A. Sviridenko, Kharkov.

The editorial office has received many letters containing  
similar requests. Readers' interest is perfectly natural—  
the expectations pinned on the upcoming conference are  
very great. Today we will describe the history of party  
conferences, the role they played in the party's life, and  
the reasons why the practice of holding them is being  
revived after so many years.

December 1905. The small Finnish town of Tammerfors. On 12 December there, in one of the centers of the Finnish workers' movement, delegates assembled for the Fourth RSDWP [Russian Social Democratic Workers Party] Congress. Most important tasks faced the congress, including two main tasks: determining the party's tactics in the revolution that had flared up, and uniting Bolsheviks and Mensheviks within a single organization and preventing division of the proletariat's forces. However, the armed uprising that had begun in Moscow, the strikes on the railroads, and harassment by the secret police prevented a number of delegations from attending. A. Bekzadyan, a delegate from Baku, was arrested en route. The emissaries of Moscow, the Urals, and Nizhny Novgorod failed to arrive, and the representatives of Samara and Kostroma were late for the start of the congress. The necessary quorum for opening the congress was clearly not present. So then the first-ever party conference was held, instead of the planned congress. The conference completely fulfilled the tasks that the congress had been going to resolve and went down in history as the first Tammerfors conference.

In introducing into the practice of party life a new supreme collective organ—conferences—the delegates were relying not only on the experience of European social democracy, but also on earlier party decisions. The possibility of convening general party conferences as well as congresses was envisaged by a resolution of the Third RSDWP Congress in April 1905.

In that prerevolutionary period what distinguished conferences from congresses was the nature of representation. While congress delegates were elected by grassroots party organizations, essentially by all party members, conference participants were nominated by local committees. This was perfectly explicable: It was difficult and dangerous to hold elections in grassroots organizations operating illegally. As a rule, local committee activists were involved in preparing and taking part in conferences, which also ensured that they were convened promptly. This practice was later adopted for the post-October conferences also.

At the same time it became clear even in the prerevolutionary period that conferences could match congresses in terms of significance. This also applies to the Tammerfors conference, but probably the most vivid example in this respect was the sixth party conference, held in January 1912 in Prague.

It was not easy to convene it. Not only because of the arrests, the difficulties in ensuring that delegates could travel abroad, and the shortage of funds. The problem also was that by January 1912 the situation inside the party itself was extremely tense. Its organizations at local level were still only beginning to recover from the heavy blows after the defeat of the 1905-1907 revolution. Many local committees had been smashed. Suffice it to say that the entire Petersburg committee alone was arrested 6 times and the Moscow committee 11 times during these years. But what was more terrible than the direct losses was the emerging ideological disarray. "Liquidationists" and other opportunist groups and currents publishing their own newspapers and creating their own independent centers and organizations were trying to explode the party from within. The Central Committee had essentially been inactive for 2 years. Its Foreign Bureau consisted of "liquidationists." Its Russian Bureau, which had long adopted a posture of conciliation with the "liquidationists," had ceased to exist after a series of arrests in 1911.

So then a conference of Central Committee members in Paris in June 1911 decided to convene a general party conference. A conference, not a congress—clearly because of the grave condition of local and central organizations, which precluded hopes of adequate representation. The Foreign Commission, headed by Lenin, and the Russian Organizational Collegium, which consisted of Leninist Bolsheviks, prepared the conference. Tremendous hopes were pinned on the conference. In a number of cases the delegates who were to travel to Prague were elected directly by grassroots cells, as during preparations for a congress. This happened in Petersburg, for instance. As a result representatives of over 20 organizations assembled for the conference. By the standards of those times, that was a colossal success.

The decisions adopted in Prague played an exceptionally important role in the party's life. The "liquidationists" were expelled from its ranks, tactical tasks for the



immediate future were determined, and it was decided to create an all-Russian workers' paper—this was to become PRAVDA. The conference elected a 7-man Central Committee including V.I. Lenin.

In all, seven party conferences were held in the period from 1905 to October 1917. They were convened astonishingly often: After all, four congresses were also held in those years. This confirms that the collective discussion of key questions of current policy and internal party life was a natural need for both leaders and ordinary members of the party.

Time was tough on the people. It was also tough on the documents. The few odd documents of the Prague and first Tammerfors conferences remain unpublished to this day. Even the published transcripts of the eighth (1919) and ninth (1921) conferences contain gaps.

There is a thin booklet bound in blue cloth with golden tooling on the flyleaf: "Minutes of the Seventh, April Conference of the RSDWP(B)" [Russian Social Democratic Workers Party (Bolsheviks)]. The conference was held in April 1917. The party had emerged from underground just 2 months earlier, and V.I. Lenin had returned to Russia from abroad just 2 weeks earlier. The main task facing the Bolsheviks was to grasp what was happening and determine their place in the revolution. There was no time, no opportunity to convene a congress, but what took its place was a conference mustering what was for those times an unprecedented number of delegates—149. Many, like Kamenev and Stalin, arrived directly from exile. The report on the current situation was delivered by V.I. Lenin.

His speech was based on the famous April theses, which provided a detailed characterization of the ways in which the bourgeois democratic revolution would develop into a socialist revolution. Much of what Lenin said was new and unfamiliar and diverged from the views widely held among a section of the Bolsheviks.

We must not take part in the game in which the Provisional Government and the soviets are participating, whose name is dyarchy, Lenin said. The control over the government, control without power, proposed by the Mensheviks (Kamenev had particularly pressed for this measure) is utopianism. We must bide our time until the government antagonizes the masses and patiently explain to the people the invalidity of the soviets' current policy. When we take power we must have a firm idea of what we are going to do with it. Our goal is mastery of the soviets, the nationalization of land, propaganda of socialism in the countryside, and the transfer to the socialist state of the apparatus of trusts and syndicates.

Kamenev, Kalinin, Nogin, and Rykov disagreed with Lenin's position. Though they were old party comrades and shared his ideas... Bubnov, Stalin, and Zinovyev

supported Vladimir Ilich. Defending his position, Lenin used persuasion and explanation, and sometimes sarcasm. People also argued with him and tried to prove their point.

At this period conferences continued to be convened frequently—there were nine of them between 1919 and 1929. The following practice was established: The congress would discuss and decide matters in principle and instruct the conference to prepare proposals and documents and to analyze the situation. The activity, for instance, of the 10th Party Conference, held in May 1921, was organized according to this scheme.

Likewise the 14th Party Conference, held in April 1925, which adopted the course of further developing the NEP [New Economic Policy] in agriculture (on the basis of A. Rykov's report). On the basis of G. Zinovyev's report the same conference adopted as a general policy guideline the thesis of the possibility of building socialism in a single country. The 16th conference (April 1929) was also tremendously significant, approving the First 5-Year Plan, whose basic guidelines were set out in the reports of A. Rykov, G. Krzhizhanovskiy, and V. Kuybyshev.

By this time a provision relating to conferences had been introduced into the Party Rules. Back in 1919, at the eighth party conference, it had been decided to hold such forums regularly, once every 3 months, gathering representatives of committees in the provinces and the capital together for them. In 1922, after the formation of the USSR, national Communist Party central committees, Central Committee oblast bureaus, and Red Army and Navy political departments received the right to send delegates to conferences.

But in 1934, at the 17th party congress, the provision on conferences disappeared from the rules.

Why? The answer lies in the transcripts of the 17th congress, which was probably the first to be held in an atmosphere of "general unanimity." Even former inveterate "deviationists" and "oppositionists"—Bukharin, Rykov, Tomskiy, Zinovyev, Radek—did not "spoil" the general picture but delivered repentant speeches.

At the next, 18th congress (1939), the provision relating to conferences was restored in the rules. A. Zhdanov, who delivered the report, argued that the purpose of a conference should be to nominate new cadres, primarily as members of the Central Committee, and also to replace former members. This was clearly dictated by very particular circumstances: By 1939 120 of the 138 members and candidate members of the Central Committee elected at the 17th congress had perished....

The last conference, the 18th, was held in February 1941 and was devoted to purely practical questions of the country's economic development and to revealing shortcomings and concealed reserves. It was primarily a

matter of strengthening the defense potential in conditions where the breath of war heralding the storm that was to come could already be felt. No more conferences have been held since then. That is not surprising: After all, even the next, 19th, party congress was held only in 1952. At it, incidentally, the paragraph relating to conferences was again removed from the rules. It reappeared only in 1966, at the 23d congress. However, the rules did not define the conference's functions. They merely said that conferences are convened "to discuss pressing questions of party policy." The possibility of convening a conference was not realized for 20 years after that.... "Universal approval" and mass "unanimity" again became dominant during the years of stagnation.

...Today, with the restoration of Leninist norms, the party is returning to the idea of holding conferences. Historically, the conference is one of the most democratic institutions in party life and is designed to resolve current problems or ones which unexpectedly confront the party. Practically any questions decided by a congress, including cadre questions, can fall within the competence of a conference.

How will delegates be elected to the upcoming conference?

A norm for representation has been established: 1 delegate per 3,780 party members. According to preliminary figures, at least 5,000 delegates will be elected.

The delegates to the 19th all-union conference will be elected by closed (secret) ballot at plenums of union republic Communist Party central committees and party kraykoms and obkoms. Representatives of the Ukrainian, Belorussian, Uzbek, and Kazakh Communist Parties will be elected at party obkom plenums. Delegates will be elected in April-May 1988.

Three years of restructuring have brought processes of renewal of truly unprecedented scope which have affected all aspects of society's life. The economic mechanism is being radically restructured. New spheres of economic activity are developing at a rapid rate—the cooperative movement and individual labor—democratization and glasnost have expanded, and changes to the political system have been placed on the agenda. The complex questions that have accumulated in the sphere of national relations also need to be examined.

All these processes and phenomena are developing swiftly. Each new step in deepening restructuring generates a need to interpret the experience accumulated so far, to make a considered assessment of our progress in the main directions of economic and social development, and to analyze the participation in restructuring of party and other social organizations and state and economic organs.

In the present conditions only an authoritative, democratic, and essentially collective party organ can do this. The 19th party conference is called upon to be that organ.

### **PRAVDA Discusses Prague All-Russian Conference of 1912**

*PM221017 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Apr 88  
Second Edition p 3*

[Discussion under rubric "Pages of History" involving Doctor of Historical Sciences V.V. Shelokhayev, chief of a sector of the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism, and Yu.N. Amiantov and Z.N. Tikhonova, senior scientific workers: "Sixth, Prague Conference"; boldface as published—first three paragraphs are PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] On the threshold of the 19th all-union party conference there is a natural heightening of interest in our party's history and in the key stages of its revolutionary struggle. From this glorious history we derive energy to resolve today's tasks and we draw lessons for the future.

We continue the series of articles on party historical topics prepared jointly with the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism, under the editorship of Academician G.L. Smirnov.

Today there is a discussion of the Sixth (Prague) All-Russian Conference of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party [RSDWP], held in January 1912. Participating in the discussion are Doctor of Historical Sciences V.V. Shelokhayev, chief of a sector of the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism, and Yu.N. Amiantov and Z.N. Tikhonova, senior scientific workers.

### **Difficult Path to the Truth [subhead]**

Question: It is well known that the Sixth, Prague Conference played a landmark role in the Leninist party's development and in the history of Bolshevism. In the previous "Page of History" devoted to party conferences (PRAVDA 1 April) we reminded readers that the Sixth, Prague Conference concluded the struggle against hostile trends in the workers movement and restored the Central Committee destroyed by liquidationists....

What has brought about the need to return to it?

Answer: This has been dictated by two circumstances.

First, the Sixth, Prague Conference was convened at a critical moment for the Russian workers movement and our party's history. The conference carried out a radical restructuring of party ranks, formulated the party's political line under conditions of an increasing revolutionary upsurge, and reflected in its decisions the vital need of the entire revolutionary movement in Russia.

And the second circumstance which makes us speak of that conference in greater detail is this. In the past there have been methodological disputes over it in party historical literature and scientific polemics connected with defining the place of the Sixth, Prague Conference in our party's history. Later, in the interests of Stalin's personality cult, the history of the conference and its role and significance were frankly falsified. The "Short Course," for example, stated that the Sixth, Prague Conference created an independent Bolshevik party, a new type of party—which is in glaring contradiction with Lenin's definition: Bolshevism had existed as a trend of political thought and as a political party since 1903.

It was, quite frankly, a major falsification of the pre-revolutionary period of party history to suit Stalin. A precedent was thereby created for further similar falsifications.

Question: Dal's "Explanatory Dictionary" contains what is, perhaps, a somewhat naive but apt definition: History is what was or is, in contrast to a fairytale or fable. Or take Aleksandr Tvardovskiy: "Neither reduce nor increase here—thus it was on earth." As we see, people both reduced and increased, and they struck out "guilty" surnames that displeased someone....

But there are authentic documents, you know....

Answer: It need hardly be demonstrated that it is best to study history from primary sources. That is a truism. It is all the more topical to make a new reading of them today, when the picture of the history of our party and our country is being cleaned of conjunctural accretions.

Now some more details about the shaping of scientific views on the place and significance of the Prague conference. There was no single viewpoint in the twenties. A.S. Bubnov, for example, believed that the conference completed the process of the Bolshevik party's organizational formation. But in the opinion of V.I. Nevskiy it marked the start of the formation of the Bolsheviks' separate party. Ye.M. Yaroslavskiy also wrote at first that in 1912 the Bolsheviks organized themselves as an independent party.

Question: Please specify in which works by the said authors these judgments were expressed. Are they accessible to readers?

Answer: Yes, they were recently opened up for mass readership. They are works by Bubnov—"Chief Moments in the Development of the Communist Party in Russia," Moscow, 1921; by Nevskiy—"History of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). A Brief Outline," Leningrad, 1926; and by Yaroslavskiy—"Brief Outline of the History of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)," Moscow and Leningrad, 1926-1928.

The different viewpoints in the twenties were accounted for by the fact that researchers had not yet formulated a unified methodological approach to determining the place and role of the Second RSDWP Congress and the Sixth, Prague Conference in the history of the Bolshevik Party or managed completely to ascertain their genetic and logical connection. And there is nothing surprising here: A creative scientific quest was under way.

The theses of the Commission for the Study of Party History and the Agitprop Department published in 1928 reflected both assessments of the role of the Sixth Party Conference. It was only in 1933, in the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) [AUCP(B)] Central Committee Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute theses "Thirty Years of the Bolshevik Party (1903-1933)" and in Ye.M. Yaroslavskiy's book "History of the AUCP(B)," published at the same time, that the most accurate formula was given. This is its essence: The Second RSDWP Congress began the existence of Bolshevism as an independent party, while the Prague conference concluded the entire preceding struggle to purge and strengthen the Bolshevik Party which emerged in 1903.

However, a book on the history of Transcaucasian Bolshevik organizations which frankly falsified facts was published in 1935. That book promoted the idea of the party's "two leaders" and juggled the facts of Stalin's life and activity.

Question: We know that the author of that falsified "history" was L.P. Beriia, who would balk at nothing to please the "leader" and be counted among his retainers.... What was the attitude to this book on the part of participants in the revolutionary struggle?

Answer: It is not hard to imagine their indignation. Incidentally, quite a lot has been written about this. And also about the fact that many revolutionary figures in the Transcaucasus who dared to raise an objection were repressed.

Question: A great man said, not without bitter irony: If the axioms of geometry affected someone's interests, they would undoubtedly be refuted.... History is clearly one of the sciences where interests clash most sharply.

Answer: The historical report "The Sixth (Prague) RSDWP Conference," prepared by the AUCP(B) Central Committee Party Publishing House for its 25th anniversary, maintained that "a separate Bolshevik Party was formed" in 1912 and, most importantly, a fairytale was disseminated about Stalin's supposedly special role in advancing the very idea of convening and preparing the all-Russian party conference and in creating the Russian Organizing Commission [ROC].

Question: While in fact?

Answer: In fact, the task of convening the next all-party conference was set in a resolution of the RSDWP Central Committee January (1910) Plenum and later at the Paris conference of Central Committee members in June 1911. Stalin was not present. It was that conference that took the initiative in convening the all-party conference.

The ROC—and this is borne out by authentic conference materials—was headed by G.K. Ordzhonikidze (Sergo). He, I.I. Shvarts, and B.A. Breslav were plenipotentiaries of the Foreign Organizing Commission [FOC] created at the Paris conference.

On Lenin's instructions G.K. Ordzhonikidze and other FOC plenipotentiaries toured the country's major industrial centers, established contacts, and enlisted the support of the majority of local party organizations. That prepared the ground for creating the ROC, which essentially fulfilled tremendous practical work in preparing the Prague conference under Lenin's leadership.

Question: When was the ROC created, and how?

Answer: In the fall of 1911 in Baku and Tiflis, at a conference of representatives of the FOC and local party organizations. The "Notice" adopted at the conference stated: "The ROC, standing outside factions, appeals to all party organizations, party elements, and figures in legal forms of the workers movement to give all possible assistance to the cause of our party's revival, to choose delegates for the party conference without delay, and to revive social democratic work locally."

Question: The "Notice" speaks not of creating but reviving the party.

Answer: Yes, just so. And I would like to emphasize something else: the appeal "to all party organizations, party elements, and figures in legal forms of the workers movement." Non-Marxist historiography claims that the very course of the preparation and holding of the conference expressed the deliberate policy of Lenin and his supporters of splitting Russian social democracy and realizing the model of a "narrow Bolshevik party of a new type."

The victory of Lenin's political line or, as bourgeois historians more frequently put it, of the "Leninist party model" is regarded by them as "a bid for individual representation of the newly created party" and thus as an extraordinary "provocation" with regard to the participant groups and organizations" directed not only against the liquidationists but also against national organizations. [quotation marks as published] The conference documents convincingly show that this is a deliberate falsification. Truthful illumination of the Prague conference debunks the false concepts of bourgeois historiography and serves the cause of the struggle against opportunism in the interests of strengthening the unity of the international communist movement.

Why "Stir Up History"? [subhead]

Question: Seven and one-half decades have elapsed and we seem to be speaking of times long gone, but in fact all this is topical even now....

Answer: History is an arena of acute ideological struggle—which, I may repeat, is also a truism. Incidentally, far from everyone among us is as yet fully aware of this.

Question: PRAVDA's editorial mail confirms your conclusion. Many readers have actively supported the appearance of the "Pages of History" in the newspaper, while others, on the contrary, reproach us: Why stir up old things? Particularly when we speak of "sore points" and problems associated with the cult of Stalin. Many people—the older generation above all—are concerned that, by exposing the difficulties and contradictions of a stage lived through in the country's history and addressing negative phenomena of the past, we may be blotting out achievements and belittling the heroic struggle of the party and the people.

Answer: The truth—and this has been stated repeatedly in recent years—can neither strike out nor belittle the true assets of our history. They are eroded only by distortion of the truth. And an elucidation of the actual course of events at and around the Prague conference helps us to understand still more fully and clearly Lenin's role in creating the party and to show what harm was done by the subjectivist approach and by looking through the "cult prism."

With the publication in 1938 of the "Short Course," which can be said to have been written according to Stalin's scenario and was edited rigorously by him, precisely the subjectivist approach began to dominate historical literature. The authors of the "Short Course" advanced the thesis that at the Prague conference "the Bolsheviks formed themselves from a political group into the independent Russian Social Democratic Workers Party (Bolsheviks)." Note: "from a political group..." That fundamentally contradicts the Leninist concept. Why was such an "amendment" required by its authors? The answer is obvious: to substantiate the idea of "two leaders" and overemphasize Stalin's special role in creating the Bolshevik party. They were not at all embarrassed that this belittled the significance of the Leninist stage in the development of Marxism and Lenin's role in creating a revolutionary proletarian party of a new type and disparaged the rich experience of Bolshevism. It was, of course, also a question of party figures, including delegates to the Prague conference, who were assiduously "purged" from history by the "Short Course." This was also the purpose of the AUCP(B) Central Committee resolution of 14 November 1938. It emphasized: "Unlike certain old textbooks, which set forth AUCP(B) history, above all, around historical figures and were meant to educate cadres via personalities and their biographies, the 'Short Course' sets forth party history by unfolding the basic ideas of Marxism-Leninism...." Such

contrasting of the history of ideas with history expressed in human biographies is unsound from a scientific viewpoint. Particularly as the resolution did not, of course, touch on the figure of Stalin himself or his biography. Thus, contrary to historical facts, the "Short Course" maintained that the conference elected Stalin to the Central Committee in his absence....

Question: But Stalin really did become a Central Committee member at just that time.

Answer: Yes, only he was not elected at the conference but was co-opted onto the Central Committee at a plenum held at the end of the Sixth, Prague Conference's work. Why was there a need to "retouch" the facts? They already attested to Stalin's role in the party's practical work. However, the authors had their reasons here. By following the truth, it would have been difficult to put him on a par with Lenin. But precisely this was necessary in order to substantiate the assertion current at the time that "Stalin is Lenin today." And to place him practically beyond criticism, including for the grossest violations of the Leninist norms of party life and for arbitrariness toward people.

Like a Fresh Wind [subhead]

Question: It is not at all easy for a nonspecialist to understand the true link between historical facts and even what he himself has lived through. It is even harder for young people, for whom all this is ancient history—what they learn in school or VUZ lessons.

But let us return to the conference itself. We stopped at how the ROC was created....

Answer: Lenin welcomed its creation "after four years of disruption and disorder"—despite incredible police persecution and unprecedented "backheels" by various groups waging a fierce struggle against the Bolsheviks.

The commission members headed by Ordzhonikidze did a great deal to reestablish social democratic organizations locally. Party work livened up. Progressive workers were actively involved in preparing the conference. All this indicated that the proletariat had not been broken by the counterrevolutionary time of troubles and that "the spirit of struggle was alive" in Russia's working class.

M.S. Olminskiy wrote: "A current of fresh air seemed to blow through working Petersburg and stir the swamp of petty liquidationist tasks and of liquidationist adaptation to legality." Let us explain: The liquidationists opposed the preservation of the party's illegal organizations—which would have essentially led to its degeneration. That could not be allowed. And progressive workers realized this. "We believe," one of the resolutions adopted at the workers' meetings in Moscow in September 1911 stated, "that the Bolshevik comrades who are called Leninists will always work as they do now. We workers will always support them."

Together with the liquidationists and the Otzovists (they demanded withdrawal from legal forms of work) Trotsky also waged a struggle against the party. Under the slogan of unity at any price, on a formal, unprincipled basis, he sought to preserve in the RSDWP's ranks the liquidationist elements who had essentially broken with party-mindedness.

The party was faced with the task of immediately "assembling everything fit for the struggle, everything living, everything that remains loyal to our red social democratic banner." And this was the aim of the Sixth, Prague Conference.

Question: Please explain: When were Lenin's division of the history of Bolshevism into periods and the Prague conference's place and role in this restored in party historical literature?

Answer: It is probably possible, first of all, to name the textbook "CPSU History," first published in 1959. Later this was done more fully and in a well reasoned manner in the multivolume "CPSU History." Let us refer readers to the second volume of that publication. Its authors brought into scientific circulation new documents and materials which made it possible to picture more fully the preparation, the work, and the results of the conference as an all-party forum equal in significance to a party congress. It was possible to do that only after the 20th CPSU Congress, which exposed Stalin's personality cult. And yet individual stereotypes have even now not been overcome, and there are failures to mention a number of conference delegates.

Question: Incidentally, how many delegates participated in its work? Which organizations did they represent?

Answer: The conference was attended by 18 delegates: 14 with a deciding vote and 4 with voice but no vote (V.I. Lenin, L.B. Kamenev, I.A. Pyatnitskiy, and N.A. Semashko). The delegates from Russia represented the Petersburg, Moscow, Saratov, Kazan, Tiflis, Baku, Nikolayev, Kiev, and Yekaterinoslav organizations of the RSDWP, the Dvina and Vilna groups of the RSDWP, and the Central Industrial Oblast. They were P.S. Zalutskiy and Ye.P. Onufriyev, F.I. Goloshchekin and G.Ye. Zinovyev, A.K. Voronskiy, A.I. Dogadov, G.K. Ordzhonikidze and S.S. Spandaryan, L.P. Serebryakov, D.M. Shvartsman, Ya.D. Zevin, M.I. Gurovich, and also A.S. Romanov and R.V. Malinovskiy, who turned out to be provocateurs. Sixteen delegates were representatives of the Bolsheviks, while two—Zevin and Shvartsman—were from the Menshevik Party members. The majority of the conference participants were young revolutionaries aged between 24 and 30.

Headed by Lenin [subhead]

Question: How do the conference documents characterize Vladimir Ilich Lenin's role at the conference?

Answer: The minutes of the Sixth, Prague Conference, delegates' memoirs, and other sources show that Lenin, who was there representing the party's central organ—the newspaper SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT—was conference chairman and delivered the main reports there, including “On the Political Situation and the Party's Tasks,” “On the Work of the International Socialist Bureau,” and “On RABOCHAYA GAZETA.” Today we know of approximately 10 Lenin speeches at the conference on other items on the agenda in addition to the aforementioned, as well as more than 30 chairman's rejoinders and brief remarks on delegates' speeches. Of the 23 resolutions 5 were written entirely by Lenin, while he made substantial changes of meaning to another 5 drafts. We also know that precisely Vladimir Ilich asked Antonin Nemec, the Czech social democratic representative on the International Socialist Bureau, to hold the conference in Prague and give appropriate assistance in organizing it. “What is most important for us,” he wrote, “is the possibility of organizing things **most clandestinely**. No one, no organization must know about this.”

“Vladimir Ilich had thought out all the details of organizing the conference with the greatest care,” N.A. Semashko recalled. “He was plainly anxious, for the success of the party's consolidation depended on the success of the conference.” Lenin met with the arriving delegates in the Belveder Hotel and later in the People's House of the Czech Social Democratic Party, where a conference was held in one of the small rooms of the PRAVO LIDU editorial board. When its participants moved into the apartments of Czech workers, Vladimir Ilich took up residence together with worker Ye.P. Onufriyev, delegate for the Peterburg organization.

Lenin was interested in everything: party business, work, earnings, the family, workers' sentiments. He familiarized the delegates with the theses of his conference speeches on the main items on the agenda. “We listened,” Onufriyev recalled, “and it seemed to us as though Lenin had traveled all over Russia and visited plants and peasant cottages—so profoundly and truthfully did he reflect the people's innermost needs and aspirations.”

The conference participants' memoirs and the minutes have brought down to us the delegates' living features and visible appearance. They include Sergo Ordzhonikidze. He was proud to have performed great work in preparing the conference and merited Lenin's approval. The Peterburg workers—the thin, very modest Onufriyev and the enthusiastic Zalutskiy—delivered detailed reports in Prague on the activity of the Peterburg RSDWP organization during the years of reaction. The cool, composed worker-fitter Serebryakov, who managed in a short time to restore the party organization in Nikolayev and attract into it old workers, party members, and participants in the 1905 revolution. The rather cunning, diplomatic, but not zestless worker Dogadov, secretary of the metalworkers' trade union in Kazan. The young, ardent, very likable poet Voronskiy, who became

a prominent journalist and literary critic during the years of Soviet power. Suren Spandaryan, racked with consumption but vehement in argument, and already a well-known journalist at the time. Firm, true Bolsheviks. “Hitherto scattered and disunited,” Voronskiy wrote in his memoirs, “we came together for the first time in 5 or 6 years and saw for ourselves that, despite all the obstacles, despite the executions, hard labor, prisons, and exile, common work that was dear to everyone was still being done everywhere.”

Menshevik Party members also attended the conference. In the early sixties one of us met and talked with former print worker D. Shvartsman. Asked what had kept him for a long time in the Menshevik camp, he replied: G.V. Plekhanov's authority. However, that did not prevent him going along with the Bolsheviks on all the main questions at the Prague conference. The other Menshevik Party member, Ya. Zevin, actively championed the line of Plekhanov, who denied the all-party nature of the conference. But, despite mistakes and vacillation, Zevin remained deeply devoted to the revolution: Now in the Bolsheviks' ranks, he was one of the 26 Baku commissars who died in 1918.

The conference atmosphere and the young delegates themselves, who had come to Prague from revolutionary Russia, pleased V.I. Lenin. “It is not hard for anyone who knew Ilich even slightly,” G. Zinovyev wrote, “to imagine how he had to display himself in such an atmosphere and cheer people, what rhythm and scope he had to impart to the work, how he had to infect (and did infect) everyone with his passionate and, at the same time, profound attitude to the matter, and how much personal cordiality and, at the same time, strict party-mindedness he introduced into relations with each of the delegates. This was the background against which Ilich could not fail to display all his particularly rich aspects. Against the background of this young ‘brood’ of Bolsheviks Ilich himself somehow grew younger. You could sense that in Prague he was, as it were, shedding from his shoulders all the burdens of the past counterrevolutionary 5-year period. Ilich was all vim and vigor. The majority of the delegates had brought from Russia boundless trust in and love for Ilich. And Ilich quickly won the trust and love of the rest at the conference itself....”

“I remember how Vladimir Ilich listened attentively to the reports from the provinces, ‘fastening on’ to each delegate and ‘drawing out’ of him everything in his soul. Ilich himself made numerous remarks during those reports and, I remember, he himself wrote the resolution on this point during those reports.”

Question: Have these memoirs been published?

Answer: No, they have not, although, as you can judge, they add quite significant details to the description of the conference atmosphere. It is clear why they were not published during the times of the cult. But the opinion

still exists, you know, that to name people who participated in a particular event but subsequently committed mistakes is to vindicate those mistakes. And so people prefer to keep quiet about them. Let us recall that during the thirties eight conference delegates essentially fell victims to Stalin's arbitrary rule—Zinovyev, Kamenev, Serebryakov, Dogadov, Zalutskiy, Goloshchekin, Voronskiy, and Pyatnitskiy. We also know of Ordzhonikidze's tragic fate.... It is, in our view, the direct duty of historians to restore the course of events in full, without gaps and deletions.

#### What the Secret Police Failed In [subhead]

Question: Among the participants in the Sixth, Prague Conference Romanov and Malinovskiy were subsequently exposed as provocateurs.

Answer: Well, as the saying goes, you cannot remove words from a song. This regrettable fact must also be commented on. Particularly as bourgeois historians zealously speculate on it and exaggerate the problem of "provocateurs in the party," claiming that the conference was largely made possible thanks to "the patronage of the tsarist secret police."

Clearly, these absurd fabrications have nothing to do with reality. If we can say something in connection with the participation of provocateurs in the conference, we can, of course, speak of the very difficult conditions under which the party had to wage the struggle: It was very cruelly persecuted by the tsarist secret police, which tried its hardest to undermine revolutionary organizations. The intention of the secret police was not only to expose and arrest the most active party workers but also to spread spy mania and suspicion, increase the isolation of party organizations, and detach them from the masses.

The Bolsheviks and other revolutionary parties took all possible measures, including collective and joint measures, to expose provocateurs. The Bolsheviks, for example, succeeded to a considerable degree in rendering harmless such major provocateurs as Zhitomirskiy, Bryandinskiy, and Chernomazov, while the Socialist-Revolutionaries exposed Azef. But they failed to protect the party from R. Malinovskiy. Possessing the gift of eloquence, being quick on the uptake in practical matters, and having energy, he had become a significant figure in Russia's trade union movement in 1910. The secret police, whose agent he was, was preparing him for a big game. Unfortunately, it largely succeeded in this. At the Prague conference Malinovskiy was elected a member of the RSDWP Central Committee, and he later became the Bolsheviks' deputy in the Fourth State Duma. He caused tremendous harm to the party. Thus, all the Prague conference delegates who went back to Russia were arrested on information from him.

"If he did not cause still greater harm," V.I. Lenin later emphasized, "it was because we had correctly organized the ratio of legal and illegal work.... While sending dozens and dozens of Bolshevism's best figures to hard labor and death with one hand, Malinovskiy had with the other hand to help educate tens and tens of thousands of new Bolsheviks through the legal press." In his deposition to the provisional government's commission in 1917 Vladimir Ilich explained: "Malinovskiy became a link in the long, strong chain linking (and from different sides, moreover) our illegal base with the two major organs of the party's influence on the masses, namely PRAVDA and the social democratic faction in the Duma. The provocateur had to protect both those organs in order to justify himself before us."

This is how the matter really stood. Let us add: In 1914, fearing exposure, the secret police had instructed Malinovskiy to voluntarily relinquish his functions as a deputy and leave the Duma. A party court (Chairman Ya.S. Ganetskiy, members V.I. Lenin and G.Ye. Zinovyev) in Poronin expelled him from the party for refusing to fulfill party duties and for straightforward desertion. Suspicions that Malinovskiy was a provocateur were also checked, but there was insufficient evidence at the time, and World War I, which began soon after, prevented additional witness depositions from being obtained. Malinovskiy was mobilized to the front, and the news of his death appeared in newspapers. However, the news was false. Only after the February 1917 revolution was he completely exposed as an agent of the secret police department. In the fall of 1918 Malinovskiy returned to Petrograd and, after being sentenced by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee Supreme Tribunal, was shot.

Infiltration by provocateurs could in no way influence the elaboration of the Sixth, Prague Conference's decisions—the secret police was powerless there. Lenin's ideas and genius directed the course of the conference.

#### In Acute Discussions [subhead]

Question: What else do we find by turning to the documents of the Prague conference?

Answer: In its minutes there are many vivid details which paint a living picture of the revolutionary struggle and reveal the principles of the party's organization and work.

Here is a characteristic example. While voicing principled condemnation of liquidationism and the reconciliationist, disorganizing factional line of Trotskiy, some delegates still underestimated the real danger of opportunism and reconciliationism and considered this to be chiefly an emigre phenomenon, and the polemics of Lenin and the Bolshevik press to be excessively sharp. "Squabbling," "troublemaking articles"—these rebukes were addressed not only to publications of the Mensheviks and Trotskiy but also to the RSDWP's central



organ—the newspaper SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT. V.I. Lenin repeatedly took the floor to explain the state of affairs and indicate the main reasons for the intensification of the ideological and political struggle in the party. “Local organizations,” he said, replying to Menshevik party members, “have been hindered by the factional struggle. Viktor (Shvartsman—editor’s note) proposes an amendment condemning the struggle among groups. But the groups’ struggle must not be condemned. This is party life. It is necessary to wipe out squabbling and condemn factionalism and unprincipled struggle, too, but condemning the groups’ struggle means condemning now and previously our struggle against liquidationism. You are introducing confusion into the minds of workers during the period of struggle.”

Or take this extract from Vladimir Ilich’s speech: “...We have argued, we have exposed reconciliationists. My article about them has been pointed to as an example of troublemaking articles. Fine. But, comrades, my stern critics, permit me to ask you a question. What kind of man is Trotskiy, the reconciliationists’ head? Under the party flag, under the guise of illegal party literature, on the quiet, this man smuggled liquidationism among the Russian workers. This had to be exposed. It was also necessary to point to those who willy-nilly play into Trotskiy’s hands. Mention has been made of my article about Rozhkov (N.A. Rozhkov was one of the leaders of liquidationism—editor’s note). It was there that there could not (be) and was no squabbling abroad. Our disagreement with Rozhkov was fundamental. This disagreement was preceded by lengthy correspondence. You say: Circles, squabbling among circles. Yes, circles. It is necessary to struggle against them, and not go away, shaking off the dust. A struggle is now being waged to the death, and there is nothing to whine or complain about here. I repeat, complaints about squabbles and polemical squabbling are understandable and appropriate only in the mouth of a socialist of feeling and sentiment. We have two parties—this is a fact. Their existence stems from the sum total of Russian reality.”

You will agree that Lenin’s energy of thought and his ability to convince can be felt even in the minutes—and these were taken down by the delegates themselves in turn.

And another fragment from the discussion on the urgent restructuring of party organizations and the combination of legal and illegal forms of work. There was no special report on the organizational question, and the debate, which was of a lively nature, began at once at Lenin’s suggestion. The delegates voiced general dissatisfaction with the state of illegal work and, in particular, with the old circle form of work and reflected on how to rectify the situation. Lenin emphasized that in the period of the new revolutionary upsurge the party must find new forms of influencing the masses: Create a mass worker press (this idea was associated with the creation of PRAVDA) and turn small legal worker societies into organizations able to take on some of the party work.

According to Lenin’s scheme, it was necessary to create in every legal organization small social democratic cells connected with the party’s underground activity. “These illegal cells, surrounded by a network of legal cells, will give us a new base. All relations are reduced to the minimum, as though there is and is not an organization. Let there be no meetings. Party work has taken on a different form. The new form has already forced its way into the old one.”

Not all the delegates at once agreed with Lenin’s ideas. Some believed that the legal societies had exhausted themselves. A heated discussion ensued. F. Goloshchekin (Boris): “I do not know what to call this ideal picture which Lenin has painted, but he did not invent it. I could cite many facts.... I think that Lenin’s proposal—a small cell leads, surrounded by a network of legal cells—is acceptable.” S. Spandaryan: “There have been changes since 1905. We must now say how to link legal and illegal organizations and how to utilize legal opportunities. The time of the old propaganda circles, to which boy- and girl-students with a knowledge of Marx’ biography came, is over.... We must set up an illegal center in every city. It must direct the economic and political struggle.”

The conference decisions were of tremendous significance for reviving the party, organizationally strengthening it, and mobilizing the masses to struggle for the overthrow of tsarist autocracy. The Sixth, Prague Conference elected the party’s new Central Committee.

#### Before New Tests [subhead]

Question: Please say, in conclusion, how the party’s Central Committee was elected.

Answer: First, a fragment from Voronskiy’s memoirs on Lenin’s conversation with delegates on this subject: “At all costs and without delay,” he said, “we must now create a Bolshevik, totally competent Central Committee strongly connected with local groups and organizations. The organizational disorder must be ended. We are on the eve of a new revolutionary upsurge. Without a strong center we cannot and will not master the movement. This is the chief feature of the moment.”

Preserved in the conference materials are the “Proposals on the Procedure for Electing the Central Committee and Co-opting Central Committee Members,” submitted by Ordzhonikidze, Spandaryan, and Voronskiy: 1) A Central Committee of seven members is to be elected at this time; 2) the right to co-opt is granted by a simple majority with no limit on the numbers co-opted; 3) the Central Committee is elected by secret ballot. And so the election was held. The delegates passed to V.I. Lenin notes indicating only the party pseudonyms of the proposed candidates, under which they all participated in the conference. Eleven such notes have been preserved, but 13 delegates with a deciding vote participated in the



ballot (Zevin refused to participate). Lenin and Zinoviev were elected unanimously; Spandaryan, Ordzhonikidze, Shvartsman, and Malinovskiy received 12 votes each; and Goloshchekin and Voronskiy received 5 votes each. On the results of a second ballot Goloshchekin was included in the Central Committee. The strictest secrecy was observed in the election: Those elected to the Central Committee were notified confidentially by Lenin and Ordzhonikidze, each one separately.

Question: Why was the Central Committee granted the right to co-opt new members?

Answer: Primarily because the majority of the Central Committee members, apart from Lenin and Zinoviev who remained abroad and made up the Central Committee's Foreign Bureau, traveled back to Russia. They comprised the Russian Bureau for the practical leadership of the party's local organizations. The possibility of their being arrested dictated the need to grant the Central Committee the right to co-opt. The new Central Committee held two sessions even during the conference. At the first of them both I.V. Stalin, who was then in exile, and I.S. Belostotskiy, former worker at the Putilov Plant in Petersburg, party member since 1904, and student of the party school at Longjumeau, were incorporated. Candidacies for co-optation were outlined—in case the elected Central Committee members were arrested: A.S. Bubnov, member of an oblast bureau of the Central Industrial Region, and RSDWP Moscow Organization members A.P. Smirnov and M.I. Kalinin, Ye.D. Stasova and S.G. Shaumyan. True, owing to the circumstances which took shape, none of them was subsequently co-opted. Ya.M. Sverdlov and G.I. Petrovskiy joined the Central Committee in December 1912.

...The Prague conference ended 17 (30) January 1912. Behind it lay 23 sessions and 12 days of acute discussions and strenuous work.

After the conference there was a farewell evening with lively conversations round a modest but nonetheless festive table. The Czech comrades who had done a great deal to organize the Sixth, Prague Conference spoke. Vladimir Ilich thanked them warmly. He was moved, and did not hide the fact.

The party prepared for a new, hard struggle. There were still years to go until February 1917 and the October victory. But the policy elaborated by the Prague conference of overthrowing czarism and carrying out a democratic coup received the support of the working class. The slogans advanced by the Bolsheviks' party, Lenin later pointed out, soon became the political slogans of all Russian democracy and the rising people's revolution.

### NEDELYA Holds Roundtable Discussion on Role of Past Conferences

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[V. Vodolazhskiy and V. Gatov account of "Roundtable Discussion" on the agenda for the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference: "Perceiving the Future by Knowing the Past. Party Conferences: Historical Steps"; date and place not given—first three paragraphs are NEDELYA introduction]

[Text] As the opening date of the 19th all-union party conference draws nearer, NEDELYA's mailbag produces a growing number of letters about this event. They contain reflections on restructuring, on the process of democratization now under way in the country, on glasnost, and on the CPSU's role in the revolutionary renewal of Soviet society.

We must not forget our history while solving contemporary questions—this idea runs right through most letters. A vision of the past and an analysis of its achievements and miscalculations, of its ups and downs—this is the best guarantee for avoiding future mistakes. It is certainly no accident that restructuring, which, in M.S. Gorbachev's expression, is "fateful" for socialism, has generated such a universal interest in history.

The history of all-union party conferences, the role which the forthcoming party forum in June has to play in the country's life, and the hopes which Soviet people are investing in it—these were the topics of a "History Club" "roundtable discussion" between: Doctor of Historical Sciences Valeriy Vasilyevich Zhuravlev, deputy director of the CPSU Central Committee Marxism-Leninism Institute; Yuriy Aleksandrovich Polyakov, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences; Doctor of Historical Sciences Kirill Vladimirovich Gusev, professor at the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences; Doctor of Historical Sciences Vitaliy Semenovich Lelchuk, senior scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences History of the USSR Institute; Doctor of Juridical Sciences Professor Vladimir Aleksandrovich Tumanov, sector chief at the USSR Academy of Sciences State and Law Institute; and Candidate of Historical Sciences Yuriy Vasilyevich Tyurin, editor of the History and Theory of Party Building Department of the journal VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS.

[Journalist] It is well known that the CPSU Statutes (except those adopted by the 19th and 22d CPSU Congresses) have all contained provisions for two forms of supreme party organ—the congress and the party conference. Conferences convened fairly regularly in between congresses until 1941. The 19th All-Union Party Conference will take place 47 years after the 18th. Why is it, in your opinion, that this form of the party's supreme organ has not been used for such a long time? At which most important historical moments in time did the party resort to convening its conferences in the past?

V.S. Lelchuk: Perfectly legitimate questions. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the majority of all conferences held after 1917 were convened in the first few years of Soviet power. Both congresses and party conferences were being convened annually virtually until the mid-twenties. Now we know well that this was a manifestation of one of the most important aspects of Lenin's style of work and of his leadership of the country, of the life of the party and the working class, and of the process of society's transformation as a whole. Check decisions made by the party "brass" against the opinion of a broad party audience—that was Lenin's principle.

We see, alas, a different picture when we look at the period which was typified by administrative edict methods of management and the conditions of Stalin's personality cult. The 15th All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Congress was held in 1927, the next took place 3 years later, the 17th (the congress of "victors") followed 4 years after the 16th, and the 18th was held 5 years after that. The same fate befell the party conferences: They were convened only three times between 1926 and the beginning of the war (in 1929, 1932, and 1941). That was no accident: The personality cult which was taking shape and the administrative system of the country's management did not need an open [glasnoye] and impartial party discussion at forums. Could there really be anything accidental about the fact that the 19th congress was separated by 13 years from the one before it?

The party lost a lot when party conferences became sporadic occurrences and lost their former importance.

Yu.V. Tyurin: A retrospective look over the postwar (and even the prewar) decades makes it possible to perceive with sufficient clarity that mistakes and failures in the determination and implementation of domestic and foreign policy in our country occurred, as a rule, whenever collective leadership was weakened and there was, in one form or another, a manifestation of the personality cult, voluntarism, and subjectivism. Deviations from the principle of collectiveness in party leadership inevitably inflicted the gravest of damage on the party, the people, and the cause of socialism. Stalin's personality cult had the most pernicious effect on Soviet society's advance along the socialist path. This phenomenon, alien to the essence of socialism, was the most serious brake along the path of implementing the new system's enormous advantages, diminished the creative potential of socialism, and deformed the essential principles laid down by V.I. Lenin.

Tangible damage was inflicted on the party's activity, and consequently on our society's development, by the deformation of the functions of the CPSU's supreme organs, its congresses and conferences. For example, the last prewar congress, the 18th, was already nothing more than just a mouthpiece for Stalin's authoritarianism and his personality cult. Just leaf through the stenographic record, and you will see for yourselves.

The 19th CPSU Congress was held in 1952 and—even though the Central Committee report was delivered by Malenkov rather than Stalin—it was in fact also used as a rostrum to proclaim the personal ideas and affirm the personal policy of "the great leader."

Unfortunately, even after the cult was debunked, attempts were made over quite a lengthy period to apply voluntarist methods to the solution of qualitatively new domestic and foreign policy tasks both under N.S. Khrushchev (during the so-called "glorious decade") and under L.I. Brezhnev. What is more, this seriously complicated socialism's progress to a new stage and compromised the progressive initiatives that were being embarked on.

While restoring the spirit of democracy we cannot fail to look back on the past and check our decisions against Engels' warning: "It is also necessary for people to finally cease treating party functionaries—their own servants—with constant and excessive delicacy and, instead of criticizing them, obeying them with utmost submissiveness as infallible bureaucrats."

V.V. Zhuravlev: It would be incorrect to examine the problem of party conferences in isolation from the complex and ambiguous processes of the development of intraparty democracy as a whole, with its indisputable successes and its difficulties and retreats.

Lenin's traditions of democratic discussion by the whole party of the package of complex questions arising at crucial stages of our history retain their importance to this day. Suffice it to recall the developments which occurred in 1921, after the end of the civil war. The country switched from the tracks of "war communism" to the New Economic Policy. This transition was truly revolutionary and demanded a restructuring of the nature and content of the activity of the party and state institutions, a breakthrough in the awareness and practical activity of Communists. A congress and two party conferences were convened within just 1 year!

For example, the Central Committee elected by the 10th Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Congress took only 2 months to prepare and submit for discussion by the 10th All-Russian Party Conference a plan for the implementation of the congress decisions. It is hardly necessary to explain how important this plan was. It made provisions for the promotion of new forces, both from among Communists and from nonparty member workers and peasants, to responsible sections of party, soviet, and trade union work.

The affirmation of the regime of personal power by Stalin and the corresponding administrative edict system of leadership led, in particular, to the gradual erosion of the direct purpose of the party's supreme forums—the congresses and conferences—as the party's main democratic councils. The atmosphere of pomposity and glorification of Stalin came to typify them. The

hitherto last party conference in the party's history, the 18th, was held in February 1941. This form of supreme party organ then disappeared altogether from the CPSU Statutes, but the 23d party congress (March-April 1966) wrote in its resolution "On Partial Amendments to the CPSU Statutes": "To make provisions... that, in the period between party congresses, the Central Committee may, to the extent that it may be necessary, convene an all-union party conference to discuss pressing questions of party policy, while the central committees of union republic Communist Parties may convene republic party conferences." I think that it was no accident that this question became so topical actually in the mid-sixties. The desire not to repeat mistakes with voluntarist overtones drew the party's attention with renewed strength to the democratic traditions of party conferences. The economic reform which was unfolding in the country brought the party and society face to face with what was described at the time as the inevitability of discussing its most complex socioeconomic aspects in the very near future. But these intentions simply failed to materialize. There was insufficient depth of perception of the situation, insufficient political determination and persistence in the work to implement the adopted decisions. A historic chance was missed.

The CPSU Central Committee February (1988) Plenum noted that, in elaborating the concept of the future conference, the Central Committee Politburo was guided by the belief that the democratization of social life and radical economic reform demand a clear-cut program of action from the party. In these conditions, the conference must define much of the party's strategic work.

The concept of the future conference not only restores the status of the conference in line with Lenin's views of party democracy, but also clearly defines the role of all-union party conference as a powerful instrument of democratization and an important lever of restructuring.

Yu.A. Polyakov: In the course of revolutionary development, the density of events is greater and movement is more headlong. This is why the party now feels the need to make more frequent use of the mechanism for collective elaboration of decisions. This need is clear now. I do not rule out the possibility that the question may be raised of convening CPSU congresses more frequently—once every 3 years, for example. In any event, the changes which have been effected in the 2 years since the 27th congress are so significant, the need for further deepening and expansion of revolutionary transformations is so obvious, that the convening of a broad party forum in the form of an all-union conference is pressing, it is now on the agenda.

[Journalist] In your opinion, what questions ought to be discussed in greater detail in the course of preparations for the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference?

V.A. Tumanov: I think the question of the means, forms, and methods of party leadership of state and public organizations has been brought to the forefront. This is of course no accident, since only high standards of such leadership can ensure the success of restructuring and can overcome the retarding processes originating with bureaucratic management mechanisms and established stereotypes of activity by state organs and public organizations.

At the same time, the basic demand made by restructuring—to abandon administrative-edict methods of work—applies to the party organs and apparatus themselves. The tenacity shown by edict methods is largely linked with the view, sufficiently widespread among party workers and especially at local level, that the law is not absolutely mandatory for them and that, in the "interests of the cause" (or rather the falsely and parochially interpreted "interests of the cause"), they can—if not "push it aside," as the saying goes—at least overlook its existence.

But wait a minute: Article 6 of the 1977 USSR Constitution reads: "All party organizations shall function with the framework of the Constitution." The appearance of this article at the time represented a great step forward. Unfortunately, however, the norm is neither concretized nor developed in the current CPSU Statutes; nor has the literature on party building given it the necessary attention. But practice shows that there is need for such concretization. Why?

Simply because, for example, to "function within the framework of the Constitution" means to respect the competence of the soviets of people's deputies, other state organs, enterprises, and labor collectives enshrined in the Constitution (and in the laws published in performance of the Constitution). Any breach of this principle represents a most typical feature of the administrative-edict methods of party leadership. I believe that the topic of "respect for the law" must take its place in conference discussions on the question of forms and methods of party leadership.

Yu.V. Tyurin: Let us ask ourselves why has there still been no proper breakthrough along the entire front of restructuring. Why is it progressing in such a complex, diverse, and ambiguous fashion? Simply because many party committee leaders still adhere to obsolete but conventional views of the CPSU's role ("we decide everything for everybody"), are slow to relinquish economic executive functions, and have a technocratic style of leadership detrimental to the political style.

Lenin said in his speech at the close of the 11th party congress: "The whole point now is to ensure that the vanguard (the party, in other words—Yu.T.) is not afraid to work a little on itself, to refashion itself...." What is this if not Lenin's political testament concerning the party's tasks in emerging, qualitatively new conditions (NEP at that time, radical economic reform nowadays)?

Lenin, finely attuned to every link and every cog in the party mechanism, also warned against the danger of deformities in the top echelons of power in the event that "an **incapable** individual vested with enormous power will '**accidentally**' [boldface as published] appear at the center." "No remedy for this," he wrote, "will be provided by any statute; it can be provided only by 'comradely influence' measures." In other words by collective and political methods of leadership.

I think there is another problem which merits serious attention: party committees' perception of the meaning of democratic centralism. After all, a formal interpretation of this fundamental principle of the party's life and work makes it possible to demand of party members "unanimity through discipline." My many years of experience as secretary of party organizations, including large ones, enable me to say that, generally speaking, any party meeting or conference which proceeded without arguments, without criticism, or without discussions has always caused legitimate dissatisfaction. To learn democracy does not mean to silently agree with everything that is suggested. Rather the contrary: It means being able to dispute and to uphold a viewpoint, provided it is substantiated. Collective wisdom is born not out of mechanical appeasement but out of intellectual diversity.

The time has probably come to also revise the outdated view held toward a "minority." One recalls a time when those in a minority were held out to be people almost alien to the party and the country. A respectful and tactful attitude toward minority opinion is one of the expressions of political culture and democracy.

[Journalist] Our country has a one-party system. Moreover, the 10th Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Congress resolution "On Party Unity," prohibiting any factional activity, still exists and still remains in force. In your opinion, does this mean that there can and must be no differences of opinion on various issues within the party?

V.A. Tumanov: Fortunately, the time when differences of opinion and discussions within the party ended with the label "factionist" or even, later on, "enemy of the people" being attached to those who disagreed with Stalin is now past history. It seems to me incorrect in principle to treat the terms "party discussion" and "factional activity" as synonyms, as phenomena of the same magnitude. The latter runs contrary to the party's organizational principles, primarily to democratic centralism. The former, on the other hand, is a necessary element of party life envisaged by the CPSU Statutes, and its absence leads to stagnation.

In my view now, in the conditions of restructuring, we are fairly successfully learning to conduct discussions expressing socialist pluralism of opinions and are abandoning the "plebiscite discussions" in which everybody gave more or less identical answers under threat of being excommunicated from Marxism-Leninism.

V.V. Zhuravlev: Unfortunately, right to this day one comes across instances of incorrect or distorted interpretation of the essence of the 10th Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Congress resolution "On Party Unity." This is an echo of the difficult times in the history of our intraparty democracy when, in the conditions of the personality cult, any expression of personal opinion by a Communist on various questions of life in the party and the country which did not coincide with the official viewpoint could be arbitrarily interpreted as a manifestation of factional activity. The pernicious consequences of this clearly perverted understanding of the principle of democratic centralism, which lasted for decades after 1953, are universally known. It is obvious that they also produced the crisis phenomena in the sphere of party duty and party responsibility which, by the early eighties, most obviously reflected the extent of the party's unpreparedness to promptly, actively, and effectively oppose the growing phenomena of stagnation in society.

Meanwhile, discussions reflecting differences of opinion within the party while it was in the process of considering current questions of its theory and policy were always assessed by V.I. Lenin as an immutable attribute of living activity by a living party, as an absolute condition for the development of intraparty democracy.

The history of ideological and theoretical struggle within the party in Lenin's time indicates that factional activity began only in cases when, after the party as a whole had adopted some decision or other, those who had been in the minority disregarded party discipline and united organizationally to wage open struggle against the implementation of the party line. It is not personal opinion that can turn a Communist into a factionist, it is his deliberate breach of party discipline, his disregard of an adopted decision, and his opposition to the cause of its implementation. Thus the borderline separating factional activity from conventional discussions and differences of opinion within the party is quite clearly defined. Given healthy intraparty relations and reliable guarantees that a Communist's rights will be respected, it can in no way prevent the unfolding of most pointed discussions on the most fundamental questions.

K.V. Gusev: On the 4th day following the establishment of Soviet power, V.I. Lenin said: We wanted a coalition Soviet Government, we did not expel anyone from the soviet, we are not to blame that the Mensheviks and right-wing Socialist Revolutionaries withdrew from the Second Congress of Soviets, and we are prepared to readmit those who withdrew and to recognize a coalition within the boundaries of the soviets.

This was, as a matter of fact, a real possibility, because the point at issue concerned the handing of power to the soviets, which were multiparty organs. But the parties which styled themselves socialist and democratic preferred to participate in the organs of Soviet power in a bloc with the bourgeoisie and were unwilling to take on

even the role of a parliamentary opposition. Instead of this, they unleashed civil war in Russia in alliance with the interventionists and the White Guards.

The government bloc formed by the Bolsheviks with left-wing Socialist Revolutionaries did not last long, either. It is well known that it was disbanded not by the Communists but at the initiative of the left-wing Socialist Revolutionaries who were against the conclusion of the Brest Peace Treaty. They attempted to blow up the peace treaty with the bomb thrown at German Ambassador Mirbach, and afterward launched an all-out anti-government insurgency. This was no longer a struggle of opinions; this was counterrevolutionary action.

In principle, recognizing the possibility of creating multiparty organs of power means recognizing the struggle of opinions and disputes between parties. Why then, if we recognize the likelihood of different viewpoints being held by different parties, should we not recognize the likelihood of this occurring within one party? Regardless of whether a state has one party or several parties, different viewpoints could exist within that one party; it is, however, obvious that in such an event the responsibility for decisionmaking and the importance of discussions within the party increase. Consequently, we are talking not about discussions or a struggle of opinions, but primarily about the attitude toward them. (Let us look no further than the Brest Peace Treaty itself. A whole series of eminent party figures, the so-called group of "Left Communists," was against signing it. They were defeated in discussions, the peace treaty with Germany was signed, but all the "Left Communists" still retained their high positions within the party....)

Opponents should not be assessed from the position of "Whoever is not with us is against us." The struggle of opinions should not be perceived as struggle against enemies—this much is obvious.

This art must be learned from Vladimir Ilich Lenin. Let us recall that on 2 June 1921 IZVESTIYA published a letter from him saying that the Menshevik I.M. Mayskiy, whom he had classed as an opponent of Soviet power, was now a member of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and should no longer be ranked together with Chernov and Martov.

I therefore think that a rejection of the prevailing viewpoint that any form of polemics is essentially political struggle waged from positions that are hostile to the party and Soviet society, and a return to Lenin's norms in the conduct of polemics with and behavior toward opponents, constitute the path which leads to the development and improvement of intraparty democracy.

[Journalist] The CPSU Central Committee February (1988) Plenum emphasized that democratization and strictest application of laws are ideas which are inseparably interlinked. The 1936 USSR Constitution granted

the country's citizens virtually the full range of democratic rights and freedoms and guaranteed their protection against illegal search and arrest. But one of the most tragic periods in Soviet history began less than 1 year later. In your view, what state and social mechanisms (laws, political decisions, system of guarantees, amendments to the USSR Constitution) are necessary to enable us to avoid a tragic "recurrence of the past"?

V.S. Lelchuk: When thinking of a mechanism which would prevent a repetition of tragic mistakes from the past, it would be naive to imagine that it all boils down to individual measures (and in particular fixed terms for renewing the leadership of party and of economic organs and suchlike). It would be appropriate to recall V.I. Lenin's proposal for organizing the work of party-state control at all levels. His last articles speak of the creation of structures which would give authorized agents (the workers and peasants themselves) an opportunity to inspect any documents and materials concerning the activity of all echelons of the party and state apparatus. Lenin perceived such control as an opportunity to diminish "the effect of purely individual and incidental circumstances."

Is it not time to take another look at these Lenin proposals? I think that a broad discussion of them in today's conditions would be a useful contribution to preparations for the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference. The question of the radical renewal of practical trade union work (again, at all levels) also merits the utmost attention. Tremendous reserves for the consolidation of democracy are contained here.

V.A. Tumanov: Could the legal system and the law guarantee the irreversibility of restructuring processes and offer a cure against a "recurrence of the past"? Only a high level of development of democracy and all its components can guarantee the irreversibility of restructuring.

This formulation of the question really assigns an important role to the legal system. This is why the question of the all-around development and improvement of the legal basis of state and social life has arisen in the context of restructuring. The thesis of a socialist state functioning on the basis of law merits utmost support but, at the same time, it is necessary to avoid the danger of presenting what is desirable as real. Very much still remains to be done to elevate the state's practices within the law, and above all Soviet society's legal awareness, to the level of a state functioning on the basis of law, and also to give specific content to this hitherto figurative expression.

Let me indicate a few of what I consider the most substantial elements: A sufficiently effective system has still not been created to monitor departmental norm-setting, which is quite extensive and frequently "amends" and even distorts the law with impunity; there is insufficient legal protection of the legitimate interests

of enterprises, cooperatives, and citizens; the judicial system needs serious and all-embracing reform; and finally, legal standards are inadequate, even in state management.

I would like to dwell in some detail on this last thesis. Disrespect for the law is a problem, not to say a calamity.... After all, reverence for the supreme acts of state (which the laws are) is one of the foundations of statehood in general, which even Plato wrote about! Yet look at what has happened in our country: The Law on the State Enterprise came into force on 1 January 1988, yet a prominent Gosplan official, competing with the USSR Supreme Soviet, sets different time schedules for this law's effect and we read about it in one of the country's major newspapers.... It appears that this law is still operating only "partially" (obviously on Gosplan instructions) and will come fully into force only in a few years' time (the Gosplan will obviously issue a special directive to this purpose). According to MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, a railroad chief declared at a locomotive depot party meeting that the first 15 articles of the USSR Law "On the State Enterprise" are ineffective regarding the depot's collective. Advance toward a state functioning on the basis of the law can be retarded by such attitudes in the management apparatus.

In my view, the psychological barrier in the minds of many functionaries is, figuratively speaking, one of the brake pads of the stagnation mechanism and, unless it is overcome, our advance will be extremely slow.

[Journalist] It is well known that the 19th CPSU Congress adopted a decision to abolish party conferences. At the same time, a decision was also adopted to abolish purges within the party. But the experience gained by the party during the years of stagnation indicated that, nevertheless, the ranks of the Soviet society's vanguard had been joined by people unworthy of the lofty title of Communist, "degenerates with a party ticket," as was said at the 27th CPSU Congress. Do you not think that the party needs a mechanism making it possible to cleanse its ranks every so often of such elements?

Yu.A. Polyakov. There are numerous instances of the party being penetrated by people unworthy of the lofty title of Communist. This was already noted during the early years of Soviet power, as soon as the party became a ruling party. Those were the leeches whom Kursk peasant Gribasov had in mind when he spoke in 1922 about the Communist Party: "I recognize that the party is right: The only problem is that there are too many wrong people among those who are right."

The method of mass purges, just like any method based on the unsystematic campaign approach, failed to prove its worth and there is hardly any point in reverting to it. What primary and rayon party organizations need is not an unsystematic campaign approach but daily work to keep their attention focused on the personal behavior and moral character of Communists. If a major or minor

chief loses his modesty and tolerates rudeness and boorishness, if an official turns into a self-seeker (and I don't mean crimes committed while in office: They must be punished without fail), if...—there are too many "ifs," and they all must be examined in an unbiased fashion by Communist comrades, they must be strictly and objectively assessed and, mainly, they must be subject to glasnost. A Communist's authority should not stem from his office but must be proved in practice by devotion to the common cause.

Let me cite an example from the experience of party conferences. Among other issues, the Eighth Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Conference in December 1919 examined (on the basis of N.I. Bukharin's report) the question of making use of new party members. Somewhat earlier, in the fall, a party week had been held in the country. It coincided with the most tense weeks of the civil war. Denikin was approaching Moscow, Yudenich was approaching Petrograd. People realized that joining the party produced no benefits but imposed most serious obligations and posed the threat of death in the event of an enemy victory. It was in these conditions that 200,000 became Communists.

The times are different now, of course. However, it might not be inappropriate to recall even now the explicitly, passionately revolutionary slogan which appeared in the press 8 October 1919, when the party week began in Moscow: "...Down with leeches who have attached themselves to the party! Kick out of the party the saboteurs, the lazy and the idle, those who put on airs! Welcome to the workers, honest toilers, fighters, and comrades!"

#### **Aims, Tasks of All-Party Conferences Reviewed** *PM261357 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian* 21 Apr 88 p 3

[Article by B. Kudashkin of the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism Leninism, answering readers' questions, under the rubric "You Wanted to Know": "In the Period Between Congresses"—first paragraph is SELSKAYA ZHIZN introduction]

[Text] The editorial office is receiving letters inquiring about the practice of holding all-party conferences and their aims and tasks in connection with the upcoming 19th all-union party conference. B. Kudashkin, a staffer at the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism Leninism, answers the readers' questions.

In the party's entire history, 18 all-party conferences have been held, 7 of them during the prerevolution period. It is almost half a century now since a all-party conference was held. In this context, the convocation of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference unquestionably represents a very significant event in the life of the party. In the early days of the party's establishment, all-party conferences played a very important role.

During the prerevolution years, they served mainly to resolve tactical questions. They elaborated, for instance, the party organizations' line toward other parties and social forces at specific periods, their stance on the agrarian or nationalities question or on specific, pressing aspects of party building.

Some all-party conferences were convened at crucial moments of the revolutionary struggle: They adopted important, crucial decisions defining the activity of the party for a long time to come, elected the Central Committee, or introduced changes to its composition.. Thus V.I. Lenin described the Fifth RSDWP [Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party] Conference as a turning-point in the development of the party during the reaction years. From the viewpoint of the science of party history, the decisions of that conference formed the basis of the RSDWP's tactical line right up to the 1917 February Revolution in Russia. The Sixth (Prague) All-Russian RSDWP Conference has been compared in its significance to a congress.

After the Great October Socialist Revolution, questions of economic policy, party building (including questions concerning the statutes), the strengthening of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, the friendship of the USSR peoples, and the development of socialist competition were discussed at all-party conferences. In their documents the conferences complemented and clarified the fundamental directives elaborated at party congresses and dealt with questions of vital importance for the party, the country, and the fate of socialist building.

In short, historical practice indicates that all-union party conferences represent an important democratic form of collective discussion of urgent questions of party policy and of vital problems of party work between congresses.

Question: Why was it necessary to convene the 19th all-union party conference?

Answer: The times are such that life is frequently outstripping even the boldest decisions, and the need arises to bring party directives in line with the new needs of life. Thus, the upcoming conference, as the CPSU Central Committee has noted, is necessary to assess our progress in the main spheres of economic and social development, analyze the course of the implementation of the radical reform of economic management, and the participation in restructuring of party and other social organizations and state and economic organs. It is of vital importance to discuss progress in implementing the 27th CPSU Congress decisions, the main results of the first half of the 12th 5-Year Plan, the party organizations' tasks in deepening the process of restructuring, and the measures needed to further democratize party and social life.

The need to convene the conference precisely in June 1988 is dictated, among other things, by the fact that, proceeding from the conclusions which will be reached at this all-party forum, it is planned in the course of the 1988 reports and elections to exactly examine the work and tasks of every party organization in the leadership of restructuring. We keep in mind M.S. Gorbachev's words at the CPSU Central Committee January (1987) Plenum. Conferences, he emphasized, "have helped at crucial stages to identify new paths and means of achieving set aims and to resolve problems going far beyond tactical problems."

Revolutionary restructuring is precisely such a crucial stage. At this stage, life is confronting us with new, complex problems and decisions. So the frank statement at the recent CPSU Central Committee February Plenum is quite understandable: "...many problems have accumulated. Half-measures will not do here. It is obvious that we must prepare for the upcoming party conference detailed proposals for improving the political system—proposals based on the ideas of the 27th CPSU Congress and the subsequent Central Committee plenums on the socialist self-management of the people, proposals which take account of the democratization processes under way in society."

As one can see, there is a very important reason for convening a grand council of the country's Communists. So the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference by no means necessarily creates a new precedent for holding regular all-party conferences after a break of almost 50 years. No, it is vitally necessary for the sake of the work in hand; it is necessary as a valuable "working" party measure.

Question: Views to the effect that, because of the rapid democratization of the party's internal life, the need has arisen to introduce certain important changes to the existing CPSU Statutes have been expressed at meetings and in the press.

Answer: Indeed, this has happened in practice more than once before. For example, the first Statutes of the party, as a ruling party that is, were adopted by the Eighth All-Russian Conference of the RCP (B) [Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)]. That was in 1919. Certain changes in the Statutes were also introduced by the 12th All-Russian RCP (B) Conference in August 1922.

It is also not without interest to focus attention on the decisions of the 13th all-union party conference. It approved in principle a proposal to change the representation quota for the upcoming 13th RCP (B) Congress to one representative per 500 people. In this context, I.V. Stalin's amendment, introduced immediately after the proposal and demanding that this proposal be referred to the Central Committee for examination, is characteristic. It shows that the general secretary's meaningful



"reminders," the "knots in the handkerchief" so that people would not forget that the Central Committee is the highest party organ between congresses, had begun even then....

Question: Why were no all-party conferences convened after 1941? We have gathered from polemical articles in the press that it was because the effect was felt of the "bitter" lessons of former all-party conferences and congresses of the post-October period. Clearly, Stalin's personality cult and the administrative-command style, and even the repressive style of work which also infiltrated intraparty life had left their mark on the course of all-party events. What can you say on this subject?

Answer: It is true that for almost half a century, no party conferences were convened. As regards wartime, this can be explained—the situation dictated a curtailment of democratic procedures and a rigid centralization of control. However, the total neglect of all-party conferences during the postwar period can and must be explained above all by the violation of the Leninist democratic principles and norms of party life.

The party statutes approved by the 19th and 22d CPSU Congresses made no provision for the convocation of all-party conferences. In the seventies and early eighties, too, the principle of collective decisionmaking was infringed, and the role of elective organs was weakened. The curtailment and "underdevelopment" of supervision of the activities of the top echelon, the latter's failure to observe statutes and laws, and the discrepancy between words and actions are characteristic of the administrative-command methods of party and state leadership.

The restructuring initiated since the CPSU Central Committee April (1985) Plenum has created a unique concrete historical situation in the party and the country. Of exceptional importance in this situation is the qualitative growth of the Communist Party and the democratization which has been recognized as a vital need of intraparty life and party leadership of society. Hence the resolute rejection of the administrative-pressure style and the persistent and vigorous efforts to overcome the gulf between words and actions. Restructuring—among other things—is taking account not just of positive developments but also of bitter experience.

An atmosphere has now taken shape in the party which, it is hoped, will make it possible to discuss the pressing development questions frankly and without an eye on easy options or short-term considerations. So Communists are looking forward to the opening day of the 19th all-union party conference with hope and faith.

### KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Reviews Previous Party Conferences

PM0905143188 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 4 May 88 Second Edition pp 2-3

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Kosarev: "Party Conferences: From the 1st to the 19th. Following the Traditions of Bolshevism"—first three paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Excerpts] The 19th all-union party conference is drawing near. As always on the eve of a major event which marks a definite milestone in the development of society, nationwide interest in the past, in the history of our party, and the key stages of its revolutionary struggle is mounting, and this is convincingly borne out by letters to the Editorial Office.

Partywide conferences feature as important pages in this history. Seven of them were held during the pre-October period, and eleven took place after the victory of the socialist revolution.

What role have they played in the life of the party, what is their significance in the establishment of the Soviet state, in military building, and in the strengthening of the country's defenses? Why, despite the legal status bestowed on them by party congresses and statutes, have no partywide conferences been held for almost half a century? This is discussed in the article which the editorial office presents here for readers' attention.

#### A Delegate's Credentials [subhead]

In the center of Moscow on Kutuzovskiy Prospekt lives a remarkable man who has been a Communist for more than 60 years—Lieutenant General Ivan Semenovich Anoshin, retired. He is remarkable not only because of the eventful life he has lived, but also because of his inexhaustible energy, his sharp wit, and his memory, which seems unaffected by his 84 years. His apartment resembles a museum; there is much that reminds us of the past, that takes us back to the twenties, thirties, and forties. Our conversation was also devoted to the past.

Ivan Semenovich unhurriedly takes a number of small bright-red squares of thick paper from a special place and passes them across the table—his credentials to the party forums he attended. Among them is also credential No. 0384, authorizing participation in the last, 18th, All-Union Conference of the VKP(B) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)], which was held in February 1941. Anoshin was elected to attend this conference as a delegate of the Bashkir party organization with a casting vote, as specified in the document. If you leaf through the newspapers of that distant period, you can find Anoshin on the photographs accompanying the reports from the conference which show the presidium. He was first secretary of the Bashkir party obkom and member of the VKP(B) Central Auditing Commission.



I was struck by the following detail. The credentials to the 18th and 19th party congresses show a picture of Lenin and Stalin. There is no such picture on the conference credential.

We remember from our history textbooks that some party conferences were compared to congresses in terms of their significance.

The 18th conference was one such conference, Ivan Semenovitch says, in view of the importance of the questions it discussed, the decisions it adopted, and the role these decisions played in preparing the country to rebuff the fascist aggression, which was quite imminent....

Let us interrupt his account here to return to it later. Let us trace the logic of events. [passage omitted]

#### Facing New Trials [subhead]

The 11th Conference [1921] was the first at which Lenin was not present. After that, there were during his lifetime two more conferences which Vladimir Ilich also did not attend because of illness. At that time, the situation inside the party began to grow more complex. The Trotskyists were seeking a revision of Bolshevism and imposing debate after debate. The stenographic records of the conferences preceding the last one reflect the acute and dramatic nature assumed by the party's struggle to uphold the Leninist strategy and tactics and the purity of the party's ranks.

The late twenties and early thirties, which are an embodiment of revolutionary fervor and of the enthusiasm of the builders of socialism, also mark the beginning of the establishment of the personality cult and of unjustified repressions. How did this affect the party conferences. Were the Leninist traditions of intraparty democracy preserved in their work and in the decisions they adopted? I addressed these questions to Doctor of Historical Sciences Leonid Fedorovich Morozov, a staffer at the party history section of the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism.

[Morozov] Historically, the conference is one of the most democratic institutions of party life, one that is called upon to resolve current problems or problems which have unexpectedly arisen before the party. For Lenin, the spirit of party democracy and a free exchange of views were indispensable. He could not imagine the elaboration of the general line of the party without broad discussion, without a clash of ideas in which he featured as a brilliant fighter, polemist, and realist who took account of all difficulties and contradictions.

Here is a characteristic example. At the Seventh All-Russian RSDRP [Russian Social Democratic Workers Party] Conference [1917], during the nomination of candidates for the Central Committee, the candidature of Kamenev—who did not share Lenin's viewpoint on a

number of fundamental issues—was rejected by a large group of delegates. Vladimir Ilich took the floor and said that Kamenev reflected the sentiments of certain strata of the masses, and therefore it was important to have on the Central Committee someone who would express these sentiments. And he concluded: "The fact that I argue with Comrade Kamenev has only positive results. Comrade Kamenev's presence is very important, because the debates I have with him are very valuable. Having persuaded him, with some difficulty, you know that in this way you are overcoming those problems which are arising within the masses."

The first conference after Vladimir Ilich's death took place in the same Leninist spirit. The party proceeded to develop forms of intraparty democracy and to strengthen the ties with the masses. However, by the end of the decade, by dint of the known circumstances, these traditions began to disappear.

[Kosarev] Back in 1919 at the eighth party conference, it was decided to hold conferences regularly, once every 3 months. At that time, the provision concerning conferences was introduced into the Statutes of the RKP(B) [Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)]. However, at the 17th party congress in 1934 it disappeared from the statutes. Why?

[Morozov] It seems to me that the answer lies in the fact that the Leninist norms of party life were gradually forgotten. A feeling of inner rejection of the collective discussion of fundamental party and state problems and of the methods of collective leadership had already developed in Stalin by this time. During the prewar years, key questions were, as a rule, discussed at best within a narrow circle at the Politburo. And even Politburo sessions were no longer convened weekly, as had been the case in the past, but once a month, or even once every 2 months. Between these sessions, decisions were adopted by means of the "questionnaire method"; that is to say, a list of questions to be examined was circulated and Politburo members expressed their views on these questions, or, more often than not, agreed with the opinion of the General Secretary. It has now emerged that lists of prominent party officials who were to be arrested were approved in this way.

Incidentally, the provision on conferences appeared again in the statutes at the 18th party congress. It was decided that they should be held to discuss pressing issues and also for the purpose of the nomination of new cadres, above all to the Central Committee to replace former members. I am convinced that this decision was dictated by the situation which had developed. Of the 139 members and candidate members elected to the party Central Committee at the previous congress, 98 were no longer alive by the 18th Congress (1939). It should also be mentioned that conference decisions on cadre questions, unlike all other decisions, were not subject to approval by the Central Committee.

[Kosarev] Nine years had passed between the 17th and 18th party conferences. Party congresses had become rare. During the Great Patriotic War, not a single party congress, not a single conference was held, and only one Central Committee plenum met. Was this a consequence of the grim times of war or an expression of the style of leadership?

[Morozov] The war played its part, of course. Nonetheless, during the civil war (1918-1920), in the face of enormous transportation and economic difficulties, when Russia was encircled by front lines, three party congresses and two conferences were held. I believe that to this question, too, the answer is unequivocal—it was due to the departure from Leninist norms of party life.

[Kosarev] Leonid Fedorovich, the last, 18th, All-Union Conference of the VKP(B) was held in February 1941. Why was it held? How does it differ from the other conferences?

[Morozov] In conditions of the sharp exacerbation of the international situation and a real war danger, questions pertaining to the development of industry, and above all heavy industry, were at the focus of the party's activities. By that time, substantial successes had been achieved in socialist building. However, by the late thirties disproportions—a worsening imbalance—in economic and sociopolitical development were becoming increasingly obvious. The causes were many. Back at the 16th party congress, the report delivered by Stalin extolled the "frenzied pace" of industrial development in an attempt to prove the feasibility of the fulfillment of the 5-year plan "in a whole series of industrial sectors in 3 or even 2 and 1/2 years," and insisted that the pace of industrial development must be further stepped up. "People who are babbling about the need to reduce the pace of our industrial development are enemies of socialism and agents of our class enemies," he emphasized.

Reliance on administrative-command methods and on "whipping up" the economy had an adverse effect on the state of affairs in many national economic sectors. The 1937-1938 repressions which hit industrial management cadres especially hard were one reason, and not the least important one, for the laggardness of industry. Serious mistakes had been committed in the planning of individual national economic sectors. Despite the fact that major appropriations were allocated to the accelerated development of the defense industry, mass production of the latest models of military hardware was getting under way only slowly.

The party Central Committee decided that it was necessary to discuss these important national economic problems at an all-union party conference. In practice, this was the first serious attempt to analyze and understand the contradictions which had taken shape by that time in the development of the economy. [Morozov ends]

Here is a quote from the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA editorial published on the opening day of the conference. "...Our country's vital interests and the necessity to ceaselessly continue strengthening its defense call for a steady rise in labor productivity and increased production of a full complement of high-grade goods strictly on schedule. This task cannot be resolved without a struggle to ensure strict accounting for all material resources, a drive for thrift and economy in all sectors of the economic organism, and efforts to cut the cost of the management apparatus. It is necessary to put an end to inertia and sloppiness which are still quite common at our enterprises. It is impossible to tolerate dirt and dust in the vicinity of the latest machine tools because they spoil the expensive equipment and lower labor productivity...."

Now let us return to the house on Kutuzovskiy Prospect, to the apartment of Ivan Semenovich Anoshin, with whom our account began. Let us return to his reminiscences.

[Anoshin] We, the delegates, took a sober view of the situation. We understood well that war was very close. Nonetheless, to many of us the tone of the reports delivered by Malenkov and Voznesenskiy was unusual. Glaring examples of bureaucracy and arbitrariness in planning and of nonfulfillment and bungling were cited, and the culprits, ranging from people's commissars to enterprise managers, were named. Each one of us felt the responsibility of the moment and understood that in the prevailing circumstances, any other discussion was simply unthinkable.

I myself also spoke at the conference. The Bashkir Oblast party organization had rightly been rebuked in Malenkov's report for poor work in the leadership of oil extraction. An account had to be given. On the Communists' instructions, I expressed serious claims against the People's Commissariat for the Petroleum Industry, which had failed to provide the necessary assistance to Bashkir oil workers.

[Kosarev] Ivan Semenovich, but what was the atmosphere at the conference and around it? After all, by that time unjustified repressions had scarred the country. Most probably you failed to find among the delegates many old acquaintances, many people whom you had met at the previous party congress?

[Anoshin] It was not as simple as that. We know this now, we talk about the personality cult, and about the crimes committed by Stalin and his henchmen. There was no mention of this at the time. Much of it seemed quite natural; after all, the country was surrounded by enemies. The mistakes in the economy and in social policy, many people believed, were the work of internal enemies, of the party opposition. The noisy trials of the enemies of the people, their universal condemnation, the

exaltation of one name—all this happened, of course. People did reflect on the tyranny and lawlessness even then, but few linked them with Stalin's name. [Anoshin ends]

Here is a quote from the Resolution of the 18th all-union party conference: "It is necessary... TO PUT AN END to the lack of planning, THE UNEVEN PRODUCTION OF GOODS [capitalization as published], and storm-tactics in the work of enterprises.... It is necessary to put an end to foot-dragging, to what is basically an opportunist attitude toward new equipment on the part of a section of enterprise managers, since this kind of conservatism hampers the further development of production and dooms enterprises to backwardness, to being left out in the cold, and undermines the country's defense might...."

The 18th all-union party conference was of great importance for the strengthening of the state economy, and it laid the foundations for the reequipping and rearming

of the Army and the Navy. The results of the implementation of its decisions were fully revealed during the Great Patriotic War, which was only 4 months away....

The 19th all-union party conference, convened by decision of the CPSU Central Committee June (1987) Plenum in accordance with the party statutes approved at the last party congress, will open in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses 28 June. The upcoming conference is another convincing proof of the reinstatement of Leninist norms in party life. The conference will analyze the results of the 3 years of life and work in conditions of restructuring and ascertain what positions our party and society have attained since launching the processes of democratization and initiating a radical economic reform. The tasks are great. Only an authoritative and, in its revolutionary nature, democratic party organ, which the party conference must indeed become, can cope with these tasks.

**Tambov Obkom Chief Discusses Public Opinion Research**

18000302 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA  
INDUSTRIYA in Russian 28 Feb 88 pp 1-2

[Interview with Ye. Podolskiy, First Secretary, Tambov Party Obkom, by A. Pavlov, SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA correspondent; date and place not given]

[Text] The February Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee emphasized that the entire party must clearly understand that only through democratization can the human factor be fully included in the deep reforms of all aspects of society's life, in the real processes of management and self-management.

Careful study of the opinions, the mood, and the needs of the people, of the entire atmosphere in the work collective, the city, the region is one way of helping to affirm democratism. For example, public opinion study councils have been created and sociological groups are operating under the Tambov Party Obkom, gorkoms and raykoms. Ties have been established between the obkom and the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Ye. Podolskiy, First Secretary, Tambov Party Obkom, reflects on the reserves for democratization discovered in the process in a talk with A. Pavlov, our correspondent.

I will begin with an example of the flexible, living reaction of a party official to people's opinion. Last spring, the Michurinsk Automotive Repair Plant was in the process of electing a new manager. Chief engineer Ye. Antonov and party gorkom instructor V. Borzykh were in the reserve for this executive position. And they were nominated as candidates. In the course of the discussion, the collective spoke at first timidly and then more confidently about a third candidate: machine shop chief V. Korotkov. What was to be done?

A mere 2-3 years ago, such a turn of events would have been called a calamity and there would have been insistence on nominating only "official" candidates. But now there is no basis whatsoever for speaking of a special situation. In my opinion, F. Sushkov, First Secretary, party gorkom, behaved correctly: he did not interfere, he did not disrupt the business atmosphere. V. Korotkov, together with the other candidates, was allowed to present his program for extricating the collective from its lagging position, and his name was entered on the list of candidates for election by secret ballot. Of the 459 votes cast, 398 were cast for him.

Nevertheless, the unexpected outcome of the elections at the automotive repair plant was an alarm signal that we are not yet studying the opinion of people in sufficient depth and that we are not discerning the different nuances in their positions. It is these considerations that have prompted the wider use of sociological research. For example, approximately 1700 persons at 15 oblast enterprises answered questions of a poll tentatively

called "The Strategy of Acceleration." Naturally, the important thing is not the number of people polled: we want to have a more precise knowledge of people's position and to correlate it with public interests.

[Question] But can it be that party officials before now did not understand the importance of taking public opinion into account?

[Answer] They understood but they acted without taking it into account in actual practice. Their hearing was tuned more to the voice up above; only a tiny part of their ear could hear the voices from below. They managed by predominantly administrative, commanding methods which generated passivity, indifference, and social dependence. The principal task of party organizations is to extricate every worker from this inert state. The present rise in civic activism is the direct result of present social change. Only through the consistent development of the democratic forms inherent in socialism can we move forward. Only through democracy and as a result of democracy is perestroika itself possible.

Society needs a citizen who is educated and convinced, who at the same time is a searcher, who knows how to live and work under the conditions of democracy and economic independence. That is how the question was posed at the February Plenum of the Central Committee in whose work I participated. But in order that this demand of the time would be implemented, we must decisively renounce the style and methods that formed during the years of stagnation. Learning democracy—that is how the party poses the task today.

[Question] What is the oblast party organization doing to realize this slogan?

[Answer] We are genuinely helping economic managers, for example, to appreciate the difference between one-man command and autocracy in production, to view public opinion not as a hindrance but as a real help in the work. Collectives are learning how to separate business-like initiative and daring innovation from demagoguery and capitalizing on popular theses. Democratization is directly connected with glasnost. Today there are no topics that are closed to discussion. The most pressing and important problems are posed at meetings and in various types of talks. There are now more meetings, more frank talks with people directly in their workplace or at their place of residence.

Let us take the selfsame Michurinsk. Just a year ago there was an endless flow of letters. The city's residents were for the most part complaining about problems in their everyday life, about red tape in dealing with many mundane issues. The party leadership was clearly not in command of the situation. It was reelected/replaced in the name of change for the better. The gorkom's work

style became more democratic and more attentive to the interests and needs of the average person. The number of complaints dropped sharply and there was a change in their character.

This process is also typical of the oblast in general. The just demands of people are met sooner, particularly by the local party and soviet organs and by economic organizations. The population has become more active both in its work and politically. The party obkom has now begun receiving more letters raising socially significant questions. Here are some lines from a letter from A. Lunev, a worker at the Kotovskiy Plastics Plant: "People who are successfully fulfilling their production assignments and who set the example in their everyday life are elected delegates to party congresses, members of party organs, and deputies to the soviets. I think this is not enough. It is necessary to take into account their civic and party position, their principles in the struggle against stagnation and red tape, their ability to defend the public interest." Such letters are the sign of today!

Many collectives have roused themselves and awakened from their torpor. This is the sign of the new moral and political atmosphere that the party has affirmed since the April (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

I will cite one more typical example. Communists and noncommunists at an open party meeting at the Uvarovskoye automotive enterprise sharply condemned V. Surkov, their chief, for his haughtiness and indifference to people and raised the question of his dismissal.

[Question] Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich, what do you think of the opinion of some leaders regarding the "costs of democracy? Their anxiety is not without foundation. Let us say that there appears a new type of time-server who is prepared to castigate shortcomings endlessly but is not prepared to change his way of working.

[Answer] The advocates of the old methods of management, of the notorious commanding, pressure style do indeed try to frighten us with the complete license, the irresponsibility, and the anarchy that are supposedly connected with democratization. But in actual fact, it seems to me that they do not want to relinquish their secret principle: "I do what I please." Democracy presupposes not only equal rights but also equal obligations and equal responsibility of everyone before the law. If the work collective elects itself a manager, then in accordance with democratic principles, he also has the obligation to carry out its orders conscientiously.

Democratization clearly shows who is who and what he is capable of doing. To be sure, however, important documents clearly also relate that time-servers who know how to speak well and who loudly criticize shortcomings have crawled to the surface. But this is the end of their energetic activity. Just as soon as matters come to a head, they have no practical proposals and do not venture to bring anything more upon themselves. There

are more than a few such examples when a slacker, a habitual absentee, or a slipshod worker, realizing that he will sooner or later come under fire, undertakes to "expose" his superiors so as to create for himself a crown of thorns as one who is persecuted for his criticism. A relentless struggle must be waged against such "democrats" to separate the wheat from the chaff: after all, they not only think up shortcomings, but also operate with real negative facts. This requires that all collectives create an atmosphere of wide glasnost and mutual objective demandingness. I want to refer once again to sociological research that provides considerable food for thought.

Communists in the "Tambovmash" Production Association were asked: "What would you do to improve matters if you were the director of the association, the secretary of a party committee, or the chief of a shop?" The answers forced the administration and the party committee to think because many shortcomings were revealed in the style of management and in the organization of production. Measures were devised to correct the shortcomings named in the questionnaire.

[Question] This is probably not the most difficult case.

[Answer] Probably not. There frequently arise such serious problems that they cannot be resolved by ad hoc measures. A large group of officials of the CPSU obkom and the elected party aktiv thoroughly analyzed the work of primary organizations in the town of Kirsanov and Kirsanovskiy Rayon. Sociological research that was also carried out here showed in particular that almost two-thirds of the communists do not take part in preparations for meetings. One-third of the respondents declared that they considered the resolutions that are adopted useless and that they vote for them only because "everyone else does." The habit of speaking frankly only in the lobby still has not been overcome. Communists conversing among themselves speak about shortcomings and make good suggestions. However many of them still do not venture to call things by their true names and to speak out candidly at meetings. Purposeful efforts of the entire oblast party organization are needed here. Precise information on shortcomings made it possible to begin this work without delay.

[Question] The new methods of management will also evidently accelerate democratization processes. Is that not so?

[Answer] Yes, direct ties and feedbacks are in evidence here. It is now more than a year since 18 oblast industrial enterprises and associations were converted to full cost accounting and self-financing. When we analyze their work we can easily see that success has come to those whose preparations were good. For example, before the "Komsomolets" Plant converted to self-financing, it studied its essence and particulars in depth and addressed economic and organizational questions. The

party committee and administration concentrated primarily on schooling cadres in economics. In the months that elapsed following the inauguration of the new economic relations, the plant realized 4.4 million rubles in profits and labor productivity rose by almost 12 percent. Social life is also in full swing here and self-management is developing. However it cannot be concluded that we are entirely ready to work under the new conditions. Take economics, for example. Some economic managers still cling tenaciously to the belief that "higher ups" will continue to take care of the enterprises, allocate resources to them volitionally, and help them out when they get into trouble. They themselves, however, take no serious measures to instruct everyone in the fundamentals of economics, to introduce true cost accounting, and to democratize production relations.

When I say this, I do not absolve the party obkom, gorkoms, and raykoms and the primary organizations. They must do better work with cadres.

We are introducing elections everywhere. Last year alone, there were multiple-candidate elections of executives in more than 800 collectives.

[Question] But some party committee secretaries believe that the primary organizations must remain neutral in order to ensure the free expression of the collective's will. They say: why bother creating a reserve and training it if there is the possibility the recommended candidate will not be elected?

[Answer] We do not justify neutrality in any way: democracy presupposes the freedom to campaign for candidates. Incidentally, to avoid accidents the reserve, too, should be formed on a democratic basis and the nomination of candidates should be based on the collective's opinion. That is what we do even though we, too, have still not freed ourselves from our habitual formalism. The collective's point of view is sometimes determined in haste for the sake of form, of the report, of giving the impression that it is in step with the times.

[Question] On the other hand, the collective is also not infallible. It, too, can elect the wrong person.

[Answer] That is what happened at the "Tambovparat" Plant, for example, where V. Tolmachev was elected shop chief with all the democratic rules being observed. He proved to be unprepared for this role and resigned after several months, realizing that he was unable to cope with his new duties.

I add that there are occasionally not only errors but deliberate negative actions as well. Elections have occasionally been used to get rid of a leader with principle and to replace him with someone who is less demanding.

Such examples are not isolated cases. Behind them are the mistakes of primary organizations and the administration and the habit of going with the flow. Now, in

order to recommend its candidate to the people the party organ must have firm proof that the candidate is suited to the position, must know the opinion of the collective, the candidate's actual successes on the job and his participation in public life, and all his strong and weak points. The study and careful screening of potential candidates is the express duty of party committees and party organizations.

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### Ryazan Obkom Chief Prepares for Party Conference

18000305 *POLITICHESKOYE OBRAZOVANIYE* in  
*Russian No 5 Mar 88 (signed to press 2 Mar 88)*  
pp 28-36

[Interview with L. Khitrin, First Secretary of the Ryazan Obkom, by the editors of *POLITICHESKOYE OBRAZOVANIYE*; date and place not given]

[Excerpts] [Question] First of all, Leonid Ivanovich, tell me briefly your impressions of the February Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in whose work you participated. What conclusions did you draw?

[Answer] The major political decisions adopted at the Central Committee Plenum made a very strong impression on me, became imprinted in my mind, as the saying goes, forced me to rethink and reevaluate many things, and above all to devise urgent organizational measures, and to put everything into motion to alter the state of affairs.

The speech by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev presented a large-scale program of practical action in all spheres and directions of work of the party and the Soviet people, concretely and purposefully posed both long- and short-range tasks, and formulated urgent current questions which all of us must resolve without delay. The style and forms of our work must be improved and made more businesslike. The high exactingness and demandingness that are approved in the oblast party organization must become integral qualities of every communist. It cannot be otherwise. The period of stagnation was too long and severe for our Ryazan Oblast.

It is particularly necessary to emphasize the idea in Mikhail Sergeyevich's speech that no matter from what position we approach the definition of the avenues of development of our economy and culture, our social and spiritual life, man himself, his political and intellectual makeup, his mastery, his patriotism and internationalism, his capacity for creativity, and his civic position and activism, will always be the decisive factor. It presents an entire program of actions for all party committees and organizations on ideological support for perestroika and its new stage.

The Central Committee's Plenum focused our attention on the need for the aktiv and all communists to turn sharply toward the ideological content of restructuring, toward strengthening the ties of the CPSU with the masses, and proposed striving for the close interaction between soviet, trade union, Komsomol, economic organs, the ideological media, and all cadres in the sphere of the economy, social policy, and spiritual life. Perestroyka must become the party cause of each communist and the patriotic duty of every Soviet person. This is the task that we are now addressing with still greater persistence. The point at issue is not simply one of certain measures, but is one of the literal meaning of the everyday, intensive struggle both in production and in the spiritual sphere. We will judge the course of this struggle on the basis of practical matters and results.

[Question] The need for the ideological support of perestroyka and the very ideology of modernization make the corresponding demands on cadres. What can you say in this regard?

[Answer] The political and theoretical preparation, the ideological and moral fiber of cadres, and their conviction of the correctness of the perestroyka course chosen by the party and the people are now increasing in importance. How can a leader lead and convince people if he himself is not convinced?

At the February Plenum of the Central Committee, it was said that people relate in different ways to perestroyka and the economic reform. Some entirely accept the changes that are taking place and actively promote them. Others are essentially opposed to change. Through their incompetent actions, they sabotage the introduction of economic methods of management and discredit them in practice. I think that both of these categories of cadres are more or less in the public eye. But there are also workers who appear to support perestroyka and who do not wish to remain outside the common movement, but who nevertheless reduce matters to imitation, who take a wait-and-see position, who do not want to act in real terms and take upon themselves additional concerns. This is a very large category of people who are sometimes quite difficult to recognize. And we are not accustomed to the individual approach.

Too often we even today call attention primarily to questionnaire data: age, party membership, education, etc. But we are frequently unable to get a real picture of a person beyond the questionnaire. At best, we ask whether a worker knows the specifics of one or another branch of production or science and technology and whether he possesses the necessary volitional qualities. At the same time, we rarely think about the ideological and theoretical outlook, political maturity, and moral principles of the candidate for a leading position, and his real attitude toward democratization.

Dry questionnaire data may prove useless here. Here it is absolutely essential to have a truly party evaluation of the person, which excludes hastiness; to have the ability to weigh all pros and cons. But we never have enough time. We are propped up by everyday activities and concerns and it frequently happens that we make decisions that are not sufficiently well thought out.

[Question] Candidates for various leading positions are frequently nominated "from above". And this, as practice shows, does not always provide a guarantee against mistakes. How can they be avoided?

[Answer] Nominations "from above" should probably be the exception rather than the rule. We must put more trust in the primary party organization, in the work collective, and reckon with the opinion of people. This is the most reliable road. And the most democratic. What is more, in past years it has become a too common practice among us to transfer officials who have discredited themselves from one manager's chair to another. With the support of the party committee, in 10-15 years such a "figure" can run through roughly the same number of positions: a person becomes part of the party raykom or gorkom nomenklatura and every attempt is made to keep him "afloat."

I think the 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU should *establish the responsibility of a higher party committee recommending for a leading position a person who does not justify the confidence that is placed in him and for errors in cadre policy.*

[Question] Of late, there have been numerous reports in the press about the unseemly actions of some leaders during the years of the stagnant period. There are more and more letters from the journal's readers in this regard suggesting that leading cadres bear stricter responsibility for any deviations from our moral standards and for breaking the law. What is your point of view here?

[Answer] I fully support a stricter approach and higher demands on the moral cast of leaders. This is specifically the line that our party obkom is trying to pursue. It corresponds to the spirit of perestroyka and the spirit of the February Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

In a recent talk with communists, I chanced to hear such an opinion:

"It is very good that any leader today, be his position ever so high, cannot count on impunity, on personal connections, on someone's "hand" and support. He must invariably pay for unseemly actions. Therein lies one of the tangible, most important results of perestroyka."

A correct conclusion! The 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU will have to decide the issue that *a person occupying a leading position in the state, party, or soviet apparatus must bear stricter party responsibility for*

*unlawful, amoral actions. The breach of the law by such a person must be viewed by the court as an aggravating circumstance.* This is in agreement with the Leninist approach to leading cadres.

Naturally, we must concern ourselves above all with preventing such actions, with creating an atmosphere of high mutual demandingness and responsibility in every party organization and in every work collective.

[Question] Specifically what can and must be done to raise the role and energy level of primary party organizations?

[Answer] The main thing, as emphasized at the February Plenum of the Central Committee, is that all intraparty life must be permeated with democratization. We have too much regulation in the activity of primary party organizations: how many meetings, when to hold them, and with what agenda. We must place more trust in the communists themselves.

Only through democratization and glasnost is it possible to put an end to deep-rooted apathy and to raise the creative activism of the working people.

We have indeed come to believe too much in the power of meetings and decisions full of the usual "indicate," "obligate," "propose." And there is something else. The leader must know that the party bureau, the party committee, and its secretary can always help and can always make strict demands for any shortcomings in the work. "Pocket" secretaries bring nothing but harm.

I believe that the All-Union Conference of the CPSU must decide the question of *electing the primary party organization secretary not at a meeting of the party committee (party buro) but at a meeting of communists by open voting.*

[Question] As noted at the February Plenum of the Central Committee, high demandingness toward oneself, a self-critical attitude, objectivity, and honesty are internally inherent in the party approach to the practice of communist construction. Marxism-Leninism has been and continues to be the scientific base of such an approach. What must be done to help leading cadres to grow continuously in a theoretical respect?

[Answer] Practically all our leaders are studying in one form or another and are raising their ideological and theoretical level. Some are attending schools for the party-management aktiv, others—universities of Marxism-Leninism, and still others—political seminars at their workplace. Everyone has the opportunity to participate in studies. But how are these studies themselves going? After all, the leaders quite often merely attend

activities and occasionally speak but do not work systematically to broaden their theoretical outlook. Naturally, everyone reads newspapers and journals. But do many read Lenin's works and experience an inner need to do so?

M. S. Gorbachev in his speech at the February Plenum said: "Perestroyka obliges us to take a new look at certain characteristics that have become habitual, to compare the road behind and the road ahead with the criteria of progress, with the goals of construction of the new society that were formulated by the classics of Marxism-Leninism." This will require serious independent work of all cadres, in which they themselves will have to find the answers to many questions born of the existing situation. It is important to make a real study, to understand our accomplishments and problems, and to extract lessons for working under the conditions of perestroyka and the modernization of Soviet society.

It would possibly be logical to say very definitely at the 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU that *every leader has the obligation to continuously engage in political self-education, to master the ideological and theoretical legacy of K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin, and to study the problems of ideological activity and problems elaborated by the party in the theory of socialism and restructuring.*

When I meet and talk with leaders on all manner of questions, it occurs to me that we should inquire more often whether they are engaging in political self-education and what they are reading.

We have already made a certain amount of progress in this respect. For example, economic leaders in the Otkyabrskiy Rayon of Ryazan are participating in independent political studies on the problem "V. I. Lenin's 'The Immediate Tasks of Soviet Power' and Modern Times." In the course of talks with communist leaders, party raykom secretaries frequently talk with them about their assimilation of the basic principles of this work and the conclusion that they have drawn regarding their activity.

[Question] And in conclusion, Leonid Ivanovich, a question that has become traditional in talks with first secretaries of party committees. The decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the Restructuring of the System for the Political and Economic Education of the Working People" assigned first secretaries of party committees responsibility for the ideological and political training of cadres. What is being done to carry out this decision?

[Answer] First of all, the secretaries of party committees, including first secretaries, are more actively attending political activities directly in work collectives not as verifiers but as active participants. This is also an excellent opportunity to see certain leaders in propaganda activity, in the process of propagandistic work. An



enterprise manager or a kolkhoz chairman heading a political school or seminar activity reveals to you facets that you had never suspected before.

Party obkom, gorkom, raykom secretaries have in large measure taken upon themselves the responsibility for briefing propaganda cadres on the state of affairs and on unresolved problems. It has become the practice to hold propagandist days and seminars where first secretaries and members of buros meet with heads of political activities and hold frank talks with them.

Does this mean that everything here satisfies us? Of course not. Thus only 12 party gorkoms and raykoms examined questions pertaining to Marxist-Leninist studies, to raising their effectiveness, and to perestroika. And the discussion of these questions is frequently conducted in the old way.

We realize that the most important time and the most complex and large-scale problems lie ahead of us. Proceeding from the basic principles contained in the materials of the February Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, we will have to launch a broad practical effort to improve the ideological support for this stage of perestroika. All means of political work must be used to make perestroika the party cause of every communist, the patriotic duty of every citizen.

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**Ulyanovsk Obkom Chief Restructures Party Work**  
*18000321 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Apr 88p 2*

[Interview with Yu. Samsonov, first secretary, Ulyanovsk Party Obkom, by special PRAVDA correspondents N. Senchev and V. Khatuntsev in Ulyanovsk. Date not specified.]

[Text] On the very eve of our meeting and talk with Yu. Samsonov, first secretary, Ulyanovsk Party Obkom, we were made aware of the following detail. You will recall that an example was cited in M. S. Gorbachev's speech at the February Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee: some party organs have become so enamored of selective meetings that they hold as many as 40 of them in a single month. As it turned out, this "some" applied part and parcel to Ulyanovsk Oblast. And at a recent plenum of the party obkom there was explicit discussion of the tenacity of this faulty style.

"We really did go too far," Yuriy Grigoryevich said at the beginning of our dialogue. It is not easy to overcome the commanding, administrative style of leadership acquired over decades. It requires an abrupt psychological break and, frequently, a struggle with oneself. We were strongly gripped by the fear of losing control of the

situation. We were used to giving orders on behalf of the agroprom people as well as on the behalf of other local soviet and economic organs. We are doing our utmost to rid ourselves of this habit.

[Question] Self-criticism, open criticism, and above all the ability to benefit from critical remarks and proposals—such is the life-giving condition of intraparty democracy. Such receptiveness sooner or later develops immunity against the viruses of infallibility, self-admiration, authoritarianism, and other antipodes of democracy. What do you think: is the obkom and are you, personally, as its first secretary open to the fresh winds of criticism?

[Answer] At any rate, we are not putting up protective barriers against criticism. I consider entirely reasonable reproaches addressed to me personally at the obkom plenum that I do not work sufficiently with raykom secretaries, especially the beginners. I can cite examples when other secretaries of the oblast committee and members of the bureau have been justifiably criticized. Nor was the criticism for the sake of criticism or for the sake of observing today's rules of "propriety."

But we must also attain such equality in the work load, in the burden that we carry. This is what we discovered as a result of a frank exchange of opinions: many members of elected party organs are not satisfied with their participation in perestroika. They are listed as having been elected but they have no real work load. We must now get away from formalism and fill the status of a member of a party organ with nothing but real work and real assignments. We have begun offering instruction to obkom party members in sections in which both executives and rank and file workers learn in a practical way from the best experience what to undertake first and how to do it!

We attach great importance to political and economic education. Nor do I conceal the fact that we also concern ourselves with raising the level of political sophistication of our elected ones. You can be a notable, front-rank worker and yet limit your outlook to the machine you operate. Is this not the source of a kind of resignation complex: you are the leader, you have all the experience and education; you make the decisions and we'll do the voting?

This is what I say: the face of the obkom or raykom must be determined by outstanding people. By people actively engaging in public life. The ones with authority are people like Nikolay Yuryevich Dodovov of the "Krasnoyarskiy" State Farm. Working as the leader of a tractor brigade, he made his collective one of the best in the oblast. But he has won the respect of his fellow villagers and the inhabitants of the rayon not just because of his successes on the job. He is a person of principle who is naturally quick on the uptake which is the mark of a real leader, who has a head on his shoulders, who is reasonable, who is not indifferent to

public affairs, and who has a developed sense of personal worth. You almost feel like saluting such a person. He has an opinion on every issue. It was not by chance that when the question of a new party committee secretary arose, the sovkhos communists and working people were unanimous: Nikolay Yuryevich was specifically the one who should lead them. I add that as a member of the Cherdaklinskiy Party Raykom, he is in the public eye, he is truly among his equals, and he takes an active part in the solution of problems.

[Question] Such equality is usually seen during a plenum or conference. Are you able to get away from overorganization, from prearranged scenarios, from unanimity for show that is best expressed in the phrase "there is my opinion and the wrong opinion?"

[Answer] As regards regulations, we have no system for restricting or filtering our speakers. Our plenums, aktivs and party meetings have become less and less stereotyped. Now you do not get bored during the discussions because everyone goes up to the rostrum with his own brainchild, sometimes with debatable judgments and with a militant, critical mood. You spoke about unanimity for show. In my view, the essence of democratization is to reject everything that is done for show, everything that is deliberate, everything that is smoothed over in favor of candor, however better, and the whole truth. The search for the truth will lead to the goal when the atmosphere is created for the polyphony of opinions, for the collective exchange of ideas. Sitzings of the bureau and plenums of the obkom truly become a collective council when there is my opinion but the opinion of my comrades as well.

[Question] Can you recall any opinions expressed at the last obkom plenum that cut you to the quick, that imprinted themselves on your soul?

[Answer] There were many such opinions. What do you think of the remark by V. Pisarchuk, deputy chairman of the Dimitrovgradskiy Gorispolkom, who said from the podium that the apparatus often arrogates the functions of an elected body, that there is danger in concentrating power exclusively in the hands of the apparatus, and that it is just one step from here to the voluntarism and subjectivism of individual leaders?

[Question] Yours is not the only oblast in which this is being discussed.

[Answer] This is all the more an indication that this is an important problem that merits the attention of the 19th Party Conference. Of course, our obkom is more than a building and staff in Lenin Square. I have already spoken about the task of securing the most active involvement of all members of elected organs in public work, of the need for closer scrutiny of the personal and political qualities of candidates. That comes first.

Second, we must truly restructure the work of the apparatus. The time has come to get rid of the guardianship of party organizations and outmoded methods. A typical example: the Maynskiy Party Raykom was notified of the scheduled arrival of a brigade that was to draft the raykom's report for the buro of the party obkom. What was the reaction? People said: you'll knock us out of rhythm for a month with your checks. The checks organized by the apparatus staff were of no benefit. The approach must be changed in some way so that people would feel satisfaction rather than apprehension.

Another question: why do some first secretaries of party raykoms take all decision-making on themselves thereby becoming "rayon directors?" There are those who lack sophistication in democratism and there are those who cling to the old ways, who are accustomed to dictating and ordering people about.

The Terengulskiy Party Raykom decided to hold the election of a farm director. Someone was selected from the rayon center and his candidacy was even approved by the buro. When he was brought out for the people to judge, it turned out that the collective was opposed to replacing its leader. Through the confusion it was necessary to agree with the opinion of the meeting and to learn a lesson for the future: the apparatus cannot get away with its plans for promoting cadres any longer. Why? Because they are undemocratic and divorced from public opinion.

Thus the debugging of the mechanism governing the activity of elected organs is a lesson in practical democracy. It is a difficult lesson that is learned through search and errors. The main thing is not to allow those on top to dole out permissions and prohibitions—this is permitted, this is not, but rather to nurture from below the creative energy of work collectives and to encourage the entire diversity of the creative potential of the masses. This is an important question for discussion at the All-Union Party Conference.

[Question] Do you visit work collectives frequently?

[Answer] The plan is to spend at least one entire day a week visiting farms, enterprises and institutions. No less and preferably more.

[Question] One oblast leader told me with a large share of humor about a recent visit to a kolkhoz. He donned a sheepskin coat and went out on the farm without first checking in at the office. He saw milkmaids scrubbing the poor cows for dear life. There was an incredible din. It turned out they were preparing for the arrival of the very same leader. The temptation to put on a show is strong!

[Answer] And its advocates do so in vain: no manner of showmanship can cover up disorder. If you talk to the people they will tell you everything unreservedly.

I recently visited the Sovkhoz imeni Gay with a group of comrades. I liked much of what I saw. The animal husbandrymen were working diligently. We struck up a conversation with the milkmaids about personal households and found that there were few people keeping livestock even though many wanted to. No pasture land was allotted nor were they helped with feed. The people were giving their all to the farm but the concern for them was meager. The village soviet and the primary party organization should have helped the people and should have called the attention of the economic managers to the situation. Otherwise in some places democratism will be understood only as the right to "advise" the manager something in a low voice from time to time. What kind of proprietor is this? But it is specifically in the primary link, in the work collectives that all democratic norms are tested.

[Question] The point is obviously to promote the strengthening of these norms. It was said at the February Plenum of the Central Committee that the party is called upon to set the democratic example. Who if not the primary party organization should be the first to set this example? Take the work with cadres—has the influence of the primary party organizations grown?

[Answer] Judge for yourselves: this is a kind of second step after the widely conducted election stage. Experience has shown that those scheduled for promotion must prepare to take the next step up the ladder. They must make these preparations in public view as if gathering votes a year or two in advance. Eloquence will be to no avail here. The need is for real actions. It is important that they indicate where they stand. Thus the reserve is trained and "run in" with the aid of the primary party organizations.

At the "Khimmarsh" Plant in Dimitrovgrad, for example, they took the following path: the reserve for director consists of three persons. Let there be competition and let the strongest person in the elections win. This is the right way.

[Question] But will the authority of the party organization not suffer if its candidate is defeated?

[Answer] This question arose after the first elections of leaders. First, how many candidates is the party organization allowed to nominate? If it is allowed to nominate all of them, this would not appear to accord with democratism. If it is allowed to nominate one, what will it be like in the event he is defeated? Second, is it necessarily obligatory that the communists nominate a representative in all cases?

I think that there must first of all be flexibility and a precise orientation toward the opinion of the work collective. There must be no foisting of one's own special opinion.

[Question] But sometimes the majority may not be in the right...

[Answer] Then one has to find the strength to persuade convincingly and within the framework of free polemics. It unquestionably happens that even the majority will be wrong, but nevertheless the collective usually has an entirely mature understanding of the real state of affairs and will not play it safe. Ultimately, for the sake of what are we affirming democratic norms? What kind of example do we expect of the party organizations? Everything is done for the sake of liberating the initiative and creativity of people. The first word here and the real effort belongs to the communists.

[Question] Are the residents of the oblast—Lenin's birthplace—feeling the changes brought about by perestroika?

[Answer] I think that they are. We are successfully implementing integrated programs in the key directions and "Housing-90" is no exception. Last year, builders surpassed all plans, including plans for commissioning hospitals, kindergartens, schools and clubs. Most importantly, the initiative is yielding a return. Two hundred thousand square meters of housing have been built by the direct labor method.

However, I must candidly admit that there are more unresolved problems than I would like, than there should be. It is lamentable, for example, that there are interruptions in trade in certain household products: sometimes the suppliers have not delivered washing powder and other things have also disappeared from the counter. This is how dissatisfaction is generated and complaints multiply.

[Question] We have noticed that the number of complaints from the oblast to central authorities, to the contrary, has dropped. How do you explain this, Yuriy Grigoryevich?

[Answer] We will consider that our work here as well is producing its results. After all, gatherings of citizens are constantly held. Last year alone, there were more than 3500 proposals from these gatherings. Many questions are decided on the spot. Conflicts are promptly resolved through the adoption of specific measures. Here, too, democratic habits are absolutely essential. Open letter days are held everywhere. Our press, radio and television have begun speaking more openly about painful issues.

The mail shows that people now have more confidence in the local organs of power. There are more and more letters of a sociopolitical nature and this is also an indicator of the growth of civil activism.

People take their example—the example of democratism—from communists, from party leaders.

**Nishanov Discusses Economy, Return to Normalcy in Uzbekistan**

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22 Apr 88p 2

[Interview with R. N. Nishanov, first secretary, Uzbekistan CP Central Committee, by G. Dimov and G. Melikyan; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] Rafik Nishanovich, there is general, heightened interest in Uzbekistan. It has been spoken about at the 27th Congress and a number of plenums of the Party Central Committee. It is currently being written about in newspapers and magazines. After working overseas 15 years as an ambassador of the Soviet Union, you returned to the republic where you served as a minister and have been chairman of the Presidium of the UzSSR Supreme Soviet for more than a year. You were elected to your current post only 4 months ago and so you have a fresh look at the situation and the process of normalization in the republic.

[Answer] Now, before the 19th Party Conference, a worker of any rank or in any post, whether he is a newcomer or, more importantly, is not a newcomer, must have a fresh approach to everything. Therein lies the logic of the new style of thinking. I will say without diplomacy that the recent, scandalously sensational newspaper publication to which PRAVDA made a proper reply was an attempt to revive views that are out of date.

On the other hand, who in our republic is pleased by the present position of the clairvoyant newcomer? To me this is simply illogical. I grew up in this party organization. What is painful to the republic is also painful to me. Even the short time I have worked in the government and in the Central Committee Buro makes me a direct participant in the republic's successes and failures—there were also some of them—during that time. The main question confronting communists and all the people of Uzbekistan is how to correct the situation along the lines of general perestroyka. There have been many promises. The need is for tangible action.

As regards fresh impressions and the most important thing—the mood of the people, you have already guessed what I am going to be referring to. After meeting with Afghanistan president Najibullah in Tashkent, M. S. Gorbachev spent 2 days in Uzbekistan talking with the republic's working people and leaders. The strongest impression created by the people, he emphasized, was their activeness, their openness, their desire to discuss serious issues.

[Question] We have seen the local Central Statistical Administration's summary for last year and the first quarter of this year. While the republic has unquestionably made progress in many spheres, on the whole the republic's growth rates are still at the level of the early

eighties. The normalization process is occurring but as someone poignantly stated recently: all that has been done is what absolutely had to be done.

[Answer] Take note of the advice that is being drummed into the Uzbekistan aktiv: "think, think, think!" It is especially important that the party organization clearly understand what has taken place, but it is no less important to conceive and to provide the people with a precise plan of action in the name of the modernization we are all looking forward to. Why has less been done than could have been done? The roots here run deep: for a good 10 five-year plans, the growth rates for Central Asia were planned at a relatively higher level in order to bring the region closer to the all-union level. More plants, more canals, more water. By using its natural resources recklessly, the republic had made very considerable progress by the beginning of the eighties. But when it became necessary to go deeper, to attain qualitative parameters, everything came to a standstill because the republic was still stuck in the same rut, in part even after the April Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

Such are the general reasons. But there are also specific reasons as well. In the self-normalization process, the republic had to replace two-thirds of all its managerial personnel and clear away obstructions. There was an appreciable shakeup—not everything cleared itself up. Unfortunately, the struggle for the new did not receive priority over the struggle against the old. A certain group of officials was to blame for everything that happened. Of course, the guilt of certain people at the middle and lower level, who said nothing, who covered up crimes, cannot be ignored. But many of them were drawn into deals that did not profit them whatsoever. Criminal proceedings were terminated against 13,000 of the 17,500 persons directly or indirectly involved in the "cotton deals." At the instigation of the law enforcement agencies themselves, the sentences of many others in the cotton complex were commuted or set aside. The involuntary depression of this category of people is passing; the spring of '88 is noteworthy for good labor activism.

Nor will I skirt the following question. Much that is bitter is written about the negative phenomena in Uzbekistan. Among the local intelligentsia, especially the writers, this has even evoked extreme emotions. But what is to blame? Publication is a secondary matter. The primary thing is the crux of the matter. And it has not cast the republic in a good light. Another question: the diligent service and highly principled line of investigative groups have occasionally been depicted in isolation from or even in opposition to efforts of republic party and soviet organizations to eradicate the negative phenomena. One publication persisted in referring to the bribery cases as the "Uzbek affair." But such an "affair" did not and could not exist. This would contradict the party's assessment: "Neither in Moscow nor among our people was disrespect shown toward Uzbekistan even during its difficult times." The people are not to blame.

They suffered the most from the disgraceful goings-on. Modernization is, after all, gaining momentum because the people are striving for it.

The following conclusion is fundamentally important for us: the mood in the republic today is such that if the people are shown a good program, they can perform major feats.

[Question] You yourself have brought us to the next question. How soon can Uzbekistan be offered such a program and if you already envisage such a program, wherein does it consist?

[Answer] In the decisive transition from "prestigious goals in economic development to a real increase in its effectiveness and in its performance in the all-union division of labor.

In what way has Uzbekistan not dazzled the imagination in more than one decade? In the development of whole steppes such as the Golodnaya Steppe; in the construction of gigantic canals such as the Fergana Canal; in the development of new industrial centers on an all-union scale such as Almalyk and Zarafshan, and as I have already said: all this is typical of the past stage in the industrialization of Central Asia, including Uzbekistan. Nevertheless, today we cannot entirely discontinue the development of new land through the development of irrigated virgin land. The most important thing is that the concept of the scale of the economy is now changing. We are not planning the construction of large machine building plants in the next few years, but machine building will continue to make progress but in the form of the reconstruction of enterprises and improvements in the product mix.

Another facet of the program is its connection with demographic problems. Over half a million people in Uzbekistan today are not employed in the public sector at the same time that there is an appreciable shortage of labor resources in the nation as a whole. There are also those who avidly watch cockfights at the same time that their children are picking cotton. But there are many who are simply unable to find employment. What are we planning to do about this? We are putting second and third shifts into operation at enterprises. We are encouraging the cottage industry in the agroindustrial complex. We are increasing the number of secondary vocational-technical schools. We are encouraging people to work at home. Many people are joining cooperatives that are now being established everywhere. Cooperation is also being organized with oblasts in the Russian Federation: 3000 Uzbek families are already working on sovkhozes, kolkhozes, in logging camps, etc., in more than 20 Russian oblasts.

But the most important thing is to create jobs in the most densely populated regions. At present, there are more than 250 enterprise affiliates and shops in these regions. Not all of them are equal to the task. Many of them

produce products of inferior quality. But this is the right idea. I would like to take this opportunity to call the attention of leaders of all-union ministries to the program. Affiliates established in Uzbekistan by Kuybyshev, Orel, Ufa enterprises and enterprises in other cities have given a good account of themselves: we have an abundance of working hands. All you have to do is train them. Infrastructure costs in the southern belt are relatively low.

[Question] The primary goal of the new model of the republic's economic development, as we understand it, is to improve the people's well-being and, not least to absorb the general overabundance of money in the marketplace. You, Rafik Nishanovich, have discussed this point in the past. Is this reflected in the program about which we are speaking?

[Answer] Of course. The program is directly oriented toward giving an early return to people, to trade, and to the bank by dramatically increasing the availability of consumer goods and paid services.

We find ourselves in a difficult situation. Belorussia, which has a population almost half the size of ours, produces three times as many consumer goods. It is planned—and the union organs support this plan—to establish within the enterprise in a short period of time a network of 40 plants and factories specializing in the production of consumer goods, small television sets, tractors, separators, sewing machines, computers for schools, and, naturally, sewn goods, and footwear, as well as 70-80 shops producing consumer goods under the auspices of large all-union enterprises. The main emphasis will be on tasks that have never been posed on such a scale in Central Asia. They are truly capable of changing the way people think and inspiring them.

The second point is housing. Uzbekistan's population increases by almost a half million persons every year. In order to give each family a separate apartment or house by the year 2000, we will have to build 200 million square meters of housing, i. e., to effect a twofold increase. Can this be done? If so, in what way? There is one way: individual and cooperative construction. The knowhow is available: in Namangan, enterprises and the population took part in the transformation of slums in the upper part of the city, laid sewer and water lines; 3000 families are building their own homes; the apartments vacated by them will go to the next families on the waiting list. People are taking the solution of the housing problem into their own hands.

Finally, the part of the program that deals with food...

[Question] With your permission, this is the first thing we would like to ask. According to the statistics, the republic's per capita consumption of meat and meat products is 29-30 kilograms compared with the national

average—62-64; the respective figures for vegetables and fruit are 170-173 and 260-270. How did this happen and what is the way out of the situation?

[Answer] Yes, these figures were a source of shame in our republic and the attempt was made to ignore them. But can there be a forbidden zone when it concerns the level of people's consumption and well-being as well as the moral and psychological climate? It is not enough to be aware of the problem. It is also necessary to understand it and address it.

What is the plan for doing so? The most important thing is to increase the return on every hectare of irrigated land. Attention was focused on this point at a recent sitting of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. The point is, while preserving the present level of cotton production and while shipping up to half of all fruit and vegetable produce in fresh or canned form, to dramatically increase deliveries of this produce within the republic. Not only by increasing the area sown under these crops but also by creating large storage and processing capacities. As regards meat and milk and mixed feeds for our farms, we must have them shipped in. We cannot count on the punctual fulfillment of reciprocal obligations.

[Question] We have come to the question that invariably enters into the conversation in Uzbekistan—the question of cotton and cotton farming.

[Answer] One of the first economic plans signed by Lenin was the Decree on the Development of Golodnaya Steppe. Soon, in May, this decree will be 70 years old. The state's enormous investments in cotton farming proved to be highly effective: instead of importing cotton, the nation became a major cotton exporter.

But overreporting of performance and corruption surrounding cotton cast a shadow over the entire branch. There were even those who demanded that "cotton farming be curbed" and that Uzbekistan be transformed from a cotton-planting republic into "workshop" for producing who knows what. The cotton independence that was attained back in the thirties—the result of the nation's common efforts—was virtually called its misfortune.

These extremes were manifested, to be sure at the apex of the Aral problem or, more precisely, the Priaralye problem. Intensive efforts are being made to solve it but where the above-cited judgments are concerned, these are typical extremes. In terms of its significance for the nation, cotton is compared with metal. Unlike metal, however, almost all cotton is realized in the form of goods for the people. The republic's cotton production quota has been reduced in order to accelerate the introduction of crop rotation and to put an end to the single crop situation. But at a recent meeting, cotton farmers decided to add up to 150 tons of raw cotton to the

lowered plan in the current year. We considered and still consider cotton farming to be not a "burden" but our national pride and our international duty.

I emphasize: the program that has been presented here in the most abbreviated form is the result of a considered approach to urgent problems in republic life characteristic of many meetings in the course of preparations for the 19th Party Conference.

[Question] The new tasks require a new type of leader. This is probably doubly important for Uzbekistan where, as already stated, two-thirds of the officials have been replaced since 1984.

[Answer] All basic links in party, soviet, state, and economic leadership are being sequentially restructured. This is not an easy matter under our conditions—it is also necessary to correct the cadre situation. But we are helped by people themselves and by the practice of holding elections. Today approximately 25,000 heads of enterprises, organizations, farms; scientific, educational, and other institutions have been elected from a list of two, three or more candidates. Experienced party, soviet and economic workers have come from Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, Voronezh, and other cities to take permanent jobs in Uzbekistan. They have brought their experience with them but at the same time they have had to learn the local conditions, to learn from us. In turn, young cadres from Uzbekistan are presently working in all union organs, are interning in party committees in the RSFSR, Belorussia, the Baltic republics, and other republics. There has been an increase in the number of Uzbeks in academies of social sciences and the national economy and in a number of higher party schools. Approximately 10,000 workers in the mass occupations are acquiring knowledge at industrial enterprises in Russia, the Ukraine and Belorussia.

[Question] As a result of purification and modernization, there are those who have been deprived of various privileges as well as economic goods. There are the "aggrieved."

[Answer] Yes, the normalization of the situation during all this time encounters—both in economics and in social and ideological spheres—an appreciable "material resistance." It revealed the inability of some party organizations to remedy matters, the perplexity of some of the cadres, and, to the contrary, the complacency of others who are trying to "catch their breath." We still have strong stagnant habits, various conditionalities in our everyday life and this has impeded the eradication of views that worked "rather well" during the time of stagnation and that became the basis for everything negative. Thus the commanding style is ideally suited to the aspirations of careerists and those who pad performance figures while clannishness and nepotism have led directly to social corrosion.

Incidentally, nepotism has become rooted not only in scientific and educational institutions but also in the nomenklatura at various levels—each one has given those close to him a hand up. Order must also be instituted here. Of course this will cause a certain amount of dissatisfaction but it will be welcomed by the entire population.

[Question] Uzbekistan is a multinational republic. The traditions of internationalism here have withstood a difficult test. But as we know, each generation must go through its own school of internationalism.

[Answer] We do not lull ourselves with words alone: inviolable friendship, mutual ties, brotherhood of cultures. We know that the practice of interethnic relations means overcoming contradictions that are inevitable in any process and solving problems that were hitherto unknown. We must address all this with all our soul and with knowledge of the matter. Unfortunately there have been shortcomings here, too. When we speak about respect for our brothers in our multinational family, why then did we have to lay claim to Avitsenna when he in reality is a great Tajik scholar? Is it that he does not belong to us if he belongs to our brothers?

It is illustrative that the word "nationalism" disappeared at a time from the local vocabulary while there were manifestations of nationalism. But why do people fear this word? The predominant nation in the republic must combat nationalism. Internationalism must become the popular practice. Our tasks here have grown complicated under glasnost when demands are frequently generated by emotions rather than reason. But we will remember: only the consideration of the interests of all nations, full justice in the area of education, culture and cadre policy—is the basis of stability in interethnic relations.

[Question] A "local" but probably understandable question: how are various detached houses and "residences" built with state funds presently being used?

[Answer] Luxurious "hereditary" personal vacation cottages for the first persons in the republic were converted into children's homes and rest homes for invalids. The persons occupying these posts have vacation cottages within the norms in the common vacation cottage zone. Very recently a custom-built dwelling house for republic executives in Tashkent was converted into a home for war and labor veterans. In connection with the scheduled abolition of certain oblasts, ministries and departments, the republic government has resolved to convert approximately 300 vacated buildings into medical institutions. While this naturally does not satisfy all public health needs and all needs for the construction of housing and sociocultural facilities, people can even now see that social justice is now more than just a word.

[Question] The final question is of a personal nature. You were outside the republic for a long time because you disagreed with the line advocated by Rashidov as far

back as the early seventies. What would have become of you if you had remained at that time? One more question: what kind of character traits would you like to instill in the aktiv? What is the yardstick by which you measure people?

[Answer] This question must also be answered because it contains a moral. Weak-willed, unscrupulous people either were not equal to the task or else were mixed up in unseemly affairs. People with a measured approach to life and all the moreso people with personal party courage remained true to themselves. Take the fondly remembered Kayum Murtazayev who went through Komsomol school in Moscow, was active in the local party organizations at the lower level, and preferred to speak frankly. Rasul Gulamov remained highly principled to the end. He was an experienced party worker who was recently elected chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet. I will not try to guess what would have become of me. I know that I would not have betrayed my conscience and my duty to the party.

As regards the yardstick by which I measure people, it is also based on the party's honor code. The most important thing is to work, to dedicate oneself to the cause, to modernization, to purification, and to learn unceasingly. It is clear to me that we must untie the worker's hands and normalize his situation. Very much depends on how we address socioeconomic problems. This will help not only to multiply the results of work but also to affirm socialism's moral principles. Diligent social labor precludes parasitism, dishonesty and the search for roundabout paths.

On the threshold of the 19th Party Conference, I would like to emphasize in particular that Uzbekistan has been a worthy brother in the Soviet family and continues to be one today. We have a plan of action. We have the resolve to carry it out. We have the support of the people. This is the main thing that permits us to hope that we will manage to cope.

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#### **Kolbin Interviewed on Kazakh Situation, Inter-Nation Ties**

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[Interview with G.V. Kolbin, first secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee, by special correspondents G. Dildyayev, T. Yesilbayev, and A. Petrushov, under the rubric "Thoughts Before the Party Conference": "How Kinship Is Strengthened; On the Problems of Restructuring and Contemporary Inter-Nation Relations"; date not given—boldface as published]

[Text] Alma-Ata—[Correspondents] Gennadiy Vasilyevich, restructuring in Kazakhstan is arousing a great deal of interest among PRAVDA readers. Letters are coming



from everywhere. That is why, when preparing for this conversation, we decided that it would be best to base it on the editorial mail, which is now more prolific and varied than it has ever been.

[Kolbin] I agree. I can also use this discussion to go some way toward answering the many letters that have been sent to the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee, particularly those addressed personally to me.

[Correspondents] The press has already carried a considerable number of reports on the events in Alma-Ata in December 1986. But people still want to know more. Typically, people are not motivated by a narrow-minded passion for the "juicy" details, but by the desire to understand the reasons for what happened and find out how the effects of the events are being dealt with. Readers are concerned that some people have begun to try to distort these events to suit their own vested interests, instill false premises in the minds of their contemporaries and sometimes offer arrogant explanations, and make political capital after the event.

[Kolbin] Such attempts have been made and will probably recur in the future. But we have a powerful weapon to counter these attempts—the CPSU Central Committee resolution "On the Work of the Kazakh Republic Party Organization Concerning the International and Patriotic Education of the Working People." This document has fundamental significance for the entire party. It helps us to draw political lessons from what has happened. It should also be carefully studied by anyone who wants to understand and interpret the underlying reasons for the events in the Baltic and Transcaucasian regions. After all, for many years we have all lived smug in the belief that the national problem in our country was solved long ago. Hence the unrestrained toasts to inviolable friendship, the mindless reports of "flourishing" and "merging," and opportunist treatises of a eulogistic nature. But the real problems posed by life have been glossed over. Basically the subject of national relations has been devoid of critical analysis. Meanwhile, national policy must be studied constantly and in depth, as noted at the February CPSU Central Committee plenum. Moreover, it must be considered in every aspect—in theory and in practice. Without this, we cannot really democratize social life.

I have no wish to deprive philosophers and social scientists of their livelihood—it is their job to support or dispute the arguments of those who claim that when a people (and the Kazakh people in particular) are making the transition from one social formation to another—from feudalism to socialism—the "ripples" left by prejudices that still persist even now are naturally inevitable. To be honest, I can see no real point in these arguments. Something else is more important to me in practical work: Many people, including the very brightest, are intoxicated by a sense of national exclusivity. In my

opinion, the reasons for this must be explained in political rather than philosophical terms, and by the level of philosophical culture and education rather than ethnopsychology.

What have our eyes been opened to, and what are we talking about today without any false constraint? Internationalism is an exceptionally broad concept. As far as I am concerned, it presupposes the desire, willingness, and ability to painstakingly gather everything that will contribute to drawing people together rather than pushing them apart. But this is only possible if there is deep respect for the dignity, culture, language, and history of every people and mutual contact between them. But, you must agree, this noble sentiment is not genetic and does not appear of its own accord. Every effort must be made to cultivate it. We do not now intend to turn our backs on anything that prevents this, provokes national insult, or excites pride, and we will not tolerate low standards in this respect. We are discussing, seeking, and testing means and methods of handling interethnic relations. In short, even this delicate area has been affected by the process of democratization and glasnost.

I think it would be naive to take the events in Alma-Ata at face value from an ideological standpoint. No people has a spiritual basis for nationalism and chauvinism. Working people of different nationalities easily understand each other and have a clear, untroubled perception of life. It is most often the case that the shadow of mutual distrust and the shroud of arrogance arise when ethics and morality are deformed and the norms and principles of party leadership and the Soviet way of life are violated. In Kazakhstan, this began with the distortion of Leninist cadre policy, when family ties and the attendant vestiges of the past began to be used everywhere.

Cronyism created a situation of group protection and mutual protection. Hence the corruption and bribery. Inveterate schemers and self-seekers who balk at nothing have gained the upper hand. They are responsible for spreading rumors, organizing anonymous letters, and persecuting people not to their liking. Their aim is simple: to shed responsibility for economic disorders, bureaucracy, and shortcomings in the supply system and conceal their own moral bankruptcy.

Take this fact, for example. Everything possible was done to prevent the riots in Alma-Ata in December. Many leaders addressed the people gathered in the square—every word of authority was valuable to us at the time. Before feelings reached fever pitch, the Central Committee Bureau suggested that D.A. Kunayev speak to the people and explain the essential political nature of the decision taken by the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee plenum to relieve him of his post as first secretary of the Central Committee. They hoped that this would dispel the tension and knock the ground from beneath the feet of provocateurs and demagogues. He categorically refused, however. For that reason, the events in Alma-Ata are largely on his conscience.



The struggle for a pure life began with restructuring within the Communist Party itself and its leading organs. The bureau has been substantially renewed. Everyone who undermined the authority of the Central Committee has been removed from it. Many people have been relieved of their duties in the Central Committee apparatus because they cannot be trusted. Last year alone, 1,200 members of MVD organs were relieved of their duties for lacking moral scruples. A total of 12 VUZ rectors have been dismissed in the republic on the same grounds. A merciless war has been declared on cronyism and bribery.

[Correspondents] Nevertheless, the PRAVDA mail contains a lot of complaints against leading personnel. "It seems to me," Candidate of Sciences A. Tazhibayev, former staffer at the Kazakh Scientific Research Institute of Veterinary Science, writes, "that they want to make me toe the line because I exposed bureaucrats and idlers. I have lost all hope of finding work in my specialized field. Wherever I apply, I always come face to face with people who persecuted me before." We have been told the same thing by Zh. Zimanov, R. Sharipov, K. Yedygenov, and others.

[Kolbin] It is hard for me to judge these particular instances—they would have to be looked into. But in principle this is serious. Immediately after the CPSU Central Committee April (1985) Plenum, the opponents of restructuring hastily began to reorganize their own ranks. Compromised officials were shifted sideways—so that they could be shielded by others. Others—from a secret reserve—were pulled upward after donning the armor of knights of restructuring. And with the long-term aim of "survival." They are now concerned with all-round defense and are persecuting those who have criticized their patrons. But we are aware of these gestures of expediency and know "who's who." When reports were given by elected organs, a total of 1,836 members of party committees and bureaus were replaced. Some 450 secretaries of primary and shop party organizations were newly elected. Obkom, gorkom, and raykom bureaus have been purged. Meetings and plenums have proposed that **if in practice a leader fails to live up to the trust placed in him, he must be replaced immediately without waiting for his term of office to end. In my opinion, this should be discussed at the all-union party conference.** The deeper restructuring goes, the more need there is to free ourselves of incompetent cadres who have lost their authority.

This cleansing process will be helped by reducing the size of the administrative apparatus. A total of 14 ministries and departments and 2 of the 19 oblasts are to be abolished. As a whole, the number of 132,000 administrative workers has already been cut by more than 33,000.

But let us return to the main subject of our conversation. There is no doubt that a timely solution to social problems will help—by exerting a beneficial influence on

the growth of national self-awareness—to prevent diseased shoots from appearing on this developing tree of national distinctiveness and to graft the culture of international feeling onto it. Real improvement in the situation in the republic has been helped not so much by "punitive," destructive measures as by constructive measures. For example, a real move from the standstill reached in the housing problem has done more to establish social justice and strengthen friendship among the peoples than dozens of the old pompous sessions and hundreds of speeches about unity and fraternity.

Improvements have also been made in the population's food supply. These improvements did not come out of thin air either. More feed was procured for farms over the summer—which had an immediate effect on livestock productivity growth. State orders are now beginning to be met and produce in excess of the plan is being channeled into the retail trade network. There is a particularly wide range of meat products available in Kokchetav, Kustanay, and Tselinograd oblasts, where they have succeeded in increasing people's personal interest in the development of agricultural production and have boldly begun to develop new forms of cooperation.

But on the whole the economy is still in a serious situation. The financial side of things is a source of serious concern. The money owed by enterprises and organizations to the banks exceeds R1.5 billion. The only way out of the breach is through radical economic reform. Economic accountability is already taking effect: Where it is operating at full strength, things are moving and the results are evident. A great deal depends on how rapidly democratic norms of interpersonal relations gain in strength. In this sense, the restructuring of society is simultaneously a highly complex process of restructuring inter-nation relations.

[Correspondents] How are you approaching the problems in this complex and delicate sphere?

[Kolbin] First of all, we have laid down clear guidelines for ourselves: When we encounter signs of nationalist prejudice, we must not dramatize events or fall into a panic. Without exception this only plays into the hands of extremists and social demagogues. We are learning to deal with difficulties painlessly, and we discuss everything in this respect frankly and honestly. Difficulties arise when a person known as a nationalist or a chauvinist considers himself a patriot. That is why criticism of his feelings and ideas often prompts such a strong reaction. This must be taken into consideration. These problems are being studied as they arise by the commissions on national and inter-nation relations which have been formed under the Central Committee and party obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms. Sectors responsible for national relations have been organized in the propaganda and agitation departments of the Central Committee and party obkoms. Life has shown that these subdivisions are necessary. Incidentally, we do not see

ourselves as pioneers in this respect. Sectors like these existed in the union republics' Central Committees and obkoms until the thirties.

The commission sessions are certainly not "academic exercises": There are many disputes, different emotions, and real clashes of opinion. This is understandable: The issues being discussed are not straightforward.

After a painstaking analysis of specific situations, we have approved a recommendation on a leader's personal responsibility for the state of the moral and psychological climate in his collective and for the level of international relations in that collective. A leader's ability to foster a spirit of internationalism in people is now definitely taken into account during the certification procedure and the renewal of his character reference.

A method of approach which excludes the possibility of cadres' being mechanically selected on national grounds has also been approved, which is helping to eliminate the infamous practice whereby office is "inherited." A lot of words have been wasted in the arguments over the percentage ratio of nations and their representatives in various organs. We are opposed to "arithmetical" operations in this respect. We should be concerned with seeking, training, and backing people committed to the common cause rather than to subtraction and division. This approach alone is fair and will offend no one. But we cannot tolerate blatant distortions. To maintain proportions is one of the natural aims of cadre policy.

[Correspondents] Gennadiy Vasilyevich, the next range of questions from our mailbag is connected with language study in schools and kindergartens. Many readers are interested in the "bilingual principle" itself and in its real application in practice.

[Kolbin] The bilingual principle.... There are many aspects here: social, cultural, legal, emotional, and those affecting everyday life. There are also political aspects. When we see that there are more and more conscripts coming from Guryev and Taldy-Kurgan oblasts with a poor knowledge of Russian, that is not just a linguistic but a state problem. Why is this happening? We are discovering, for example, that in remote regions where the population is almost 100-percent Kazakh, even the Russian language teachers themselves have a poor knowledge of the language. Russian teaching generally is very poorly organized.

This, I believe, should be borne in mind by us all. Russian became the language of inter-nation communication for historical reasons and not as a result of a decree from above. This is a reality, just as it is a reality that the USSR is a polyethnic, multinational society, where every national language must feel it has full value.

Bilingualism is a requirement in the national republics. The question of Kazakh language teaching in schools and kindergartens was already a serious issue here a year ago.

But why, one asks? Who prevented the former leadership from doing what is being done now? New classes and groups have been opened throughout the republic in line with laws and instructions. They are tailored to meet requirements. They teach not only teach Kazakh, but German, Uighur, Kurdish, and Polish are also offered. The Communist Party Central Committee and the republic's government have approved special resolutions to improve Kazakh and Russian language teaching. We work on the basis that we must establish bilingualism (voluntarily, of course) and not just talk about the need to do so, because this clouds what is generally a clear-cut issue. I cannot see why, but previously it was only given the hard sell without ever getting down to real decisions and real action. The necessary dictionaries, textbooks, and phrasebooks have now been published in a short space of time and circles have been organized to study the languages of indigenous and Russian nationalities. This has become a need for people living in the republic.

The CPSU Central Committee February Plenum said that we should more often recall Lenin's behest that the cause of internationalism and friendship among peoples are best served by the practice of Russian and native language teaching in one general school rather than in different schools. This is also greatly helped by the joint education of children of different nationalities in children's institutions.

Yes, the drawing together of nations is a long dialectical process, but creating artificial restraints on this process means lowering oneself to a mimicry of internationalism.

[Correspondents] We would also like to touch on the question of traditions, which have likewise become a subject of dispute and discussion.

[Kolbin] Here, too, there must be a sense of moderation. When this fails, even the very best tradition becomes its own opposite. Take the following example. Kazakhs—and other peoples too, incidentally—clearly express their respect for their elders, or aksakals, literally translated as "the white bearded ones." This is fine! Over the last two decades, however, this word also began to be used to dignify people in senior office, although some "aksakals" are only 25-30 years old. Was this not a source of the cult of rank, with all the attendant consequences? And was this metamorphosis accidental? Of course not. It was precisely at this time that the struggle against feudal-landowner morality and patriarchal-ancestral customs essentially waned. But it is one of the brilliant pages in the history of the Kazakh Communist Party. Much was achieved on this path. Bride money, polygamy, and other conservative customs virtually disappeared. But in the years of stagnation they began to be revived again.

In short, the offensive in this neglected area of ideology must be conducted across the board and by varied means. But the most important thing is individual work.

I would like to repeat: We say frankly that leaders at the top are entirely responsible for the atmosphere in their collective. Hard? It could not be otherwise. There has been too much big talk about friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance. The time has come to give some substance to these words. Lenin taught us to "know how to be... an internationalist in reality," and it is our duty to remember this behest.

**To be honest, I am most of all excited by the headstart we have made in work concerning international and patriotic education in preparation for the all-union party conference and the forthcoming CPSU Central Committee plenum. We must prepare constructive proposals for them. Some have already been verified and have justified themselves in practice.**

Whom will people follow? Who will unite them? Yes, it is a question of leadership. The time demands bold, energetic leaders free of the fetters of the past. Leaders who have strong authority by virtue of their personality rather than because of the office they hold. I believe that if we were to arrange a test today in the form of a popular vote, not everyone would pick up a "pass mark." For example, N. Davydov, former first secretary of the Dzhezkazgan party obkom, did not have a single good word said about him at the plenum which saw his retirement. A sad outcome which offers a lot of food for thought.

I think that the political life of functionaries like this will now be shortlived. I am gratified by the "chief requests" I hear at meetings with people who live in Kzyl-Orda, Tselinograd, and Kokchetav oblasts: Do not take our first secretary away from us. Yerkin Nurzhanovich Auelbekov, Andrey Georgiyevich Braun, and Makhtay Ramazanovich Sagdiyev have won authority by their actions.

Not a great deal of time has passed since the bad memories of December 1986. But how the nature of the letters sent to the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee and its Bureau has changed! They contain support and approval, and practical, concerned advice. We draw strength and confidence for our work from them.

#### **Gorbachev, Media Officials Discuss Party Conference**

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[TASS report under the general heading "Through Democratization—Toward a New Face of Socialism. Meeting in the CPSU Central Committee"]

[Text] It has already been reported that a meeting with leaders of the mass media, ideological institutions, and creative unions took place in the CPSU Central Committee 7 May. An account of this meeting is published below.

M.S. Gorbachev: We want to devote today's meeting to the forthcoming 19th party conference. We can see that society and the party have joined in the process of preparing for it. This is why there is a need for guidelines.

The press has already inaugurated the appropriate rubrics and discussion is essentially already under way—and it is going on not only within the party framework; it is a nationwide discussion. I think that the mass media already have a certain amount of experience here, a certain amount has been accumulated, and various questions have been raised. Hence I propose: You, comrades, go ahead, express your opinions, raise questions, and then I will speak. If there are no objections, we will adopt this procedure.

N.M. Gribachev, chief editor of the journal SOVETS-KIY SOYUZ, was the first to speak.

All Soviet people, he said, expect a very great deal from the party conference. It seems to me, however, that a certain passiveness can currently be observed among Communists. Some of them are waiting to see which way the wind will blow.

It is currently fashionable to sail the rivers of history. I will take the liberty of doing the same. So, the party prepared the revolution, the party under V.I. Lenin's leadership accomplished the revolution, the party is continuing the revolution. And this is impossible—simply impossible, dear comrades—without unity in the party ranks and without every Communist assuming a serious responsibility. V.I. Lenin repeatedly raised the question of party unity. I think that this question will inevitably surface, in some form or another, at the party conference.

Now I would like to say a few words about the press which we represent. The press has a tremendous role to play, including in preparing for the party conference. It is particularly important at this time to know whether everything is perfectly in order in our journalists' corps. Do we always adopt a responsible attitude toward the cause?

Developing this thesis, the speaker spoke about the need to examine historical facts in a principled and honest way and from party positions and to avoid oversimplification of these facts and an indiscriminate approach to the most acute problems. At present this kind of approach is not a rare occurrence in our journalism.

It is particularly important, the speaker went on to note, to ensure that all our journalism is truthful to the utmost and is based on accurate and verified facts. After all it can happen that a trivial fact is violated in one case, then in another, and as a result there is an overall undermining of trust in items about restructuring.

I personally believe that there is no need for any administrative measures here. Let people work calmly. Other things are more important. First, educational work in journalism. It must be deepened and intensified. Second, it is necessary to assess every statement from party positions, to constantly show concern for and think of the unity of the party ranks, to be even more strictly exacting toward ourselves. "Lapses" in work will then diminish.

The forthcoming party conference will certainly discuss the results of our work which we call restructuring. S.V. Vikulov, chief editor of the journal NASH SOVREMENNIK, said. Readers' letters to all the mass media now testify that the people are seeking an answer to this question and want to really feel its results.

These results must not be assessed in a primitive fashion, only from a mundane point of view, as it were. We must not forget for a single moment the main point—the human soul, the human factor.

I believe, the speaker went on to say, that the first and foremost result of restructuring is that all of us, the whole people, have become different from what we were. People have found their voices, they are talking and they are talking in a demanding fashion, at times with indignation and even anger, about the things obstructing restructuring. And the important point is that people are speaking not from positions of personal interests but from positions of state interests, the motherland's interests. Even those who from time immemorial have lived with a "nothing to do with me" attitude are now starting to think in the spirit of restructuring.

This is evident in readers' letters. People are frankly expressing their opinion, which at times does not coincide with what they read in the pages of our publications. There are profound conclusions and very businesslike proposals. I would say that, in general, these letters are a mine of the people's wisdom and experience. These letters are the tuning fork of the people's soul. It is a great pity that we can't find the time to fully process and study these letters. After all, in essence this is nothing else but a nationwide referendum. People are themselves answering questions and baring their souls, and therefore their voice must be heeded. Unfortunately, the letters departments in many editorial offices are too small to deal with this huge mailbag, while some literary and art journals do not even have such departments at all. We, for example, do not have a single person who could work in a letters department. That's the nature of our staffing situation, unfortunately.

Yet, as we know, the West has entire institutes to study public opinion. Now that we need to know with absolute accuracy what the people are thinking about what is happening in the country, comrades, why don't we give some thought to more intensive study of the people's opinion and the creation of appropriate institutions.

The speaker went on to dwell in detail on the party's role in restructuring and spoke of the need to resolutely combat bureaucracy. The mass media have a weighty role to play in this struggle, whose results are awaited by the whole people.

At the same time, the press must raise the question of making stricter demands of Communists and cleansing the party ranks of those who disgrace this lofty title. I think that this view ought to be discussed at the party conference. Let the party be built according to the principle: "Better to have fewer people but of better quality." I perceive this as one of the potential areas for boosting its prestige.

Speaking about the role of the intelligentsia and the masses in the transformations which are gathering pace in society, the speaker stressed that the goal of all the work which we call restructuring is to finally overcome indifference and inspire the people. We have the courage to admit the mistakes of the past. The people have waited a long time for this courage, and they are in favor of restructuring with every fiber of their soul.

Now it is important to stand up straight, proudly raise our heads, roll up our sleeves, and get down to work. The mass media must now achieve the main objective—to awaken people's sense of pride in their country and confidence in the victory of restructuring.

The moment we are currently living through is a very serious time, a turning-point time, NOVYY MIR Chief Editor S.P. Zalygin noted in his speech. It cannot be said that everything is fine, that success is assured. I think that, no, it is not assured. Very serious steps are required to assure it. It must not be thought that those whom we call the masses—the intelligentsia, the working class, the peasantry—are all rapturously accepting restructuring. The part of social life which very often passes us by must not be disregarded. The point is that we are not very good at listening and being guided by public opinion. You can see what is happening. How many demonstrations and pickets we are witnessing, how many complaints about new construction or the felling of forests. But this is not only about trees, not only about forests. Unless we now respond to people demanding the preservation of nature we will become estranged from them. They will not trust us.

There is quite definite contact between the party leadership and the public. But as soon as the middle link gets involved things break down and we lose this contact. How can we not return to ecological problems! Everybody can now sense that in another 5 or 6 years that will be that—there will be no hope. Then we can talk about restructuring or whatever we like, but the resources will have been destroyed. And people realize this.

The speaker went on to stress the importance of the correct selection of cadres. It must not be thought that you only have to remove two or three people and then

things will be sorted out. No, these people will have been operating in a certain environment. On their own they could not have existed. So we need to dig deeper to ascertain who is linked to whom and whether these links have now been destroyed or not.

M.S. Gorbachev: Cadres, then. This is a very tricky subject. Some 66 percent of our ministers, 61 percent of obkom first secretaries and obkispolkom chairmen, and 63 percent of party gorkom and raykom first secretaries are new. This is the kind of change that has taken place. Many of them have already demonstrated their worth, have shown that they have reacted correctly to the times, have taken on special burdens, are sensitive to the new changes, and are responsive to people. There are many people like that. And there are people who never committed any violations punishable by law. But the past has left its mark on them.

New and often unexpected people are now coming to the fore. The people are noticing and supporting them. This is why we all need to pledge ourselves to democracy and the democratic process. There is a need for permanently operating mechanisms which will feed talented, energetic, and really capable people through the funnel of public opinion into leadership at every level. This is better and more reliable than appointment from above. This is democracy.

Even democracy involves costs. This can happen, comrades. But I do not believe that anyone can offer us a more correct approach. Therefore this process will develop. Reality is reality, and it is multidimensional. For example, a certain good man sent me a letter recently. He writes: I am a supporter of yours. You spoke recently, Mikhail Sergeyevich, and I noticed that you were starting to get nervous. I have to tell you that this is a luxury available to subordinates but not to leaders.

The people have been discussing things. This is good, comrades. It comes within the framework of glasnost. Nothing can compromise a leader as much as an attempt to deal with a person for criticism as happened in the bad old days.

We must live in accordance with Lenin. With how much passion and at what cost to his health did he devote himself to uniting, rallying, and consolidating people on a principled basis! This is how we must act, devoting everything for the sake of restructuring.

S.P. Zalygin: So we have come here with our demands.

It seems to me that the role of the public needs to be intensified. Say, for example, a report by some minister is going to be presented—in the CPSU Central Committee or the USSR Council of Ministers. Why not create before this some kind of public advisory body [obshchestvennyy sovet] consisting of people closely linked with this special subject? So they could go to the meeting and put questions to the person presenting the report.

We have set up various societies recently, but bureaucratic apparatuses have emerged in them and correspondence has flowed to such an extent that we have again ended up with something different from what we wanted.

M.S. Gorbachev: Unfortunately people come into these social organizations with the stereotypes and the mentality of the pre-restructuring period. And their first concern is for a direct government telephone line, good premises, a car, and so forth. And workers in the localities so they have someone to give instructions to. Often this is as far as the activity of social organizations goes. It gets to the point where the slightest criticism leveled at them is regarded as disrespect for those whom this social organization unites.

This is a very widespread phenomenon. Many people are pursuing their own selfish, egoistic interests but want to promote them in the convenient guise of concern for the people and socialism.

My personal inclination is to always respond with my heart to a person who sincerely strives for good and feels closely the people's pain and the life we lead. He can even be misguided or mistaken, but such a person, I believe, must be understood and can be helped.

S.P. Zalygin: But why shouldn't two or three societies present reports? Say a society has been formed and a year has passed—we should take a look...

M.S. Gorbachev: Or two or three journals.

S.P. Zalygin: Excuse me. A journal is on view; you can see it, it's there in print.

V.G. Afanasyev, chief editor of PRAVDA, spoke. Both a concealed and an overt argument is currently being conducted among journalists, writers, and workers in the mass news and propaganda media. What is more important: unrestrained criticism of what was and what is, or some positive proposals and the elaboration of forms, methods, and means of resolving the urgent problems that face us? We still think that, despite all the importance of criticism, including criticism of our history, the chief thing now is still creative work. If we are touching on problems of history, I think that we must rely, above all, on the facts and not on various kinds of reminiscences and fabrications. In this way we only confuse public opinion, muddle history, and introduce confusion into the brains of our young people.

Dwelling on the questions to be examined at the upcoming party conference, the speaker emphasized that it will be necessary, above all, to speak clearly and definitely once again about the leading role of the party. Why? Because there are now direct attempts under the flag and slogan of democracy, which at times can be very good, to dilute the party by homogenizing it with the people and some other organizations.

Another important question is the structure of party organs. PRAVDA receives many letters containing suggestions about this. There are proposals, for example, for the elimination and abolition of sectoral departments and an examination of the actual siting of party organs.

Maybe control is also a very complex question. Our readers and some scientists propose reviving and restoring the Central Control Commission in the party. And the logic is rather curious: We do not have an opposition party, but we speak of socialist pluralism, and the Central Control Commission is the party's walls; thus, we will have socialist pluralism, but there will be very clear, rigid control over the work of our leading party comrades.

Our most complex issues are questions of the economy, agricultural production, and consumer goods. We have adopted a radical economic reform. But let us state bluntly: The reform is not proceeding as it ought. First, because the administer and command apparatus is still very great. It produces nothing but paper. Everyone writes, orders, and issues directives, and there is a mass of checks and commissions. Clearly, we must more resolutely undertake the reorganization of our managerial apparatus.

At the center we observe: A ministry has been cut back, but some institution has been organized next door. All the officials who were working at the ministry move to the other apparatus. I do not know of a single case where a prominent engineer has moved from an office to a machine tool, a plant, or a factory. It is necessary to drastically change people's mentality. This is complex and difficult, but we will not get far without this, and cutting an apparatus will lead to nothing. We at PRAVDA have written about this and will do so again.

A word or two about criticism. Things have again become bad. At one time criticism was made, and people responded to criticism. Now there is again some avoidance of responding to critical remarks. We comment once, we comment twice, we comment three times. People do not respond.

Of course, we still make a mass of blunders and mistakes, sometimes we criticize the wrong person and defend the wrong person. We admit all this. We struggle against this however we can. We struggle earnestly.

A.A. Ananyev, chief editor of the journal OKTYABR, devoted his speech to problems of studying the history of the country, the history of the revolution. He used specific examples to show that this study is frequently conducted badly and superficially. There are many such instances.

M.S. Gorbachev: When I was preparing for the report on the 70th anniversary of October I was given from the stockrooms a list of documentary movies on the most important stages of the country's life. We have a vast

stock of newsreels which in themselves, even without commentaries, make strong propaganda material. We must make better use of them and more widely familiarize the people with them....

A.A. Ananyev: We must use historical parallels to give people the sense of being the master of their land and their country. For there is not even a law on land. But there should be, as there is on ecology. For what happens is that a bulldozer comes along, and chernozem gets buried while clay is brought to the surface. Who is accountable for this?

The speaker made a suggestion—to set up a special commission to examine the question of agriculture in a most fundamental fashion, in all its aspects. All conditions must be created so that the person—the master, the working person—can take root on the land. So that his children and grandchildren continue his cause. The peasant must not become a nomad. And the lease contract should be propagandized from these positions.

At present our contract workers take land only for one season, and they are prepared to wrest from it everything they can. It is not known if he will take this land or some other the next year. This is an extremely important question, perhaps the most important one....

M.S. Gorbachev: I agree. A Politburo session discussed this recently. I also have the impression that there are some things we are not thinking through. It can still transpire that a peasant is prevented from really getting into his work, so that he can feel and realize his potential as a master, as an independent person. Within kolkhozes, if the idea of the lease contract is realized correctly and fully, the benefit could be colossal. All opportunities to maneuver, including maneuvering equipment, must be created for every lessee. This must be guaranteed by a lease contract.

What a huge pyramid still presses down on the peasant. We still do not entirely trust him. But for no reason. People are able to assess the situation in a mature manner. I have been told of a kolkhoz in Ulyanovsk Oblast which has gone over completely to the contract, where the kolkhoz members would not take 10 specialists in any of their teams. They refused. They know that these people are idlers. (Animation in the hall).

It must be put down in writing: If someone wants to lease land and work to a contract, with a lease, no one has the right to refuse him. People still refuse now. The lessee's hands must be untied!

A voice: In Moscow Oblast's Krasnogorskiy Rayon there are now 1,000 families employed on the family contract....

M.S. Gorbachev: I think that if there is a small city near a kolkhoz or a sovkhos, then city people who wish to cultivate the land must not be refused—let people grow vegetables and fruit and do some farming.

We have socialism and a socialist economic system. But how best to combine private and public interests, and what should be the nature of relations today?—this is what must be decided. And it can be seen that we are on the right road. The person must be the master. He is tired of being hassled and ordered around by people just how they like. A machine operator in Pskov Oblast became a lessee. He built a house and restored a tractor and a combine. Explaining why he did this, he says: I was tired of every Tom, Dick, and Harry coming and ordering me around. In the middle of my work I have to stop, report, and say how things are going, while the guy who turns up shows his mettle. I was sick of it. People think I'm a fool, but I feel that there are many such people around me. (Laughter). I support that machine operator. People's hands must be untied, and they must be given an opportunity to live and farm on the land.

Voice: In order to free people's hands legislation is needed to protect the worker....

M.S. Gorbachev: Legislation is needed. I know that peasants, rural workers must be assigned jobs. And these jobs must be protected by law. The same applies in industry and construction.

I.D. Laptev, IZVESTIYA editor in chief, said: What matters most to us, as journalists and ideologists, is how we are doing the job which has been entrusted to us, how we are advancing the policy of glasnost, how we are developing and asserting it, and what we have achieved. The policy of glasnost, he said, has already put down such deep roots that there is no going back.

Not only the Soviet people but the entire world now views the policy of glasnost as an indicator of the progress of our restructuring. People link their own future and the future of the whole country with it. Therefore it is no accident that any threat to glasnost has such repercussions and evokes such a reaction in the people as a whole.

However, problems have cropped up even in the policy of glasnost itself. And this has to be discussed during the preparations for the conference. For instance, we have proved ill prepared for the elucidation and interpretation of the new problems, the new facts which are arising in the process of democratization itself, in the course of life itself.

M.S. Gorbachev: Quite correct. The party too has proved insufficiently prepared, and so has the press and the whole of society. There is probably an explanation for this, however.

I.D. Laptev: You could mention the problems affecting young people here, and history, and all that is being written and said about the problems of relations between nationalities. We did not expect many of these phenomena to crop up. For instance, how many times did journalists and correspondents, especially central newspaper journalists and correspondents, visit Nagorno-Karabakh. There was much that they did not see, much that they did not notice.

As a result we did not come up with an effective approach to these problems, we lost the initiative, and here and there we even lost control of the situation. What conclusion is to be drawn from this? We must tell ourselves quite clearly: If phenomena or events of this kind are a blow to restructuring, our silence about these phenomena or events is even more damaging, or at best just as damaging.

This is of the utmost importance. Because otherwise the earnestness of our intentions, our view about the place of public opinion and the place of the press in the modern world are immediately called into question. And I would also like to draw the following conclusions: It is impossible today to suppress a single fact relating to social life once it has happened. It cannot be done. It is not within anyone's power.

Suppression is harmful. It breeds rumors, fabrications, lack of confidence. Sometimes information alone resolves the problems. The speaker corroborated this statement by citing a series of concrete examples, referring to articles published in IZVESTIYA. Many events and phenomena, he said, demand a quick and widespread response and a bold approach. These situations will continue to arise because they are engendered by democratization.

We understand that this kind of phenomena are grist to Western propaganda's mill. This is unquestionably so. However, the less we talk about them, the longer we leave it before we mention them, the more grist there will be. Is it not time to stop trying to justify our own mistakes and failures with references to our ideological opponents' intrigues? As yet attempts of this kind are quite frequent, but they merely serve to emphasize our shortcomings in, among other things, the policy of glasnost.

Over the past 3 years many important decisions and new laws have been adopted. I believe that the upcoming party conference will adopt crucial decisions. It would not be amiss to take a look at how the decisions and laws that have been adopted so far are being implemented. And if we honestly look the truth in the eye, we will have to admit that frequently many of them are revised as soon as they have been adopted.

Who is to blame for this? Indeed, the bureaucrats. We have already spoken about this here. However, in my opinion, the reasons for this lie nonetheless in the incompleteness of decisions which are being adopted today.

This is particularly obvious in the economic sphere. And that despite the fact that the center of gravity of restructuring lies precisely here. People want to work. This desire has been rekindled in them. They are saying, they are clamoring: Let us work, let us! Remove the countless irresponsible taskmasters, endless paperwork and reports, free us from checks, hectoring, conferences, and coordination meetings!

And the upshot? We criticize bureaucrats for all we are worth, yet it has absolutely no effect on them.

We are now preparing for the conference, we have introduced various rubrics and are publishing all kind of materials. I believe that the crux of our entire restructuring effort and the future of the country is contained in one short phrase: "Let people work."

Great demoralization and great dependence, compounded by the shadow economy, have made people forget how to work, G.Ya. Baklanov, chief editor of the journal ZNAMYA, said. And many of them still don't want to work, it has become part of their mentality. A bureaucrat loves order and sets about creating it, but life is not order, life is spontaneous. And who is disrupting this order? It is above all the intelligentsia. It is because, using its intelligence, it is constantly trying to find reasons, trying to understand what course life should take, what are the natural laws to which it is subject. It has been said that our intelligentsia has grown philistine, that it has not proved itself in the struggle for glasnost and restructuring. That it is soft and spineless. How can it be said that the intelligentsia has not proved itself in the struggle for restructuring?! Has perhaps the press been functioning all these years without the participation of the intelligentsia? I believe that the intelligentsia has shown itself to be selfless.

The speaker went on to say that it is necessary to very rigorously raise the question about justice everywhere and about individual decency. About individual decency above all. We cannot have a situation where a contemporary "leading" author is published in bigger editions than Dostoyevskiy.

The bureaucratic mechanism took shape over a very long time. It has poisoned people's thinking, it propagates and will continue to propagate itself. Bureaucrats invariably present personal failures as failures of restructuring. This is a very serious and harmful matter. The opponents of restructuring are defending the system which has enabled people without talent or skill to occupy leading posts and to bring life down to their own level. No matter how difficult this may be, no matter what obstacles may arise, we can only proceed in one direction—we can only

proceed forward and we must do it resolutely. Our press has cited the following figures: Over the past decade we have lost 25-40 percent of the fertile chernozems, the soils have become so clogged that they are not longer suitable for crop rotation. This is only comparable with being deprived of part of our homeland.

V.M. Falin, chairman of the NOVOSTI PRESS AGENCY Board, said: In reality the conference is already under way. Strictly speaking it started the day after the 27th CPSU Congress closed. As I see it, it is progressing in two main directions—the elaboration of the ideological and practical platform for the generalization of the experience gained over the past 3 years since the April plenum and the 2 and 1/2 years since the CPSU congress, and preparation of the conference in terms of the compilation of a program of expectation. What do people in the party expect from this conference, what hopes are they pinning on it? What does the population expect from it? What do our friends in the socialist countries expect from it? Our ideological opponents, too, are looking forward to this conference with expectation.

Everyone is familiar with our initiative in the sphere of foreign policy. But in a certain sense it is our internal affairs which constitute our most influential foreign policy in terms of the outside world. People are judging how far they can trust us in our foreign affairs according to our internal affairs, according to how steadily and consistently we implement the program approved for our internal restructuring.

M.S. Gorbachev: Restructuring has become a reality. It opens up the potential inherent in socialism and presents our country differently: both the people and the party. In general, the "enemy image" is collapsing.

Yet that is the basis of the entire concept of the propaganda struggle against the Soviet Union and its policy, domestic and foreign. We have proposed the new thinking as the basis for an enterprising foreign policy that invites everyone to cooperate. Yet they try to impose things on us, dictate to us.

V.M. Falin: I would like to support V.G. Afanasyev, who said: Just try, when you want to take a moment to fill a vacuum with something useful, try to get through to the obkom secretary, the republican Central Committee, the minister. We also spend 5-10 times more time on organizing a program for a good journalist than on the work of the journalist himself, because everything takes a long time to coordinate via the hierarchical ladder. The time spent is incommensurate with the actual result. A great deal of time, literally years, can be spent on resolving a trivial question, even on organizing a response on very critical and urgent questions.

The party should show the results of practical work, of its leadership of society, every day through constructive information about current events and phenomena. The



mass media should have a specific common strategy for covering the whole period of preparation for the conference, the conference itself, and the subsequent period.

There should be a strategy for covering questions of history too. There should not be competition, especially among individual press organs—who can write most trenchantly about something in the past. Here too we need coordinated efforts, harmony in our actions. And finally, it would help the cause greatly if work on the textbook of party history and other documents was accelerated.

It is necessary to be honest always and in everything—that is a condition of the people's full support for the tremendous constructive work of renewing our life, K.Yu. Lavrov, chairman of the USSR Theater Workers' Union Board, said. He put forward a proposal to elaborate fundamental principles guaranteeing the immutability of the course of restructuring. That should be done without fail.

There are also the laws that have already been mentioned. And it is necessary to ensure that they operate not half-heartedly, but at full strength. That is the guarantee of steady progress. I would very much like those people who have demonstrated their commitment to restructuring in their lives and deeds, the speaker said, to go to the party conference without fail, and conversely, the people who resist it, who retard its progress, should not be at the conference.

M.F. Nenashev, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade spoke of the masses' role in restructuring. Noting the working people's heightened activeness throughout the country, he said that the opinion is still current among some people that restructuring can be carried out "from above"—by the efforts of the apparatus.

Yet the main peculiarity of restructuring is that it cannot be implemented without the participation of millions of people. That is why the PRAVDA article was very timely. It prompted such a reaction, an explosion of public opinion. Today the most interesting thing in the newspapers is people's letters, how direct and frank they are. They are evidence of the irreversibility of the restructuring.

That is the most important political lesson, the lesson of such enormous trust among people on the threshold of the party conference.

I believe that so far we have done only poor work in uncovering the nature of the stagnation period, and we must do this. After all, here is the answer to the main question: that society, the country, has no alternative. Everyone must understand that.

I believe it is also necessary to state clearly at the party conference how far that stagnation period deformed us: the moral atmosphere and the spiritual health of young people. It is not easy to overcome the social passivity, lack of responsibility, and habit of waiting for orders from above, which leads to unthinking obedience—phenomena which were formed over the decades. But we must overcome these phenomena. Otherwise there can be no progress or development of society.

It seems to me that we now badly need a major discussion about the party. There is to be a party conference, and I believe that a wide-ranging, serious discussion of the substance of the matter has not yet begun. It is not to be seen in the newspapers. The opinion is emerging that the party apparatus is keeping quiet, and some people conclude that it is not doing this by chance, that it has nothing to say, or does not share in the changes. I believe that a discussion about the party and its role in restructuring is simply essential today.

The impression is created, G.N. Seleznev, chief editor of the newspaper KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, said, that Communists and nonparty people, Komsomol members and perhaps even Pioneers, veterans and young people—everyone is discussing one question: what we are taking to the 19th all-union party conference.

Today not only at meetings, but also in the editorial offices' mail a great many questions are raised, big and small: How will our democracy develop, what path will we take, what is socialist pluralism? And I am sure that this curiosity on the part of young people must not be stopped, we must not silence those who ask searching, tricky questions.

We can see from day-to-day practice that young people are actively involved in restructuring. A rubric has appeared in our newspaper which says: "Down to Work."

Yes, the value of concrete actions, deeds, is growing. We newspapermen did not expect the rubric "I Choose To Live in the Countryside," devoted to the far from easy life of villages in the Russian non-Chernozem, to lead to such an influx of people wanting to come to the countryside and help it. More than 100,000 people who would like to move to the countryside to live. And more than 20,000 young people have already moved.

All the same, the new settlers in the countryside are beginning to come up against all kinds of petty difficulties, although on the whole the farms prepare for their arrival. It is important not to give the young people any reason to be disappointed, which unfortunately has happened before. Way of life has always determined mood, and in the period of restructuring we cannot allow the people whom the country has summoned to help our Russian non-Chernozem to be disappointed.

I.K. Arkhipova, chairman of the All-Union Music Society Board, who then spoke, talked about the important role of culture in the process of transforming society. Our country, she said, has many splendid musicians. But on the other hand, a neglect for music can be seen. And it begins with children at the earliest age.

The activity of the All-Union Music Society should exert a marked influence on the country's musical life. Unfortunately, as yet the mass media report little about the society and its affairs.

The cultivation of a harmonious personality is a very important problem. And it begins in childhood.

Yet with us, preschool artistic education is left to its own devices, and music teaching in general educational schools is extremely badly organized. Unless we cultivate a love of good music in children from their childhood, of folk music, for instance, and patriotic songs, this gap will soon be filled by some kind of rock music or just plain bad music, which has now multiplied to an incredible extent.

In conclusion the speaker appealed to the representatives of the mass media with this request: Do not forget that the art of music is an important, ideological art. It needs the constant concern and attention of society.

Glasnost is a powerful instrument of restructuring. It should be used in the most principled way, V.V. Karpov, first secretary of the USSR Writers' Union Board, stressed in his speech. As yet, he believes, a one-sided approach is not uncommon. A newspaper or journal publishes an article containing sharp criticism of someone, but does not offer space to the subject of the criticism. I think that is wrong, the speaker said, this distortion must be rectified.

In this connection the idea was expressed that the participants in a debate in the press should enjoy equal rights to a reply argument. According to the speaker's idea, that would make the mass media select and check their facts more carefully.

In our society, A.D. Salynskiy, chief editor of the journal TEATR, stressed, the powers and potential of the human personality are not fully revealed. His will, his labor, his hopes. Under socialism, you would think it would be like this: All man's potential—his gifts and talent—should be revealed as fully as possible. But however, the old formula still operates, that was expressed by Gorkiy even before the revolution—in Russia, more people die of underestimating themselves than of consumption. Indeed, we often fail to realize how much is present in a person, and the person himself does not realize it either. It is our social duty to reveal all this to the full. We cannot yet do this, because for many years the dogmatic principle prevailed among us, namely that the collective is always right. Nothing of the kind, by no means always.

An individual personality, a serious, profound, out-of-the-ordinary one at that, determines much, while the collective follows some kind of pattern, a well trodden path. In every worker, scientist, artist, composer, or rural worker, so many interesting reserves are present, and must be revealed.

In conclusion A.D. Salynskiy noted that the party conference will achieve success when it becomes, so to speak, a nationwide referendum in support of the ideas and practice of restructuring.

M.S. Gorbachev then addressed the participants in the meeting:

I want to thank you all, above all those who have spoken. I observed that all the others remained interested throughout in what was being discussed. Such meetings are very important to us, to the Central Committee, and it is good that we now have such a tradition. There are at least two points that could be taken up.

First, the party's leadership needs to consult you. A policy devoid of a scientific basis is doomed to vacillation and errors. We know this from our own experience. A policy not enriched by morality can cause, I think, no less harm. [This and following variations are reported by Moscow TASS in English at 1807 GMT on 10 May in a similar report on Gorbachev's address. Here the TASS report says: "A policy not resting on morality can cause, I think, no less harm."] And we are aware as well of what this has led to. This is why this meeting is important to us.

Second, I hope that the exchange of opinions offers a possibility for you, heads of ideological organizations, journals and newspapers, as well to check your tack and your approaches. For it is common reference points that we all need, especially in ideology and consciousness. I think that freedom always goes together, comrades, with increasing responsibility. The editors, the media executives bear vast responsibility at this watershed time when our society has found itself at a very crucial phase in its history. Every editor, of course, needs such contacts, such meetings, as they say, to check his watch. This is why I welcome this meeting once again.

You may rest assured that we take in the entire pluralism of opinions at these meetings with you. After all, it offers food for thought and the basis for understanding things better, for honing ideas and formulating them so as to realize them later in practice. I find it inspiring, for example, that our meetings are growing each time more substantive and the dialogue is getting ever more meaningful and profound. This is understandable, though, as perestroyka, too, has scaled new heights and acquired new parameters.

I said in my opening remarks that we wanted to devote this meeting to the forthcoming 19th party conference. Much is expected from this conference in our party and

in our society indeed. Much is expected from our conference also by our foreign friends. Our antagonists are making their own plans and calculations. This probably explains the tremendous interest in our conference.

Very many people are anxious about the question of who will be elected to the conference, of who will decide on vital problems bearing on the fate of our society and of socialism.

In short, people are showing concern for the destiny of perestroika. Even this by itself is very good.

The CPSU Central Committee has expressed its opinion on procedures for the selection of candidates for election as conference delegates. Our position is that it is committed stalwarts of perestroika, active Communists, that should be elected delegates. There must be no more quotas, as were the case in the past, specifying how many factory workers and farmers and how many women are to be elected, among others. The principal political directive is to elect active supporters of perestroika to go to the conference.

We expressed ourselves for the candidates to be picked out necessarily with the participation of party organizations and worker collectives and of party committees at district and city levels, in short, by all the people. Some regional party committees have decided to make the names of the candidates public in the local press even before the plenums that are to elect the delegates, so that they could be publicly discussed. This is just right, in our view. This will make it possible to approach the candidate selection from correct positions.

The CPSU Central Committee will keep the entire process of electing the body of delegates to the party conference in its focus of attention all the time. Some 5,000 delegates will be elected, or the same number that has been elected to the 27th party congress.

Comrades, we are positive that the line of the 27th congress is correct. The three years since the April 1985 Central Committee plenum have borne out that we have made the right choice.

How do we define the task for the conference? What is its concept? The conference is to make a thorough review of the progress of perestroika and give it a further and strong fillip. The conference is to create the political, ideological and organizational prerequisites that would not only guarantee the irreversibility of the processes of perestroika and democratization, but also contribute decisively to unfolding these processes and furthering them.

We have entered, figuratively speaking, the boost phase of perestroika. And we have been able to foresee that the second stage, these coming two or three years, will be very difficult. Strategy is being transformed into real policy, into real social processes and affecting all sections

of society. We knew that we should expect a tension and that a new situation would emerge. Still—as it was pointed out correctly here—far from everybody has proven prepared for this. It is only natural, comrades, that the load on the party, on the cadre and on all society is increasing. This is evidenced by broader glasnost and democracy and by deep-going changes in the very basis, in the management system and in every aspect of society's life. It is as if doors had opened for us to a new and unusual environment. And it has proven vast and unfamiliar in many respects. We are covering new ground, like pioneers, and this means that we're making progress. Hence the varied reactions of people to the processes under way.

We knew: We should be prepared for this. Be prepared to think, act and live in a new manner.

In the Politburo we have compared notes and concluded that the novel nature of problems and the dimensions of new phenomena and processes at the second stage of perestroika have put the whole party and its cadre in a new situation. We saw that far from everybody was prepared to view the present situation correctly. We found veritable confusion in the minds of many people—workers, intellectuals and administrators alike. And, let us be blunt, not only on the ground level, but also on the top. So the Politburo decided that the general secretary had to speak on ideological support for the second stage of perestroika. I want to stress that everything that has been said on behalf of the Politburo and won backing at the February plenum fully retains its significance as reference points today as well.

I am telling you this because some people have indeed lost their bearing amid all these processes under way. Some people have failed to keep their heads and panicked. And the panic—and this is very serious—has taken the form of asking: "Isn't perestroika coming to mean the wrecking and rejection of the values of socialism, isn't it giving rise to alien phenomena, isn't it destabilizing society?" I'll tell you that all these questions are very serious. And I wouldn't reckon those who have panicked to be irresponsible people or people opposed to perestroika out of hand.

No, comrades, we should treat this seriously, without falling into another extremity, without branding everybody who has voiced some doubts as an opponent of perestroika. And I am especially against the position of those who have put the "enemy of perestroika" phrase into circulation in the press.

What does it mean, comrades? This sounds somehow ominous. This is the same as the allegation which has been floated through SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA that we are being threatened by the descendants of NEPmen and kulaks, and so on. Just think of it: 70 years on, they're trying to scare us with the descendants of NEPmen, Trotskyites and Dans [reference to followers of Menshevik leader Dan]. Let's rise to the occasion, comrades.

Through perestroika, we want to restore Lenin's image of socialism and lead Soviet society to a drastically new level. We should really bring out the humanist potential of socialism—that is the task for perestroika. But this means that at the second stage of perestroika we should see the overriding goal—an updated society and updated relations among people in line with Lenin's ideas.

We should work towards this end by using methods marked by humanity, trust and respect. This does not mean lack of principle, any eclecticism or reconciling the irreconcilable. No, it doesn't. We should restore the genuine, wonderful meaning of the great word "comrade", restore the spirit of comradeship in the party and in society.

We cannot pursue perestroika, which aims to upgrade socialism to meet the parameters of Lenin's thinking in the interest of the people, by practicing a free-for-all. We aren't after all destroying the social system or changing the forms of ownership. The soviets (elected governing councils) will stay put. Listen to Lenin: Socialism should be built with the human material inherited from capitalism. We are effecting perestroika with people born under socialism. So should we renounce part of them, then?

No, we can't put the question this way. Our slogan is: Uniting and rallying society for perestroika. This is the main thing, comrades. When it is essential, we should find out the root causes of these or other negative phenomena. This approach is proof of our confidence in the chosen path, in the chosen aims and in the chosen methods. And we have already identified them. This is precisely what, in my opinion, distinguishes perestroika and makes it strong. We should all think it over in real earnest. This would be useful for us and, most important, simply indispensable, vital for us. I already said it in a remark here and I want to stress it once more: Both the party is at the service of the people and all the media are at the service of the people.

It is impossible to write of the people's destiny in a formal, bureaucratic, soulless way. Sometimes a true-to-life picture is presented, but the author writes in such a way as if the pain of the people is not sensed. And if there is no awareness of this pain, then epithets and metaphors are used, labels are stuck, anything. This I repeat, happens, if the author does not sense the people's pain. And if this sense is present, if you remember your people always, if you write with an anguished heart of the grimmest things, then there will surely emerge something which in the long run will contain a lesson and optimism. For there will be a sense of involvement in the destiny of the people and the care that its life should be better. I am not going to teach you, I simply address your hearts and minds.

All in all, you, too, should reform. The media are an instrument of perestroika. And in order to be an effective instrument they should undergo restructuring, just

as the entire society. We say that there is no monopoly to criticism, that no zones are denied to criticism. But, hence, the press itself cannot be exempt from criticism. You should pose questions in a serious way, truthfully, in the interests of the people, socialism, restructuring. In this the press can count on the support of the party.

Why is conservatism so tenacious? This is another theme which I would like to discuss with you. What is it that feeds conservatism?

I believe that conservatism is the main factor impeding perestroika. Establishing what it is that feeds conservatism should not be avoided as the answer to this question will help the party and the media to determine correctly the methods of overcoming this phenomenon.

We must defeat conservatism on the roads of perestroika. Conservatism in part of society is nourished not only by dogmatic mentality, the habit of thinking in stereotypes, the fear of everything new, but also by egoistic interests. As to egoistic interests, this theme is raised by the press. It is shown that perestroika pinches someone and they start resisting, hampering the process of renewal of society. But this is just part of the problem. The main thing for all society is still the need to overcome dogmatic mentality as it is something that a politician, a writer, a scientific worker have. It exists in all who are connected with intellectual activity and this largely determines theoretical analysis, the shaping of politics, etc.

There are stereotypes of thinking and action and they have a grip on a worker, an intellectual, a politician. This is a serious and profound phenomenon. We are all products of our time. We have conceived perestroika and we also manifest many of the things that inhibit it. To reveal this, comrades, is a very important task of the media and, certainly, of the party and ideological work. Such a treatment of this subject helps man make a revolution in his own thoughts and determine his stand.

Indeed, conservatism quite often stems from egoistic interests. But will anyone mount the rostrum now and say he will write in a letter to a newspaper, that he raises some or other problems in order to save his present positions and preserve what suits him very much? Not at all. His stand will be presented in such a way as if he were acting to the benefit of the people, for the sake of socialism. This is something to be seen and understood.

And, comrades, there is another very important aspect. We often label as a conservative a person who holds his own special point of view. But take a more attentive look and you will realise that he gets into this position for the reason that so far he has not learned how to work in new conditions. He just does not know how to work, comrades. This is quite commonplace now. And we see how difficult it is to learn to work in a new way when we have been acting for decades in the framework of methods of

the command-and-administer system. Then should these people who have not yet learned how to work be regarded as adversaries of perestroika, as inveterate conservatives?

A real process of perestroika is conducted in society through concrete experience, through debates, comprehension and realization of this process and changing positions with taking into consideration the renewal of our society. And these are important things. We give everyone a chance to adjust. We talk about this in conversations, in the press. But sometimes it is reasoned in the following way: Everyone has been given three years for perestroika and that is enough. If you failed to reform, get out. But we, all of us, have not yet reformed. I shall say this outright that we have not yet reformed and are only doing this.

What is to be done now? What emphasis is to be placed in party work, in the work of the media? A correct idea was expressed here that though during perestroika much is being done in all directions, the main thing—the life of the people, their wellbeing, their mood, the way they feel—should not be overlooked, comrades. It is not only material wellbeing, social environment, but also the way people feel, their dignity, that should be taken into consideration.

The main thing that is to be done in every area, including spiritual, is to overcome alienation which, deplorably, takes place under socialism when it is deformed by authoritarian-bureaucratic aberrations. And it is only on the roads of democracy, glasnost, on the roads of moral purification of our society that alienation, bureaucratism, formalism can be overcome. In this work we are aware of the vigorous involvement of the enhanced political, intellectual, cultural potential of the entire people.

We also feel the support from our intelligentsia, and this support is growing. How can restructuring be implemented without intelligentsia? The matter is that not only workers and peasants but also our intelligentsia played an important role in what has been achieved.

An atmosphere that would guarantee the successful holding of the party conference should be created in the party and in society. The merit lies not in being the first to point out some or other fact or event and proclaim this the loudest. What is needed is that the media should raise vital problems. There already exists a history of perestroika, difficult and complicated, which should be revealed. And when we address ourselves to the past, this has the aim of understanding better what we need now so as not to repeat the mistakes of the past.

All this should be done without undue sensationalism. I would like to say that a good sensation for us is the one that our people is waiting for and our adversaries fear. It is the success of perestroika.

The further development of criticism, the widening of glasnost is a matter of extreme importance. [The Moscow TASS English version adds: "This matter has been resolved."] It is asked sometimes what the limits of criticism and glasnost are. We have resolved this matter in the framework of socialist pluralism of opinions. We are for broad development of criticism and glasnost but in the interests of society, of socialism, in the interests of the people. Waging consistently and resolutely the struggle against conservatism, rooting out everything that hinders the process of perestroika we must no less firmly protect, popularize and uphold everything which promotes perestroika, which is in favor of the country, of the people.

We need new approaches, new methods, new discoveries in asserting perestroika. Let us recall Lenin's words: Do not try to resolve new problems by old methods. Nothing will come of it. Hence we must conduct the quest for new methods. And we conduct it in every direction—in the economic area, in the spiritual area, in science, in education. The mass media must help the people master new forms, new methods, new approaches.

At the February plenary meeting we set ourselves the task of grasping Lenin's concept of socialist society more profoundly in order to apply it creatively in the present concrete historic conditions. Note, creatively. It was right that when the theme of NEP cropped up, it was said that we cannot copy, cannot repeat precisely the approaches of the past. No, comrades. We must study Lenin's thinking. It always provides many instructive things.

Consider, for instance, how Lenin acted in suggesting NEP. In the situation when the country was in ruin Lenin's resolute thinking, decisive policy were addressed to realities, based on realities. Therefore not everyone, not even Lenin's closest associates, accepted NEP at once. Lenin was accused of apostasy. It was thought he was pushing the country onto a road leading to ruin. So I say that we should address ourselves to Lenin's thinking instead of copying concrete decisions of that period. And there is room for new, off-beat decisions. This is natural. And it sometimes happens with us that as soon as an off-beat decision is made, there is an outcry: "Help, socialism is in danger, they are spawning private operators!"

Therefore I repeat that we should grasp Lenin's concept of socialist society in order to apply it creatively, taking into account the present conditions. What is needed is not just a return to the past. This would be the worst kind of Talmudism, dogmatic mentality.

We should get rid once and for all of the view of socialism as if it were levelling out, negating personality, of the notion of socialism as a certain minimum: the minimum of material benefits, the minimum of justice, the minimum of democracy.

We have a right to pose the question in the following way—realistic and serious: with the economic, intellectual and cultural potential accumulated over seven decades of our history, we should implement a contemporary model of society ensuring for all its members civilized living standards and multiform opportunities to meet spiritual and cultural needs, the freedom of choice and expression of opinions. But all this should be implemented in the framework of our socialist choice, in the framework of our socialist democracy and morals. This society will inevitably be more multi-layer, but it will remain socialist and it will not forgo the principles of social justice, comradeship and internationalism in the slightest. Why do I mention this? Generally speaking, our entire society is for socialism.

The point is that we are now faced with the task of the renewal of socialism. All of us, comrades, should realize what socialism is and by what methods it can and must be built, renewed and improved. This is the theme on which one should think and work. We should advance our traditional notions of socialism to the level of contemporary demands, so that they should keep abreast of the present day and the future of science, economic, scientific and technological progress. In short, we should restore the revolutionary character and historic perspective to socialism. Perhaps, it is necessary to establish the criteria of socialism for as soon as some advance is made and some new features appear, the question arises: Where are we moving, are we not moving away from socialism?

It is necessary to determine these criteria. What is truly socialist and what is alien to the very idea of socialism? It is necessary to rid socialism of everything pseudosocialist, distorted and deformed in the period of the personality cult, command system, stagnation, and restore the truly Leninist sense to socialism. And the role of the media in this cannot be overestimated.

We need that; without that we cannot go to the conference. We cannot do that without a clear idea, without drawing a picture, as it were, of the society for which we strive. We, certainly, should do this work with the greatest responsibility. I will say again: We should look for answers to the objectives of perestroika within the framework of the socialist choice.

And let no journal, no newspaper urge us onto another path, by referring to the diversity of views.

Socialism in Lenin's interpretation makes it possible to ensure a pluralism of views, a pluralism of interests and of requirements, and to ensure that these interests and requirements are met.

We are going to the conference, which means that we must give an account and sum up the results. We must have more discussions at the conference already on the history of perestroika proper. Accent shall be laid on summing up the results. And this is to be done from the

standpoint of self-criticism: what has been done, and wherein our weaknesses lie. Then we will be able to outline the perspectives better. It is necessary that the conference be more businesslike.

The time has come to lay even greater emphasis on the question of the unity of word and deed, on the decisions taken and the course of their implementation. We have taken very important decisions which shall ensure a serious change in the structural policy towards the light and food industries, the social field. All this should lead to improving the living standards of the Soviet people. The implementation of the decisions on questions of scientific-technical progress in the field of machine-building and electronics is designed to ensure an acceleration of our advance, attainment of new parameters of labor productivity and the quality of products.

And now on how things stand today. In 1987, our gross national product grew 3.3 percent. The growth of the volume of industrial output was 3.8 percent.

Over the three years from 1985 to 1987 the average annual growth rates were: national income—3.3 percent, the gross national product—3.9 percent, industrial output—4.2 percent, the output of consumer goods—4.7 percent. The gross agricultural output in average annual count grew 1.9 percent, the commissioning of the fixed assets—3.5 percent, of housing—3.6 percent.

We have made progress in the output of commodities; progress has also manifested itself in health protection and public education.

The creative forces of the society have been set into motion. Positive tendencies are appearing. This is exactly what changes life. And this should effect a change, if we develop these trends in the right way.

Take, for example, labor productivity. From 1981 to 1984 we obtained 86 percent of the national income due to it. From 1985 to 1987—96 percent. In 1987 the whole increase was ensured through labor productivity. In the first quarter of this year labor productivity in industry grew 5.4 percent, including at enterprises working on conditions of full cost-accounting and self-financing—6.6 percent. In the building industry this growth was 8.9 percent, and of those who work on conditions of full cost-accounting 9.8 per cent. This is, comrades, serious progress. If we keep up this trend, I believe that many things will change for the better.

Here is an interesting fact. In 1985 the renewal of machine-building products was 3 percent, and in 1987—9.1 percent. This is a three-fold increase. We set ourselves the aim of achieving the 13 percent mark. Contract discipline is heightening. Cost-accounting is beginning to produce its fruit there too. The positive trend is making headway, overcoming the natural difficulties

involved in transition to cost-accounting, to new economic standards, state quality control and many other things, which fundamentally renew our production field.

Now what we eat, what we are short of? Above all meat, fruit and vegetables.

The situation with the foodstuffs is a source of concern for us, of much concern. We should look for more cardinal measures to advance towards resolving that problem faster. It is necessary to stock the shops, public catering, the market and cooperative trade with enough foodstuffs.

Now about housing. Over the three years ten million families have bettered their housing conditions. This is a considerable growth. We had no growth in housing construction for several five-year-plan periods.

Now about the trade turnover. It has grown 13 percent. And it is apt to note, that over the past three years the sale of alcoholic drinks has declined by more than a half.

The growth is evident, but the shortages are evident too. This means, comrades, that we must have by far more of everything, of everything including the services, but their volume is insufficient. There are enormous potentialities for cooperatives in that field.

Every year the country's population increases by two and a half million. This dynamic should determine the growth of production rates of foods and commodities.

We are at a difficult stage in the economy, a very difficult one. We are introducing the reform, enhancing state quality control, mastering cost-accounting. A half of the country is run on cost-accounting and the other half not. This is, indeed, an unusual situation. To rectify the errors a decision is now being prepared on state orders.

Such are, comrades, the realities of perestroika. I would ask you to show more competence in covering the perestroika processes whatever fields they may concern. This takes profundity, responsibility and a well-balanced attitude. While criticising conservatism and shortcomings we should most actively support everything that is progressive.

In general, comrades, we should raise all of these questions both at the stage of preparations and at the conference itself from positions of principle.

We have what to tell the conference, both regarding the results and regarding the further perspectives.

We should come to the conference with major proposals concerning our society's political system, which is also in need of a fundamental restructuring.

We should comprehend the role of the party as the political vanguard at the current stage. We do not give up Lenin's concept of the party as the society's political vanguard. We believe that at the stage of perestroika, the party's role further grows in the perfection of the socialist society, in carrying out far-reaching transformations. This necessitates from it that a science-based policy be outlined on the strength of correct appraisals and forecasts. This necessitates a large volume of ideological and organizational work.

Only the party equipped with the methods of science-based Marxist analysis can cope with this task. Therefore far from questioning the guiding and leading role of the party, we believe, on the contrary, that we should comprehend it more deeply. This role should, undoubtedly, be a different, a weightier one, precisely in the terms which I am speaking about—regarding carrying out the functions of the political vanguard.

In that connection the question arises about dividing the functions between the party, the soviets and the economic management bodies. A mixing of the functions resulted in a situation in which the party has taken upon itself many economic matters and began resolving specific issues, down to day-to-day ones.

This brought about a weakening of the functions of the political vanguard. On the other hand, this has resulted in a decline of responsibility both of the soviets and of the economic management bodies.

We should reappraise also the structure of the party machinery. This will uncover the enormous potentialities inherent in our party. If we simultaneously do everything necessary so that every Communist should become more active, that every primary organization, all of our cadres start working more vigorously, then things will start moving. We are planning to table a number of proposals on that score at the congress.

And naturally, comrades, in connection with the reappraisal of the functions of the party as the political vanguard, the role of the soviets should be comprehended in a new way. It is necessary to enhance the role of the soviets, the significance of the work of the sessions of the soviets and the commissions of deputies. The activities of the Supreme Soviet should also be reorganized. We should all give enough thought to it.

We should come to the creation of a machinery, permanently functioning and democratic, that would contain everything necessary to ensure the irreversibility of perestroika, an active involvement of the people in it, that would name most active persons for leading offices, be aware of the sentiments and make the necessary corrections in the work. If we fail to do so, comrades, the economic reform will get bogged down and other processes will also get bogged down.

If we take a closer look, we will see that the key to everything is through democratization, through drawing people into all matters. Therefore the aim of perestroyka is man and the means of perestroyka is a mobilization of the human potential. We will press ahead with perestroyka through that and naturally through the cultural field, through strengthening the spirit of the people.

We must complete the creation of a socialist legal state. Therefore we will also need a judicial-legal reform. And this shall also be formulated as an objective at the conference.

This is a major turn, comrades. We are now creating the prerequisites upon which our society will function for decades. This determines the measure of our responsibility today. Therefore when we are told that we are indecisive in something and are reproached for that, we say: No and once again no. The most costly mistakes are the political ones. The best results are produced by well-prepared political decision. In general, comrades, we wish the 19th all-union party conference to take responsible decisions, that would give our perestroyka new, second wind, and open for our society an even wider road of progress towards democracy, the road of socialism.



**Formal Changes Needed to Strengthen Soviets**  
18000272 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
20 Mar 88 p 3

[Interview with Vladimir Vasilyevich Chicheurov, chairman of the Pushkino City Soviet ispolkom (Moscow Oblast), by columnist Yu. Feofanov; date, place, and occasion not specified]

[Text] [Question] At the last Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev posed the question "of the need to restore the power of the soviets in its Leninist understanding." I would like to engage you, Vladimir Vasilyevich, in a frank talk. Perhaps even one which is unpleasant for the chairman of the ispolkom. The long-standing predominance of the system where the apparat decides all questions has led to the soviet itself becoming a kind of formalistic organ which really decides nothing. A situation has taken shape, in my opinion, where the ispolkom is not under the soviet, but the soviet under the ispolkom. It seems to me, if we are speaking of restoring the power of the soviet itself, then we must first of all make it independent. This may possibly diminish the authority of the ispolkom.

[Answer] The point is not that such "reform" will diminish the role and authority of the ispolkom. Even now we understand that we are an executive organ of the soviet and in no way do we encroach upon its prerogatives. The most important questions are brought up at the session of the soviet, and the standing commissions are quite active too. No, do not think that I do not understand the underlying point. What you wanted to say was that everything is really decided by the ispolkom and at the session the deputies merely raise their hands. Is that really so? Well, I will not play around. Such things, as they say, do happen. Obviously the ispolkom should make more efforts to activate the deputies and expand the circle of questions submitted to the session. Most deputies do not familiarize themselves with the materials on the questions being discussed until the day of the session, and sometimes they do not have a full idea of the essence of the problem. But if the session goes beyond the set schedule, the deputies even begin showing dissatisfaction—the ispolkom has not done its job! Passivity seems to have become the norm in the deputies' work. It is the ispolkom apparat today, rather than the soviet, that reviews all the vital issues of activity in the city, the rayon, and the oblast and prepares them for decisions.

[Question] Tell us, what questions did your soviet discuss in the past year? And who planned the agenda for it, the soviet?

[Answer] The ispolkom naturally planned the agenda. As is envisioned by law. But which questions... Four sessions were held last year. The last session of the soviet of the last convocation was held in February. The tasks of

our rayon's soviets to fulfill the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree on further refinement of the economic mechanism of economic activity in the agroindustrial complex were discussed.

[Question] And was it an active discussion?

[Answer] A normal one. As always. Further. The housing question was discussed at the first session of the soviet of the present convocation—how to provide every family with an individual apartment by the year 2000. Our ispolkom's report was at the next session. A report according to plan. Well, as usual, the plan and the budget were at the winter session in December.

[Question] Imagine you are not the chairman of the city ispolkom. Simply a deputy of the city soviet. A regular deputy. And you are told: decide on the sessions' agenda for yourself. Would you have planned what was planned? Or does the city perhaps have more crucial problems?

[Answer] Hm... One can't answer that right away. I would have adopted a lot of what we discussed at the ispolkom.

[Question] In other words, you discussed the things that were most important, difficult, and —God forbid—controversial, without the soviet, in a narrow circle? But I am leading up to talking about changing this practice drastically. The soviet has been elected. It selects the soviet chairman and the working presidium. It outlines the plan of its work itself. And it forms the ispolkom as an altogether separate economic organ with administrative functions and its own chairman. The entire system continues to be under its control, and it is accountable to the soviet for everything. But the soviet decides the main fundamental questions which involve the territory and population. Independently. For example, a department has requested a plot of land to build a plant. Who decides that now? The ispolkom does. But it does not have that right. That is, land is at the complete disposal of the soviet. To go on. It has been decided to allocate the land. The soviet has recorded what the plant must do to protect the environment. And the soviet rather than the ispolkom will accept the plant. The department can influence you, the ispolkom, you have your own interests in Moscow. But the soviet is the authority which is not contaminated by economic interests. It cannot be convinced to accept the plan without purification structures. Or a housing block which is not finished. Or a kindergarten where children cannot be taken, and so on. But for now the soviet does not have such power. The ispolkom has all the power.

[Answer] In short, you mean distribution of powers? As in the English parliament? The soviet makes the laws but the "government"—the ispolkom—has all the levers of management?

[Question] In principle, yes. And the "government" for all that is under the control of the representative and fully-empowered soviet.

[Answer] But if one accepts your idea of the distribution of power, then one must follow it all the way through. What place will the party raykom have in your scheme?

[Question] Delimiting of the function of party and state organs is another question.

[Answer] No, I do not agree. It is the most important one! And it must be decided now. Otherwise, "three authorities" will decide one and the same question, in the same way that two do now. For example, I am building a school. Suddenly the order comes from the raykom to transfer the construction workers. But everything has been planned at the ispolkom. I cited the first example that came into my head. But I can cite a great many such examples. No, we must resort to revolutionary restructuring. I have thought about this for a long time and have come to the following scheme. Party leadership should be exercised through influence rather than by orders. I think of it this way. Each enterprise has a party organization, and so does the ispolkom, the agroproms, people's control, and so on. There is even a party group in the soviet. Party influence should also pass through them, through the party cells. But now it comes directly, through orders: the raykom to the director, the raykom to the agroprom chairman, the raykom to the chairman of the ispolkom. That is what should be stopped. How? Organizationally. Just organizationally. Otherwise, everything will remain just words. Direct ties with the party cells of the rayon institutions are needed, party leadership and influence must be implemented through these cells. If we are speaking of the soviet—a party group has been set up in the soviet; but we will be frank, this party group is only formally the transmitter of party influence. What does it do? In the hour before the session it approves the order of work and the agenda prepared by the ispolkom. And that is all.

[Question] Well, how about the raykom? Do you assign it some place in this scheme?

[Answer] I think of it without sectorial departments. Why hide it, it has become the same kind of economic-administrative organ as the ispolkom, only with more power. With its power the raykom will stop the construction of the school which I mentioned, but the complaints will be submitted to the ispolkom. Party leadership will take on a qualitatively new form here.

That is how under such a reform the soviet can take its place as a fully-empowered representative organ. And the ispolkom will know the range of its duties and rights. Everything will fall into place. I will tell you: this is the only way the law on soviets will be fully implemented and the same is true for the very idea of representative

power, power "through the working people," as you recently said in IZVESTIYA in your talk with the legal scholar Comrade Kurashvili.

[Question] You said that party leadership "will take on a qualitatively new form." But won't the role of the rayon or city party organization diminish?

[Answer] Not at all! In proposing to "unlink" the soviet and the ispolkom, you are certainly not thinking of eliminating the former. On the contrary, you believe that the self-sufficiency and independence of the deputies will be strengthened. I assume that the very same thing should happen in party life. Understand that we are not talking of diminishing the party's leadership role. Party committees exist in ministries. They do not work for the minister, but they carry the party line to the sector, without saying how to mine coal or smelt steel. There can certainly be a lot of variants. If the soviet's influence is insufficient, why not set up a party committee with a very small staff?

Many questions will arise. I cannot give any prepared answers, and, moreover, I do will not try to do so. But I would hope they do not escape the attention of the 19th party conference.

[Question] Your ideas are very interesting, in my opinion. But does it not seem to you that we have digressed from the subject somewhat—from the soviet itself and its status and method of formation?

[Answer] Why? In the rayon and in the city everything is so interrelated and interwoven that without organizational reforms, and decisive ones, we will not resolve the tasks of restructuring. We cannot separate out the soviet and its ispolkom from all its interrelationships.

[Question] The last elections brought much grief to party, soviet, and economic executives who did not get into the soviets or found themselves "reserve deputies." Grief from the fact that the deputy mandate had become a kind of appendage to the local-level "ministry" post. If we presuppose that there will be no "deputies selected according to official position" in the soviet, then many acute administrative and psychological features will be removed. Recently we met with the chairmen of gori-spolkoms. One of them told: "I wanted to take a sensible assistant, but he said it wouldn't work, that he would not be elected to the soviet, so he would have to look for new work." But if the soviet forms the ispolkom and its apparat simply out of sensible specialists rather than deputies, as the committee of people's control, the agroprom, and the like are formed, then everything will fall into place. The need to get someone onto the soviet will disappear.

[Answer] Yes, the election campaign brought much grief and many surprises. Again there were instructions on whom to elect, according to sex, age, profession, and the like. Suppose that we get away from this. Let us give up

"deputies by position." And you are right: many arrogant and powerful people will be removed. But an independently operating soviet will need an altogether different body of deputies.

[Question] Undoubtedly. So let microrayons and more or less significant social formations nominate candidates for the soviet. Not only the party, the Komsomol, DOSAAF, and cooperative societies do it, but other organizations as well. For example, nature conservation societies and societies for the protection of historical and cultural monuments, the culture fund, and others, the animal protection society, the sobriety society, informal associations, and simply groups of citizens. Then a certain democratic front will be represented in the soviet. I am certain that it would no longer be necessary to "breathe life" into the sessions. Speakers will be found. Optimal decisions will certainly be worked out in the confrontation of interests. I want to emphasize: the entire discussion in such a soviet must go on without direction by the ispolkom. The ispolkom is the servant of the soviet, and nothing more.

[Answer] I do not think that the soviet should be formed that way. Then it would not be a Leninist "working corporation" but something like the Novgorod veche, if not the marketplace. I believe the successful work of the soviet depends on the qualitative make-up of those elected by the people. Let there be fewer of them. We now have 350 city soviet deputies. (Our particular situation is that Pushkinskiy Rayon is part of the city of Pushkino). This figure may be cut to about one-third of that. But only labor collectives should form the make-up of the soviet. Let the best managers, chief specialists, and leading workers and kolkhoz members be nominated. Let the city soviet itself examine proposals on the quantitative make-up of deputies, and let it ratify the staff of the ispolkom and the wage fund. By the way, I would also introduce payment of deputies for work in the soviet.

All microrayons should be represented in the soviet. But I definitely do not agree that societies to protect animals, monuments, and nature, and even informal associations should nominate candidates. These social organizations have their cells in labor collectives and only labor collectives along with party committees should decide whom to nominate as candidate to the soviet.

After all, jurisdiction is the main thing where the soviet is completely independent. At least half the deputies in standing commissions of the soviet should be specialists in the field: in health they should be doctors, in public education—teachers, in industry—engineers, economists, and workers, and so on. What is the reason to separate the functions of the soviet and the ispolkom, as you propose? For the good of the work. In practice this means competent and qualified solution of issues pertaining to the socioeconomic development of the territories. An independent soviet develops, discusses, and ratifies a

complex of programs: "Health," "Environmental Protection," "Resource Conservation," "Restoration of Villages and Rural Areas," "The Housing Program," and the like, while the ispolkom provides the practical solution of these problems and reports back to the soviet.

[Question] You, Vladimir Vasilyevich, want to make the same kind of ispolkom, only a very big one. But what kind of a representative organ will this be if it is assigned by professions? A marketplace is of course bad, but a veche... why not? Once again I want to explain my idea. The ispolkom decides practical affairs, specialists are needed there. But honest, respected citizens should be in the soviet, without regard to profession. So then, for example, will a metallurgy worker, a milkmaid, a writer, an economist, and simply a pensioner be unable to evaluate the quality of a polyclinic that has been built? You say that if everyone, even "informal" organization members, is represented in the Soviet, the work will not get done. But on the other hand, they will receive a podium from which they will be able to express their opinion and defend it before the territory's higher-ranking authority. That is broad representation.

[Answer] There is sense in that. But I am a business-like man and I would not want playing at democracy in the soviet, but rather real Soviet democracy, so that the soviet works for the people's benefit rather than being turned into a speechmaking assembly.

[Question] One must bear in mind that an "unqualified" soviet has the right to form any type of expert commission to study a question or to prepare those same programs. And one more thing. Once the soviet is master, there should be no prohibited areas and questions for it. Suppose that warning was received about trouble in places for detention under guard. The soviet forms an expert commission, checks on it, and makes the results public. Or, for example, catering in hospitals. Or the situation in an old-people's home. I am thinking of that kind of prerogative of the soviet, we can call it. A children's home is in terrible condition. The soviet uses its power on an emergency basis to take money, workers, and materials from any building site and transfer them to the children's home. If the session decides to, that is.

You, Vladimir Vasilyevich, told me how many departments have interests in the city. It is hard for the ispolkom and its departments with their vertical subordination to stand up to Moscow ministries. But an absolutely independent soviet is beyond their influence.

[Answer] In the first place, no one now is preventing the soviet from checking on detention facilities or anything else. There are no closed areas for deputies in the territory. And as for their moving workers from one site to another "by their own authority," we would be setting up a marketplace. That is the sphere of the ispolkom.

Yes, we have a hard time with the departments. We have 236 ministries, departments, and other organizations in our rayon and they carry on their balances enterprises, housing, and sociocultural and health facilities. There are many questions and unresolved problems. The condition of housing resources and utilities systems is especially alarming. We summon "lax" managers to the ispolkom and demand that they take steps. And what happens? Here is an example. The Confectionery Factory imeni Babayev of RSFSR Gosagroprom takes a terrible attitude toward its housing resources (and they have 12 residential buildings in the settlement of Lyubimovka, the former Stanislavskiy estate). Last winter we were forced to move all the residents out of frozen buildings. The factory director did not draw the proper conclusions. I am not even mentioning their duty to restore architectural and historical monuments. The summons to the ispokom produced nothing. And what could an independent soviet have done? Exactly the same as the ispolkom, because the factory is subordinate to Moscow. So relations with the departments is a very complex matter.

As for allocating land for new production facilities, that I would give to the soviet. It is easy to push us ispolkom members around, we are closely tied to the departments. It is easier to convince us to accept a project in pieces, even though afterwards it is the ispolkom that has to listen to the complaints of the inhabitants—why a chemical plant is polluting the atmosphere next to a park. The soviet possibly would not permit that. But let me repeat, a qualified soviet.

[Question] It seems to me that one of the main functions of the soviet is to defend the legal rights and interests of citizens. The soviet itself does not do this today, in my opinion. The complaint bureau is at the ispolkom. What if it were attached to the soviet. At the same time I think that the soviet should really have broad power. Suppose prices have been raised in the city for apartment or television repair or at tailor studios. The soviet "vetoes" this, even though it came from the Ministry of Domestic Services. Let them prove to the soviet that the price increase is necessary. Everything that touches the city dwellers in any way should be approved by the soviet.

[Answer] I will repeat again: I am not afraid of "infringing on the rights" of the ispolkom. Monitoring prices hardly limits us at all—we certainly are not the ones who raise prices. But an arbitrary "veto" is not democracy either. The qualified soviet which I advocate would make such a "veto" after weighing everything. This would be a sound "veto." But to just say, "We don't want it, and that's that" is more anarchy than democracy. The same with complaints by the voters. A complaint bureau at the soviet seems inadvisable to me because it cannot decide many questions, and the deputies would become not "lawmakers" but petitioners in particular causes.

Let me repeat: I am for a sharp rise in the independence of the soviet, for "delineation" of powers. But nonetheless, as a practical worker I am concerned that reforms of the state system, especially such radical ones, must serve both the people and the state.

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**Reader Proposes Elimination of Bureaucracy**  
*PM061144 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Apr 88*  
*Second Edition p 2*

[Article by Professor B. Fedotov of the Moscow Physical and Technical Institute, deputy secretary of the party committee, under the rubric "From the Mailbag Debate: Addressed to the 19th All-Union Party Conference": "Against Bureaucracy"]

[Text] What would you personally take to the conference platform? What specifically would you say and propose? What would you draw attention to? PRAVDA asked its readers these questions on 4 March.

Here is what I would say at the 19th all-union party conference.

Comrade delegates! First of all, let us think about how we can revive the Leninist party spirit everywhere. In this connection, I submit some thoughts for your consideration.

First, what must be done, in my view, to increase the party's prestige and influence is to cleanse it of those members who are not really communists: degenerates who are indifferent to public affairs, bureaucrats who are cut off from the people. Honest people are gripped by anger and a sense of protest when they learn that all these Adilovs, Churbanovs, Rashidovs, Khuramshins, Shchelokovs, and many of their ilk were party members. Yet the true nature of many supposed "party men" who were formed during the period of prolonged stagnation has not yet been revealed. Therefore I propose more active work to cleanse the party ranks. Every party member should be investigated individually, especially as regards his actions and behavior in recent decades.

Second. There should be a drastic reduction in the number of full-time party workers—both elected workers and members of the apparatus of party committees at every level. The inflated, obsolete leadership structure that grew up many years ago and the apparatuses of raykoms, gorkoms, and obkoms that are often cut off from the party rank and file take the place of mass party work and lead directly to the bureaucratization of leading party structures. The best buildings in the cities are occupied by chiefs, deputy chiefs, and instructors who do not instruct anyone and are sometimes incapable of doing so. Hardly anyone needs that kind of instruction anyway. The very title is, in my view, an anachronism.

More and more young people are now being elected secretaries of raykoms, gorkoms, and obkoms. But some of them promptly take up the well established unwritten, nonstatutory principle: Intelligence is distributed according to official position. If someone is first secretary, then it goes without saying that he is the most intelligent and omniscient. So he starts instructing everyone living and working in the territory of the city (or rayon, or oblast): engineer, agronomist, academician, professor—as to what to sow and when to plow, how to organize the feeding and milking of cows, and so forth; he instructs the teacher how to teach and the physician how to heal people. Sometimes it is the workers on raykoms, gorkoms, and obkoms who are responsible for administrative decree methods of leadership. By virtue of the party's prestige—and they are the party's official representatives—these methods spread and are taken up by soviet ispolkoms, public organs, and economic leaders.

Clearly raykom, gorkom, and obkom apparatuses are overblown, and in this respect do not meet the demands of restructuring or economic methods of management. Even the principle whereby the number of full-time (gorkom) workers depends on the numbers of the population and the number of party members is not adhered to. I visited Sakhalin on official business. Makarovskiy Rayon is there. It has a population of less than 10,000, a small factory, a small capacity coal mine, and a raykom like everywhere else. But take Mytishchinskiy Rayon in Moscow Oblast, with a population of nearly half a million, great economic potential, and a number of VUZ's and scientific institutes of national significance. Apart from Mytishchi City with a population of 160,000, the rayon also includes the cities of Dolgoprudnyy and Lobnya, each of which has 80,000 inhabitants, yet these last two have neither raykoms nor gorkoms. But nonetheless, Mytishchi CPSU Gorkom copes with the leadership of party and other work in those cities.

We should think in general about the expediency of raykoms and gorkoms in rayons and cities with a population of fewer than 50,000 and with fewer than 3,000 CPSU members. There would be less paperwork and conference mania and it would be easier to measure the work done in terms of real deeds.

And a third point. The systematic renewal of the membership of party committees. The 27th congress introduced a provision to this effect into the CPSU Statutes, but only in general terms. I believe that without concrete details, clarification, and the creation of a mechanism for systematic renewal, it is difficult to put this provision into practice, and its implementation could sometimes take a not entirely acceptable turn.

First and foremost, in my view, a strict limit on terms of office in leading party posts is needed. The CPSU Statutes adopted by the 22d party congress in 1961 provided for such limits. They were revoked 5 years later, at the 23d CPSU Congress. The resolution on

removing the limits was, of course, an expression of the pressure from certain group interests which were passed off as partywide interests. Arguments can always be found in such cases. They used the argument that practice had produced not only positive results, but also certain negative secondary results and consequences.

The negative element took the form of introducing a degree of formalism into the process of selection and placing of leading cadres. Perhaps a given leader was the most capable and worthy, but the statutory limits led to his compulsory replacement. So there were some arguments against setting strict limits. All the same, practice in recent decades shows convincingly that the removal of limits had far more negative than positive effects, and that the negative consequences of limits can be neutralized entirely.

The practice of intraparty life in recent decades indicates, in my view, that the prolonged tenure of leading posts by the same individuals leads to serious negative consequences and stagnation in the movement of cadres.

First, a weakening of control from below is inevitable in these conditions, and a considerable number of leaders become detached from the party rank and file, grow indifferent to the opinion of their party comrades, and pay attention only to the assessment made of them by the higher-ranking party leaders.

Second, a prolonged term of office in party posts leads to the loss of the leaders' qualifications as specialists, they become all-rounders, so to speak, who can be transferred to any leading post you like.

Third, it may be said, in the worst case, that insufficiently mature Communists, who still find their way into leading posts not all that uncommonly, realizing that the appointment is "unlimited," begin to act arbitrarily and sometimes sink as low as abuses and crimes, utilizing the levers of power and impunity.

I would like to stress that a limit on terms of office in leading party posts and the systematic renewal of leading personnel are particularly necessary from the level of enterprise party committee to the level of party obkom (kraykom).

I propose that the 19th all-union party conference support the proposal to give concrete form to the provision in the Statutes on the systematic renewal of the composition of party committees at all levels by at least one-third at each election. The election of the same individuals as secretaries of party committees up to and including obkoms (kraykoms) should be permitted, as a rule, for no more than three terms in succession.

Today it is first and foremost the party itself that should set an example in eradicating red tape and bureaucracy. We must act thoughtfully and wisely, but at the same time boldly and resolutely. A return to Leninist principles and norms of party life must be carried out steadily in every respect.

### Filmworkers' Union Spokesman Looks Forward to Conference

PM131157 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA  
in Russian 9 Apr 88 p 5

[Text of Speech delivered by Aleksandr Gelman at 23 March open meeting of the USSR Cinematographers Union Board party organization under the "More Democracy, More Socialism" rubric: "Time for Mustering Forces"—final paragraph is SOVETSKAYA KULTURA conclusion]

[Text] No one set me any tasks as the keynote speaker, so I have set myself the task of making a statement of a personal nature and imparting my own ideas and concerns in the light of the forthcoming 19th all-union party conference.

Some 3 years have elapsed since the start of restructuring. What is the main positive result? In my opinion it is that despite the fact that 3 years have elapsed restructuring is continuing. What is the main negative result? In my opinion it is that despite the fact that 3 years have elapsed restructuring has not yet become irreversible.

For all those who link the destiny of our future with restructuring, the fact that we have not yet created adequate democratic structures which would make the democratic way of life reliable and self-generating is a tremendous anxiety, a tremendous concern which does not relax its grip on us for a single day or hour. And in my opinion this will be the main question of the 19th party conference—elaborating and adopting decisions whose implementation guarantees the complete irreversibility of the democratic process in society.

As I feel it now, in the course of preparation for the conference, all forms of the struggle for and against the revolutionary nature of restructuring are being sharpened. It is not out of the question that this struggle will also make itself felt in the work of the conference itself.

The open and backstage opponents of restructuring are realizing increasingly clearly that the ideals of restructuring are winning ever new hearts and minds with every passing day. They understand that the interval of time within which restructuring could be halted or at least palpably driven from its resolute revolutionary path is a small one. Sensing this lack of time left, they have come to attention. They realize that they must make haste while the decision-making mechanisms are still operating, with whose aid public opinion can be bypassed and a blow dealt to restructuring. These mechanisms are in many cases in their hands. I admit that preparation for

the party conference or even the party conference itself could be the bridgehead on which they will try to engage a resolute battle with restructuring.

Perhaps my fears are exaggerated, God grant that they are, but it is a case of such serious matters, it is a case of such potential tragic consequences, that I consider I have the right not to be inhibited in expressing my fears.

In this sense I do not regard as accidental SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA's publication of an article by Nina Andreyeva, who has expressed some of the program aims of the conservative forces in the party. This article's main thrust is to cast doubt on the correctness of the moral criterion in assessing the past and present of Soviet society. It preaches as a Marxist idea the incompatibility of politics and morality and contrasts the class and ethical approaches. Speaking of a Leningrad film devoted to Kirov, she is angered by the commentator's text which reminds viewers of the repressions of the thirties while the film shows scenes of enthusiasm from those years—she sees in this an act of violence against the truth. She is generally angered by the fact that very little is now being written about the labor enthusiasm of that time while everything is about tragedies and more tragedies. It does not seem to occur to her that the laws of normal human responsiveness state that people are more concerned with the fate of those who died innocently and prematurely in Stalin's camps than with the fate of those who undoubtedly deserve respect for the labor heroism they displayed but nonetheless lived and worked normally and who are still alive or died a natural death. At all times tragedies have met with a greater response in people's hearts than the normal course of life, especially when it is a case of a tragedy on a scale like Stalin's actions. Nina Andreyeva also demands some kind of state-historical criterion of assessment and not a moral criterion with regard to Stalin himself. She believes that we have simply not grown to the point where we can define Stalin's place in history—anything big, she says, can only be seen from a distance.

In general a certain skittishness is allowed in some comrades' assessments of the figure of Stalin. In an interview with OGONEK Sergey Mikhalkov says that, yes, of course, on the one hand Stalin was a butcher, but on the other hand, just think, he would not allow himself to remove a comma from the text of the USSR anthem without the author's permission and he sought out the author at the front to ask his permission—you see, he says, what a contradictory, complex personality he really had. And someone else has written that yes, Stalin was a butcher, but he was an ascetic, he needed absolutely nothing, he was as poor as a church mouse. Just like a second Mahatma Gandhi.

Yes, Stalin was indifferent to things and money, it was something else which brought him pleasure—he liked to enjoy full power over people, over entire peoples, and in that respect he was no ascetic, he took inordinate pleasure in it....

Who gains from Andreyeva's position? The people? The party? In no way. This position, whether she wants it or not, serves the vital interests of the bureaucracy, including the party bureaucracy. It is to their advantage to separate policy and morality, they need this to avoid denunciation for their old sins and to ensure that nothing prevents them from committing new ones.

The most intelligent and far-sighted opponents of restructuring use a different strategy—they try to replace democratization with liberalization. What is the difference? Democratization provides for the redistribution of power, rights, and freedoms, the creation of a number of independent structures of management and information. And liberalization is the conservation of all the foundations of the administrative system but in a milder form. Liberalization is an unclenched fist, but the hand is the same and at any moment it could be clenched again into a fist. Only outwardly is liberalization sometimes reminiscent of democratization, but in actual fact it is a fundamental and intolerable usurpation.

One more method used to discredit restructuring. It is claimed that an exhaustive critical analysis of the past and of Stalin's actions strikes against the authority of the party as the leading force of society. Yes, in a certain sense it does. But, in opening up to society the opportunity to criticize it, to deprive it of a few pages of specious glory, the party at the same time also opens up the opportunity, thanks to its policy's resolute turn, to acquire new, untarnished glory. We must think not only of the party's past but also of its future. You cannot bring back the past, but the party's future is being laid today on a purged foundation of truth. If we are speaking of the past, we can say today that the moral nucleus within the party never died, it was dying away of fear and defenselessness in the Stalin era but after contracting and shrinking it retained its inner worth. Otherwise neither the 20th congress nor today's restructuring would have taken place. The party bore its loyalty to moral principles through its entire, very complex, history as a living, unfading value.

The party has done very major services to the people, but it is also in their debt. The main debt is democracy, full socialist democracy, which the party did not implant promptly in our social existence. I will even put it more sharply—throughout entire, quite protracted, periods the party, especially its leading organs, acted in the role of a force opposing democracy. Sufficiently strong anti-democratic traditions were created in the party. This should be admitted without reservation, otherwise it is hard to explain the need for a drastic change of course or to implement restructuring in practice in the spirit of the new course. Yes, the party has accumulated debts to society and it is now beginning to pay this debt, and when this imposing work on the democratic restructuring of society has been completed the gratitude of the people and the whole world will cover many times over the damage to the party's authority connected with an exhaustive critical analysis of its history.

Without democratic management of public property this property is in fact not public property, not the property of all the people. Being the owner of property means being the master of management, otherwise property belongs to the bureaucratic stratum of society and not to the people. Removing the land and the plants from the exploiters still does not mean transferring them to the people—only with the implantation of democratic structures of management is the act of handing the people their property accomplished. This seems to be acknowledged today, but frequently only verbally, while in practice, I repeat, we can observe a persistent attempt to supplant democratization with liberalization, the obsolete, discredited liberalization of the bureaucratic system of management.

The opponents of restructuring have no conclusive logic and no persuasive program, but they do still have power. They have strength. That is why I believe that we rank and file Communists should not sit idly by and await the decisions of the party conference on the basis of the "whatever God sends" principle. Our concern for the fate of restructuring must be transformed into real action. Not only into books, screenplays, plays, and films, but also into real, direct, political action. The progress of preparation for the conference today cannot be wholly assigned to the party apparatuses. It is very important that the conference delegates should sense the mood of the party masses and the position of the party organizations.

I want to propose for your attention the draft mandate to the 19th party conference from our party organization.

First. It would be desirable for the 19th party conference to be held openly with the publication of the delegates' speeches without cuts, with the televised broadcast of substantial parts of the conference's work, for the Communists and society as a whole to sense the atmosphere, for people to be able to respond not formally but effectively to what is happening at the conference even while it is working. For a lively hourly feedback so to speak, to exist between the party and the conference.

Second. In the spirit of this openness the conference should take the decision that CPSU Central Committee plenums also be held openly [glasno]. A Central Committee plenum is in fact the main party parliament and, considering that the party rules in our country, it is in general the country's main, deciding parliament. If Central Committee plenums are held openly [otkryto] this will intensify the Central Committee's beneficial influence on society and at the same time will increase Central Committee members' responsibility for their words and for their mission as a whole.

Third. We associate ourselves with those Communists who propose that the term of continuous office in elected posts should be limited to 8-10 years.



Fourth. There is an urgent need for the activity of party leaders of any rank, including Central Committee secretaries and Central Committee department chiefs, to be constantly on view so that people know who is who and have a more detailed and real knowledge of their personal qualities and have an idea of any nuances of their world outlook and features of their character and of the features of the position they hold on particular issues, their style of work, style of communication, and cultural purview. We can no longer allow, as has frequently been the case in the past, that society and the party itself should suddenly learn of the shortcomings and errors of a particular party figure. There have already been enough of those information shocks, those blows to the head, when at first a person is for a long time considered to be a really good man and then suddenly—bang!—it turns out he is an adventurer or extremist or is in favor of “glasnost without limits.” One reader of mine wrote in a letter to say, just you wait, “your Gorbachev will yet be thrown out for glasnost without limits.” You see, he has the formula all ready. I am sure that the adoption of a decision on access to observe the activity of the leaders will meet with approval among the leaders themselves and the Communists. People’s fates cannot be decided without glasnost [neglasno] and suddenly. Who knows, perhaps even Stalin, had he worked under conditions of glasnost, would have found the strength to curb his evil proclivities and would have gone down in our party’s history not as a butcher but as an entirely respected figure.

The question of glasnost, of greater autonomy and independence for the media, is in need of additional and in-depth discussion at the conference. The activation of the ideological backup for democratic transformations is connected with this. A program to eliminate illiteracy in democracy is needed, perhaps on television. People have a poor knowledge of the historical path of democratic values. These values were not revealed today in the course of historical creation, as it seems to some people. Democracy has performed outstanding services in the history of mankind. The fact that today we are having endless debates and heart-rending polemics about the harm or benefit of glasnost is evidence, not least, of our insufficiently high standard of culture. Essentially these are routine debates, the question of the benefit of glasnost is a historically decided question, and marking time for years on this tiny piece of political culture is simply intolerable. Incidentally, when it was necessary to provide ideological justification for and to ensure the lack of glasnost in recent years, the Central Committee culture and propaganda departments were far more skillful than today, when the authority of glasnost has to be strengthened.

We must treasure glasnost as the apple of our eye. And I want to mention one important thing here. A mass of negligence, a mass of stupidity has accumulated—after all, for years a veritable dictatorship of mediocrity existed in many regions. Many of these questions were not discussed, were not touched on in polemics, and

were not explained for decades. And suddenly there is glasnost and freedom. And in many heads everything has become confused—hence alongside the fair, justified, necessary demonstrations and protests, we can observe, and there may be more of them in future, protests connected with thoughtlessness, false certainties, and extremist feelings. That is why, in addition to the danger that restructuring may be halted by its direct opponents, there is also a danger from the extremist forces who support restructuring. These extremes can join without ceremony, particularly now, in the period of transition, when democratic foundations are still only beginning to take root, when they have not yet been reinforced with the cement of perfected procedural instructions. In brief, our feet may be ahead of our heads and the entire frame of restructuring may tilt and even topple and here the iron-clad boot of excessive administration will try not to let slip the chance to attack restructuring and put an end to it.

I think the party conference should draw society’s attention to the need, especially in the period of transition, to distinguish between freedom for the head and freedom for the feet. Our heads need complete freedom, so that people can read and think about everything and work out what is what and why, clarify the obscure, and check their feelings against reason. But our feet need restraint. I realize that it is hard to separate feet from heads and my wish will look speculative; nonetheless if you have a good think about it, methods will be found that are entirely acceptable under the conditions of democracy for the self-limitation of freedom for the feet with complete freedom for the head.

Like everyone, I am very concerned by the events in Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. Blood has been shed there. The culprits must be sought out to the last man and punished, punished. Unfortunately, the press has uttered no words of grief for the innocent lives which have been taken. Our media have proved unready to cover dramatic events in a human and honest way. Some turns of phrase in the items published have angered Muscovites, never mind readers in Yerevan or Sumgait! Our union and the cinematographers union secretariat must contribute its share of considered, sympathetic efforts to promote the consolidation of the spirit of reason in the actions of these republics’ creative intelligentsia.

Democracy is not above reason; there is nothing in people’s lives that is above reason, because democracy itself is the child of reason, the child of human wisdom. It does happen that, for the sake of self preservation, democracy is obliged, is compelled, to display for a while a firmness and even toughness which is not inherent in it. But even in that case it should do everything openly [otkryto], openly [glasno], persuasively explaining to society the moral justification for the measures which are being taken. Reason responds to reason, and human hearts are reassured when they are addressed sincerely, caringly, without ulterior motive.



Today it would be sensible to create a ministry or committee for the affairs of nations. This organ could investigate in detail all problems of inter-nation [mezhnatsionalnyye] relations, take preemptive measures, and not allow the solution of these problems to degenerate into mass protest demonstrations. There is a lot to do here, especially in the autonomous republics and oblasts. The purely administrative classification of a particular people as autonomous should not lead to any violations of their opportunities for developing their own culture. In attitudes toward nations there should be not a trace of division into ranks. In that sense our union must think about Tatars, Bashkirs, and other peoples having conditions for developing their national cinema. We must not wait for a resolution to do this to appear. The creation of conditions for developing national cinemas where they do not exist should be part of the program to restructure the cinema as its most important component.

The forthcoming party conference should define the new, nonauthoritarian nature of the party's leading activity. Its ideological, spiritual activity. And that is more complex than appointing and removing and then a year later again appointing and removing the next leaders. The party must learn to act, enjoying ideological and spiritual power. And this is a power to which people can subordinate themselves only voluntarily.

When you can order people, no one will try to persuade them. When you can order people, any complexities of life and activity are merely oversimplified, reduced to their outline, to dogma. It was the authoritarian principle of activity which became the reason for massive oversimplification. The sin of oversimplification is an old sin of ours, it is very difficult to break the habit of this sin. It is one of the reasons for opposition to democratization—many party workers are simply unable to cope with the complex tasks and do not have the qualities required for it. And each person wants what he is capable of. And if he is not capable of something, he says it is not needed, that it is harmful and dangerous to the foundations of socialism.

The party's well organized restructuring in a nonauthoritarian style needs several, admittedly not big, but sensible, high-quality films and effective cinematic assistance. The creation of such films today will obviously require special organizational efforts. In my opinion cinematographers today have investigated exclusively general human themes and problems and that is fine and I welcome it, but we must also remember that our restructuring, the restructuring in our party, today has a real, practical, general human importance.

I think that as a whole since its renowned fifth congress our union has somewhat lost its importance as one of the ideological and intellectual bastions of restructuring and democratization. That is normal, that can be understood, efforts have been dispersed for specific jobs, but I think that we should have sufficient dynamism and ability, when necessary, to focus our efforts for concerns

of general importance. Now, in the period of preparation for the 19th party conference, is just such a time for mustering and concentrating our forces.

The following question seems legitimate to me: If restructuring is halted, who will primarily be responsible—its supporters or its opponents? I personally have just one answer: Its supporters will be to blame.

Somehow we have rapidly become lazy and we let slip unheeded things which should not be let slip, some people have been seized by euphoria caused by the opportunities opened up, some people are rushing to pluck their little piece of the freedom which has only just begun to emerge from the iron shell of tyranny. I address these rebukes not only to you but also to myself, above all to myself.

We must take in air for a second breath; now is the right time to do so. The struggle has not ended, its decisive, hardest stage is only beginning.

From the Editorial Office [subhead]

The open party meeting fully supported A.I. Gelman's speech and its proposals and adopted a decision to send the text of the speech to party organs, including the CPSU Central Committee, as the mandate from the USSR Filmworkers Union Board party organization Communists to the 19th all-union party conference. The decision was adopted unanimously.

### **Burlatskiy Calls on Reformers to Mount 'Decisive Offensive'**

PM201015 Moscow *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA*  
in Russian 20 Apr 88 p 2

[Fedor Burlatskiy article under the rubric "Toward the 19th All-Union Party Conference": "What Sort of Socialism Do the People Need"]

[Text] What sort of socialism do the people need? This question will probably appear seditious to some people. But in fact, if you think about it, this is precisely the nerve center of the current debates. This was very accurately put in PRAVDA's editorial article "Principles of Restructuring: Revolutionary Nature of Thinking and Acting" (5 April 1988): "How are we more quickly to revive the Leninist essence of socialism, purge it of accretions and deformations, and rid ourselves of what was fettering society and preventing the full realization of socialism's potential?"

Lenin made a significant statement in the wake of "war communism": We are reviewing our entire viewpoint on socialism. Speaking bluntly, without beating about the bush, we now have to solve a similar task. First in order to get back to Lenin and overcome Stalin's legacy, and second in order to express the interests and aspirations of our people, who have been building socialism for over 70 years now. It is also necessary to take into account the

experience of the peoples in another 14 socialist countries and to realistically assess the competition with the capitalist world in the epoch of the technological revolution. This, I believe, is the essence of the new thinking on contemporary socialism.

It is appropriate to speak of the way we perceive our task today in view of the discussion of the article "I Cannot Waive My Principles," published by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA (13 March 1988). This article is more than just a manifesto of dogmatism. It is an action on the eve of the 19th party conference, an action calculated to consolidate the conservative forces. Principles are something necessary, and man—as Lenin used to say—needs ideals, but human ideals....

The adversaries of restructuring are trying to exploit the difficulties of its initial stage. Glasnost and the freedom to express diverse opinions—a freedom exercised by people who did not arrive from another planet but were shaped in the same difficult conditions of the personality cult, the enthusiasm and disappointments of the sixties, and especially during the period of stagnation, in conditions when the consequences of an authoritarian-patriarchal political culture were still not overcome—this kind of glasnost is inevitably accompanied by emotional extremes, destructive outbursts, and uncivilized polemics. But so what? Politics—and this was known back in the deepest antiquity—is not made up of just positive or absolutely negative phenomena. It is always necessary to choose the solutions which produce preferable results. Can there be any doubt when we compare the two methods—to expose problems or conceal them? Glasnost is a sword which heals the wounds it inflicts. Who said that? Lenin.

Serious politicians, as well as anyone else who has a serious attitude toward the cause, realize that to conceal a problem is to drive it inside, to let it grow to a size which will make it impossible to cope with. On the other hand, to expose the problem is to start solving it. Did aircraft not crash, trains not collide, and national conflicts not flare up also in the past, in the personality cult time? Of course they did. But everything was accompanied by silence, a funereal silence. And the country is now paying for the years and decades of silence. Glasnost is the people's mirror and they are not afraid of it, since they themselves produced in ancient times the adage: There is no point in blaming the mirror.... Yes, it is necessary to change the face of society itself so as not to have any reasons to blame the mirror.

The conservative forces also want to take advantage of a certain imbalance existing between glasnost and the actual economic results, which are still scarce. But responsibility for the fact that innovative reforms are progressing more slowly than required lies primarily with them, with these forces. It is they that use every means at their disposal, direct or indirect, to resist the development of cooperatives, of family, link, and team contracts, and of individual labor, all of which could

swiftly produce results without incurring significant costs. The few tens of thousands of small cooperatives set up in the country in the last 3 years are just a drop in the ocean. As for them, our home-grown Tories, with one hand they put the brakes on progressive transformations, while with the other they encourage panic-mongering statements about restructuring.

But the article in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA is useful in one respect. It is challenging and direct in its defense of Stalin and his legacy. One would imagine that the covert adversaries of restructuring would have found it more expedient to take a more balanced stance, to fight on two fronts, as it were—against extreme anti-Stalinists and against outspoken Stalinists. But this has not happened. This has proved yet again that there is no alternative to restructuring. Nobody finds Brezhnev's feeble and wishy-washy policy suitable. And this is significant.

It is not difficult to understand why the adversaries of restructuring have come out into the open now. They have clearly sensed that restructuring is entering a stage when it may become irreversible, when it may become an organic part of our people and of our social relations. They have sensed this, and have decided to make a stand, attempting to split public awareness and find support among the most retrograde social forces.

According to the article in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, the main topic of discussion is the question of Stalin's place in our country's history. But this is untrue! This question was the main object of struggle some 30 years ago, at the time of the 20th party congress. Essentially, it was bluntly answered back then, and this would be easy to prove by publishing N. Khrushchev's "secret" report. More and more new facts are coming to light as the CPSU Central Committee Politburo Commission's work progresses, as well as in the course of research conducted by the press, science, and literature. And it is only very retrograde people on the fringes of political fights who now seem to be only just discovering this chapter in our history.

In actual fact, the main question now is a different one, one that was not answered in the sixties. It is the question of the management system which developed in Stalin's epoch. "We realized," M.S. Gorbachev noted, "that the party must display courage and determination and free itself from the prevailing notions of socialism which bear the stamp of certain conditions and especially of the personality cult period. To free itself from the old ideas on methods of building, and mainly to get rid of everything that, generally speaking, deformed socialism and fettered the people's creative abilities."

Seneca said: A grave mistake is often tantamount to a crime. Stalin's obvious crimes were brought to light and exposed almost one-third of a century ago. But the mistakes—mistakes which have so deeply penetrated our management system—are still alive and hinder the country's advance. Nowadays there are very few people

who openly defend the repressions of 1937. But there still quite a few people who more or less share Stalin's mistaken ideas. This is why emotional criticism must be supplemented by scientific criticism, drawing lessons from the past for the present. This is precisely why it is very important to study Stalin's concepts which justified the deformation of socialism.

There is no denying it: Our ideas of Marxism and Leninism, of socialism itself, were handed down to us by Stalin himself. From the early thirties, the system of tuition and education was based on Stalin's work "Questions of Leninism," the "Short Course in the History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)," which he edited, the ideas he expressed at the 14th-19th party congresses, and the work "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR." In one way or another, all current textbooks on party history, political economy, scientific communism, and philosophy, as well as most theoretical studies in the social sciences, hark back to these sources.

Under the influence of Stalin's views the experience of the period between the thirties and the fifties was absolutized and used as a yardstick in judgments on socialism. This is the only way to explain the amazing fact that the author of the aforementioned article in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA takes the Stalinist period as a model of socialism, makes no allowances for the repressions in the thirties, and actually perceives glasnost, democratization, economic reforms, and the ideas of today's restructuring as deviations from socialism. Furthermore, whenever a new form of effective development of socialism emerges, there are people who take the tempting stance of "defenders of purity" and declare: "This is not socialism. This contravenes its fundamental principles." The most minor charge is that of sliding into positions of "capitalism." The gravest accusation is that of being "enemies of the people."

Just look at the suspicion with which people in our country regarded the quests and experiments in other socialist countries. Back in 1955, when N. Khrushchev went to Yugoslavia, he courageously admitted the mistakes we had made in the past. He signed a declaration which enshrined the right of every country to take its own path to socialism. But only a few years later the zealots of "purity" launched an all-out ideological barrage against the Yugoslav experience of self-management and workers' councils.

A significant episode took place during Khrushchev's visit to Yugoslavia in 1963. He was touring a Belgrade enterprise, where he met representatives of the workers' council. Suddenly Khrushchev declared: "And what is so bad about workers' self-management in Yugoslavia? I see no sedition here. You have some forms, we have others." The remark was publicized in the Yugoslav and Western press. We tried to include it in the report for our press, but when Khrushchev was informed he said: "It is not worth annoying the geese back home." Oh, these

geese, what high price we have to pay for their prejudices, for their ignorance of the Marxism in whose name they brand and reject everything new, everything capable of advancing socialism!

And how suspicious we were for 20 years about the Hungarian reforms! How many excesses and extremes there were in reflections on the debates about socialism in Czechoslovakia! And the covert and overt malevolence that was aroused by attempts at economic transformations in Poland and the GDR!

Not so long ago, after my return from China, I had an opportunity to speak about the reforms there. Specifically, about the way family contracts were successfully used there to solve the food problem, to increase grain production by more than one-third in 5-6 years, and to raise peasants' living standards threefold. Suddenly a venerable professor took the floor. This is what he said, literally: "All this is of course okay. But what was the price that had to be paid for it? The price that had to be paid for was a retreat from socialism and the borrowing of capitalist methods. Is this not too high a price to pay for economic growth?"

I beg your pardon, 800 million peasants—starving, unhappy, and almost suffocated during the "Cultural Revolution"—are now beginning to enjoy prosperity. Is this bad? From whose point of view? What principles stipulate that working people must live in poverty and destitution? Whenever I hear things like that, I get the feeling that some of us are going too far....

M.S. Gorbachev is a thousand times right when he says that no system has the right to exist unless it serves man. This is our criterion, our socialist criterion for assessing any system, and primarily our own system. At the same time, it is a strictly class criterion. We are concerned about the working person's life and not in the least about the incomes of the bourgeois or the privileges enjoyed by some elite group. The term socialism can be applied only to that which really ensures prosperity and culture for working people—workers, peasants, members of the intelligentsia. And anything that does not ensure this is not socialism.

Once we accept this criterion, everything else falls into place. Family contracts in China, at least at the present stage of the country's development, have produced a colossal effect both for the development of productive forces and for the raising of living standards. This means that they are not only a socialist but an efficient socialist form. Voluntary cooperatives in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, which harvest 40 quintals of wheat per hectare, have proven highly productive and ensure harvest yields and labor productivity that are twice as high as ours and corresponding living standards for the rural and urban population. This means that voluntary cooperatives have proved more effective than kolkhozes.

And how about the Yugoslav state farms, which have harvest yields reaching 60 quintals of wheat per hectare and are organized not along the line of our sovkhozes but rather follow the model of large industrial farms in Western countries—are they more socialist or less socialist than sovkhozes? And how about the stores, snack bars, and workshops run by individuals or families in Poland, the GDR, and Hungary, offering good and inexpensive food or services? Is this a retreat from socialism? And how about the fact that any working person in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, or Yugoslavia—provided he has the foreign currency—can travel without any restrictions to any country: Is this a return to bourgeois liberalization?

What we have to do is to assess the similar and at the same time differing economic models taking shape in socialist countries: Plan-commodity economy (the PRC), planning in the light of market requirements (Hungary), market economy (the SFRY)... To assess not only the positive experience of other socialist countries which have traveled the path of economic reforms, but also the difficulties, blind alleys, and new problems that have developed there.

But why and how did the deformation of socialism occur in our country? Let us begin with the fact that, as far back as the twenties, there had developed not only two views on socialism but also two models competing against each other in practice.

The first was that of "war communism" (1918-1921). This model was established as a result of the harsh civil war, but it also reflected to a considerable extent the semianarchic views about the possibility of a "leap" toward communism. What this meant in practice was the triumph of edicts and violence, direct confiscation of produce from the peasants, and elimination of the normal exchange of products of labor.

The second model, the "New Economic Policy" or NEP (1921-1928), was founded on a commodity economy in which different types of enterprises—state, cooperative, or private—compete with each other, an economy in which the peasant is free to sell his produce on the market and to purchase industrial goods in exchange. Democracy, especially within the party, the trade unions, the soviets, and at local level, and struggle between different trends in art and culture were an important feature of the NEP.

Without going into a discussion of why and how the NEP was overthrown, let me say that the struggle between the two trends, the two approaches, the two views on socialism has been waged throughout our whole history and throughout the existence of the liberation movement.

The whole point is that, ever since the inception of the liberation movement, it has been the arena of a struggle between two trends: The social democratic (Bolshevik in our country) trend and the war communism or barracks

communism trend. This started back with our predecessors. Saint-Simon on the one side, Babeuf on the other. Marx on the one side, Bakunin on the other. Marx himself spoke of the Bakunin current as "the sick shadow of communism," as "barracks communism" denying individuality and civilization everywhere and bred by poverty, ignorance, and the social jealousy of the lowest of "the low."

This current was exceptionally strong in our party and it was firmly founded on the backward awareness and authoritarian-patriarchal political culture of the masses. In Lenin's time, at least one-half of the party Central Committee Politburo members were at different periods committed to the ideas of "left-wing communism." Let us look no further than Trotsky, who, even after his exile abroad, until the last days of his life continued to preach the most nonsensical leftist ideas.

In this context, it is worth paying thorough attention to the activity of N. Bukharin and other leaders who realized the full importance of Lenin's political testament, of the new approach toward socialist building, and of the new view on socialism. Bukharin's stance in general was of particular importance for us, an importance which we have still not fully appreciated. Arguments and sharp debates are still raging around this extraordinary individual. This is more than just a human problem, more than just natural sympathy and compassion for the fate of innocent figures who were ruined and tormented, for their families and relatives. This raises the question of whether there was an alternative to Stalin's methods of industrialization, collectivization, and consolidation of the country's industrial and defense might.

It is usually said that history does not recognize the subjunctive mood. Whatever has happened has happened and could not have been otherwise. But this is not so. Let us ask ourselves the simplest of questions: Had Lenin lived for another 10 or 20 years, would the country have undergone the grim ordeals that fell to its lot in 1937-1938? Never! Let us approach this question from a different angle: What would have happened had the 13th party congress followed Lenin's direct instructions and relieved Stalin of his duties as general secretary of the party Central Committee? There can be no doubt that our path would have been easier, more humane, and much more effective. Here is further proof, taken from practical experience: Following Mao Zedong's death, the arrival in the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, who managed to replace Mao's direct heir Hua Guofeng, marked the beginning of major economic and political reforms in China. It is no accident that N. Bukharin's works are being published over and over again in China—people there are well aware of the full importance of the alternative to Stalinism and Maoism.

A member of the group of "expropriators," Stalin was in the mainstream of the leftist current from the very beginning of his political activity and was inclined

toward terrorist methods. This is why he either failed to understand or deliberately rejected the ideas of Lenin's testament which underlay the ideas of the new (rather than the old, from the "war communism" period) economic policy.

Stalin deemed it necessary to present his own interpretation of theory as far back as the early twenties. A modern reader would find it worthwhile looking through his "Questions of Leninism." The work consists largely of quotations from Lenin, both with and without attribution, followed by brief comments couched fully in the terse and simplistic "Stalin style."

It is easy to trace how Stalin gradually, at first imperceptibly and then more and more obviously, shifted the emphasis and moved the center of gravity in Lenin's statements. These shifts were all in the same direction. The main point—the apotheosis of violence—was gradually but by no means steadily highlighted. The revolution, the socialization of the economy, the leadership of culture, and all other transformations were for him synonymous with crude violence. This left a dark and grim stamp on the methods used to implement collectivization and industrialization, on the forms of party struggle, and generally on the entire process of social transformations. It was by no means an accident that, in his quest for parallels for the development of his epoch as far back as the early thirties, Stalin turned to such dissimilar figures from the fatherland's history as Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great. It was from their experience that he derived justification for the inevitability of the most cruel methods for the sake of the country's grandeur as a great power.

But the analogy with Peter actually works against Stalin. Alas, Peter was no socialist. He had to extricate the country from its backwardness at any cost. The task of the people's prosperity and culture was pushed far into the background. Meanwhile, two-thirds of Stalin's ideas about the country's grandeur as a state and the leader's role were drawn from Russia's past experience and not at all from Marxist sources.

Stalin sent several million peasants to Siberia, and some of them were locked up in camps simply because they had owned three or four cows and horses. It appeared that the better working people lived, the more they had to be restricted and punished by the state. Is this what Stalin held to be socialism?

At the 18th party congress in 1939, right after the horrifying bloodletting in the party and among the people, Stalin declared that the time for direct transition to communism had arrived. He did not clearly explain to us the actual meaning of communism: It was unclear whether it meant that everybody would have enough to eat their fill, or universal equality of—what?—needs, abilities, opportunity? But what was clearly affirmed was this: An entire generation of people must be sacrificed for the "leap" toward the communist future. This policy

led to destruction of the normal functioning of the national economy, to attempts to statize the kolkhozes, and to massive utilization of prisoners' labor.

Toward the end of his life, Stalin returned to his scheme of a "leap" toward communism in his work "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR." What he put forward as immediate tasks were a transition to direct barter, gradual abolition of payment for goods and services, and restrictions upon, followed by the elimination of, commodity-money relations. His idea that the law of value operates in a modified form in the conditions of socialism provided the theoretical substantiation for total distortion of the price formation system, economic arbitrariness, and violations of proportions in the economy's development.

But how was the belief in state violence reconciled with the dream of a "leap" to communism? The answer to this question was actually provided by L. Trotskiy. He came up with the graphic comparison of the dictatorship of the proletariat with an oil lamp: The wick burns particularly brightly just before it burns out. The way this was interpreted was that state violence ought to reach its maximum level just before the withering away of the state. As we can see, every utopia has its flip side.

Stalin secretly borrowed this view and obviously and simply applied it in practice. Everybody recalls his idea that as successes in socialist building multiply the resistance of class enemies grows and class struggle is exacerbated. Is this not that same "oil lamp" which cast a horrifying light on the repressions during the thirties, when the terror was directed against Communists themselves and against nonparty workers and peasants?

Stalin was particularly intolerant of the intelligentsia which perceived the mistaken nature of his ideas better than others. Stalin personally originated many decisions aimed at organizing further campaigns to "attack" figures in literature, art, and cinematography. Problems of humanism, the overcoming of alienation, and competition [sostyazatel'nost] in culture were perceived as "throwbacks" to bourgeois ideology.

The personality cult ideology founded by Stalin and his barrack utopian ideas of a "leap" to communism retarded our country's development, had a negative effect on the building of socialism in East European countries and China, and undermined faith in socialism in capitalist countries.

Stalin oversimplified and "straightened out" the task of socialist building, equating the process of large-scale socialization and statization. At first industrial enterprises were subordinated to state management, and this was followed later by what was essentially the statization of kolkhozes.

It not only encompassed the economic sphere but also spread gradually to the whole of spiritual life and the management of cultural institutions, publishing houses, theaters, schools, universities, hospitals, and sport. When you also bear in mind that state employees themselves were not elected by anyone but were selected, it becomes easy to identify the sources of the bureaucratization of management.

Our classics foresaw the possibility of such mistakes. The temptation of simple statization is all too great. Here are their warnings. "State ownership of productive forces," Engels wrote, "does not resolve conflicts, but it does contain a formal means, an opportunity for their resolution." "If a state monopoly on tobacco is socialism," Engels wrote with a sense of humor, "then Napoleon and Metternich must certainly be included among the founders of socialism."

During the post-Stalin period our theory and practice have in general overcome two of Stalin's mistaken ideas—the belief in the absolute power of violence and the temptation of a "leap" toward communism. Khrushchev was the last of the country's leaders who still hoped that "the present generation will live under communism." But Stalin's main idea—"state socialism"—remains unshaken to this day. I have enclosed this expression in inverted commas because I am aware that it is approximate, conditional, and not entirely adequate. It was actually Stalin and not Lenin who developed the theory that the state plays a decisive role in the building of socialism. Not the working class and its party, but the state—even though it itself produces nothing, neither bread, nor footwear, nor machines, nor books. This is all done by the people, with the state only regulating—for better or for worse—the process of creation.

Even though Brezhnev was the first of our leaders who did not promise to build communism in a single generation's lifetime, he had absolute faith in the omnipotence of the state and its organizational potential. When he took over the country's leadership, he was under the impression that it would be sufficient to do away with Khrushchev's "ventures" and revert to the previous forms for things to take off. He was more prey to illusions about "organizational response" than any other of our leaders. It was no accident that the number of ministries and departments increased to more than 100 under him. There were almost one-third fewer of them even under Stalin.

The belief in organizational solutions to real-life problems applying almost exclusively to the upper echelons of management has still not disappeared to this day. But the task now is to place every producer, whether worker, peasant, or member of intelligentsia, in new conditions. To stimulate their interest in the results of labor, their personal initiative.

The article in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA attempts to create the impression that socialism is in profound crisis. But if we are to speak of elements of crisis, this applies not to contemporary socialism as a whole but to just one of its forms, "state socialism." This form is now becoming obsolete, revealing its inefficiency in the conditions of technological revolution. Supercentralism and state compulsion did play a role in the mobilization of resources and concentration of efforts in extreme situations, especially during the civil war and the Patriotic War. But now this form is an obstacle to advance in all spheres of economic, social, and cultural life. And it must be transformed—gradually, in a balanced fashion, with due reflection—into a new form which could be provisionally entitled "self-managed socialism of the whole people."

It is time to grasp why our country, with its colossal wealth of land, forests, oil, gas, and metal, with its energetic and now fully educated people, still lacks the required quantities of good-quality food, clothing, housing, books, movies.... Obviously, the socialism was not entirely good, and the people need a good, a very good socialism. The people do not need Stalin's "dawns," they do not need monumental edifices to honor leaders, they need a normal civilized life.

Of course, this does not mean that centralized state leadership will disappear. The total "dismantling" of the state is an absurd idea, especially in conditions of increasingly complex domestic and international economic, information, and humanitarian ties. But it does mean that the state must devolve a considerable proportion of its authority, functions, powers, and prerogatives to civil society and its institutions. Primarily to labor collectives in plants, factories, cooperatives, institutions, and creative unions, as well as to public organizations and other—completely new—social institutions which will probably emerge in the course of restructuring. Society must take over much of what was previously borne by the state, panting under the burden of extremely complex tasks and bureaucratism.

Incidentally, capitalism has gone through various stages in its reconstruction: The classical stage in the 19th century, followed by the state and state-monopoly stage in the first half of the 20th century, and now, in the conditions of technological revolution, it is acquiring a new form which has still not taken its final shape. It is still rather quick to change its skin, and this is probably why the process of its decay is taking so long.... It has to be admitted that capitalist countries no longer have all that many doctrinaires or downright fools who dream of returning to the past, to the times of Louis Napoleon, Bismarck, or Hitler and Mussolini. This is one of the few advantages of a pragmatic ideology which seeks nothing but advantage everywhere.

M.S. Gorbachev once remarked that socialism is a society of people with initiative. And "state socialism" deserves the harshest of sentences for having enserfed

the working people's initiative. At first individual initiative was sacrificed to collective initiative, then collective initiative was sacrificed to the management apparatus' initiative, and finally the initiative of workers within this apparatus was stifled. Structured like a pyramid, this apparatus increasingly concentrated initiative in the top echelons of power, and ultimately in the hands of a sole chief and leader. What happened was this: No matter what question a worker raised or what initiative he put forward, he inevitably came up against a forest of obstacles erected on orders, instructions, and traditions. Hence the bitter joke: Any initiative is punishable. Is there anyone who has not experienced this personally!

Structural transformations now presuppose the creation of a form of socialism which would encourage rather than punish initiative. Go out and talk to people: What do you hear? Relieve us from tutelage, let us freely get down to our work! As M.S. Gorbachev said in Uzbekistan, he was amazed at how forcefully this was heard at the kolkhoz members' congress. But this same demand is also to be heard from plant, scientific, school, and creative collectives fettered by instructions and the aforementioned prohibitions. It is bursting from deep within every inventor, cooperative member, artist, and citizen seeking a way to apply his talents.

Let me emphasize once more: The most important theoretical and political task is to return to Lenin, to return to Marx, to the sources of socialism. At the same time, as Ilich liked to repeat, to preserve a legacy does not mean limiting yourself to this legacy. Marx traveled in a stagecoach, and Lenin traveled in a car which today can only be seen in a museum. Is there any need to talk about the changes that have occurred in the world? It was only Moses who wanted to lay down for eternity the laws by which his people ought to live. But Moses did not do this of his own accord, but in the name of God, whose advice he awaited for 3 days on top of the mountain. Neither Marx nor Lenin could even think of prescribing for eternity laws, rules, or principles of life for millions and billions of people.

Use your own head—this slogan of Lenin's ought to be inscribed on the walls of at least all scientific establishments and party centers. The technological revolution, demographic explosion, ecological tension, and nuclear threat have presented contemporary Communists with totally new and totally puzzling tasks. And when bold, intelligent, and talented political thinking begins to solve them, stones can be thrown only by the most diehard dogmatists terrified by the scale of the ongoing changes and incapable of comprehending them.

What is it like, this qualitatively new model of a more efficient democratic and humane socialism? Only some of its outlines are visible as yet.

It is a plan-commodity economy based on economic accountability and a multiplicity of types of social ownership—elevating state ownership to the level of ownership by the whole people, and developing the cooperative, family, and individual forms. It is economic

competition (socialist competition) [Eto ekonomicheskaya sostyazatel'nost' (sotsialisticheskaya konkurentsiya)]. It is the development of civil society and subordination of the state to society. The shaping of what Engels called a universal association of producers. It is the separation of authority, powers, and functions between party, state, and public organizations. It is the overcoming of at least the most uncivilized forms of bureaucratism and the building of state management according to the principle "better fewer, but better." It is the development of self-management, the shaping of public opinion as a factor of the political process, the development of the principle of election, the rotation of cadres, and professionalism. It is competition between cultural trends, the education of the socialist individual, the overcoming of the legacy of authoritarian-patriarchal culture, and the shaping of a socialist culture. All these transformations are aimed at consolidating socialism, the Communist Party's prestige, and the power of the whole people.

It is obvious that the development of contemporary socialism will take a long time—running into several decades. But, unless there are hindrances, these will be decades of inspired labor by the whole people for the benefit of our motherland and every Soviet person.

This is the mighty movement of the people that is opposed by the manifesto of the adversaries of restructuring. The preparation for the forthcoming 19th party conference inspires hope that all forces of restructuring will engage in a decisive offensive. Relying on Lenin, it can be said that defense is the death of revolution. Only a persistent offensive, constant consolidation of the positions of revolutionary reformers, steady advance along the path of economic transformations and democratization of society will make it possible to squeeze out the adversaries of the new and make the waverers switch to the side of reforms. This is when the present stage of restructuring will become the starting point of its transition to another, higher level.

**Writers' Union Official Urges Changes in Conference Elections**  
*PM221400 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA*  
*in Russian 21 Apr 88 p 2*

[Article by Yuriy Andreyev, CPSU member since 1956 and member of the USSR Writers' Union Board, under the rubric "19th All-Union Party Conference: I Propose for Discussion!": "Before It Is Too Late"]

[Text] Leningrad—The vast majority of the people and the party want the all-union party conference to mark a really revolutionary change in all spheres of our people's life, and above all to resolve questions of restructuring in our party milieu.



We pin great hopes on the decisions of the 19th party conference, as long as they help to release the vast, hitherto unutilized reserves that are latent in us, in literally every individual and in the state as a whole.

But what if these decisions are half-hearted, hedged about with reservations, and lacking a fusion of excellent initial theses and concrete means of implementing them, as is now often the case with the majority of major laws that are adopted, which have progressive-looking headings but are extremely difficult to execute?.. That would be a major, really overwhelming calamity, and not only for our country.

But where, in fact, do these fears come from? This is where they come from. As was noted in the report at the recent Leningrad CPSU Obkom plenum, the vast majority of activists polled on the eve of that plenum, which was devoted to ideological problems, "regard conservatism in all its forms, and the passivity that is usually associated with it, as the main braking factor. Of the 16,000 Leningraders who sent in responses to the 'Ideology and Restructuring' questionnaire, 90 percent also describe these trends as the most dangerous" (LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA, 12 April 1988). A. Varsobin, chief editor of LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA, also cited these figures: "We cannot ignore the fact that in 1987 there was a thirtyfold increase in the number of letters to the editorial office about formal, bureaucratic attitudes to citizens' statements, a fivefold increase in letters about violations of labor legislation, and a twofold increase in those about communists' violations of statutory requirements. One cannot help wondering: Where are the party organizations, why has no substantial progress been made on these questions?"

So where are the guarantees, one wonders, that these highly conservative figures, ossified in their bureaucratically soulless attitude to their own fellow citizens and their worries and interests, will not be the very people who are elected delegates to the 19th party conference, and that the right to decide what our common future will be will not be put into the hands of precisely these active (or passive) opponents of restructuring? There are no such guarantees! In fact, on the contrary, the entire experience of the past virtually guarantees that it is these people, the ancient leadership workers who have grown roots in various kinds of apparatus, members of various party committees, including high-level ones, who will do everything to ensure that they automatically make up the vast majority of party conference delegates.

The paradox of the situation also lies in the fact that many of the most active supporters of restructuring, its true fighters, who have emerged since the 27th CPSU Congress, naturally do not belong to any elected party organs, because the full range of elections took place before the congress. It is also a paradox that those who are most active ideologically in expressing and forming public opinion—writers and philosophers, current

affairs writers and economists, historians and journalists, and representatives of creative unions—also do not, as a rule, belong to city, oblast, or republican party organs, since the majority of them found their voices at the congresses of their creative unions, which took place after the 27th party congress. Unfortunately among the members of party committees there are many obedient, obliging figures, convenient mouthpieces for those braking forces. Consequently the direct, outstanding forerunners of the restructuring, those workers in literature, culture, and art who predetermined yesterday and determine today the tone of the era of democratization and glasnost, might not be elected.

Given the present system for elections, it could quite logically happen that the conservative minority, which upholds without mercy for anyone or anything the only system that suits it and is convenient to it, the command-and-administer system, will turn out to be in the majority at the forthcoming historic forum, which is called upon to define fundamentally new paths for us.

A revolution must be able to defend its gains, its goals, and its ideals, or else it is not a revolution, but only noisy talk about revolution, as I and many others believe.

That being so, the procedure for nominating delegates to the all-union party conference must depart from the routine, customary procedure! It should be not so much the fact that someone has been installed in his leadership post for a long time, as his active, creative, constructive spirit that should be the mandate for the crucial 19th party conference! It should not be an official post or the number of awards gained, sometimes honestly but often by distribution, but the personal contribution to the ideology and practice of restructuring that should mark out the delegates. Only the one who is really the most active out of every 3,780 party members should be elected. (Incidentally, that rate of representation is determined by... the size of the hall in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses—5,000 seats. There will be no less than 5,000 delegates. But perhaps only 1,500 true, impassioned fighters for restructuring would suffice?...) I am not sure that the experienced apparatchik cadres, who have already on many occasions taken cover behind all kinds of instructions which they themselves had generated, will be wholeheartedly concerned with precisely this task of electing the true leaders as delegates. More likely they will do precisely the opposite of what the times demand. They will act calmly on the basis of the instruction on elections to the conference that is formulated very comfortably for themselves.

Before it is too late, an amendment to the instruction should be drawn up and introduced strictly, so as not only to permit, but to require oblast, kray, and republican party organizations to give unequivocal preference in the elections to those communists who have won a reputation, through their deeds, as the foremen of restructuring: bold ideologists, leading, if refractory, production workers, out-of-the-ordinary farm leaders,



and, of course, the heralds of glasnost, fighters for democratization, active workers in creative unions. Before it is too late! The shadow of the paradox is advancing rapidly and very perceptibly. To paraphrase the proverb, let me say: The stable door must be shut, before the horse has bolted...

### Reader Notes 'Excessive Regulation' of CPSU Practice

PM281401 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA  
in Russian 26 Apr 88 p 1

[Letter from G. Vildanova, member of the Kazan CPSU Gorkom Bureau and leader of a construction industry workers team, under the rubric "19th All-Union Conference: I Submit for Discussion!": "A Raykom or an Emergency Service?"—boldface as published]

[Text] Let's be frank: The prestige of Communists declined during the years of stagnation. We spoke rather too much about the monolithic unity of the party and the people, and failed to notice how mistrust developed. This was because one thing was said, and something else was done. What happened was that, in parallel with honest people whose hearts were aching as a result of our misfortunes, the party ranks contained many indifferent, timorous people, and even careerists, who looked on their party card as a pass to a leadership position and personal advantage. Hence the negative attitude to people.

I think that the question of blocking access to the party ranks for casual people is more acute than ever before. This could be done only by abandoning the dogma of percentage proportions when admission is regulated according to people's belonging to various social groups. I realize that there is no room for anarchy, but **dragging someone into the party simply because his record fits within the notorious percentages is a gross violation of the CPSU Statutes.** This is not a matter of isolated cases: Anyone reading this letter could cite appropriate examples.

At our construction site, for example, young foremen and skilled craftsmen—those who are in the thick of labor collectives—are consciously striving for party membership. Alas, they are not supported: There are no "vacancies for workers...."

Let us also look at recommendations. Anyone who has had occasion to make a recommendation can recall all the trouble involved in formulating it properly: sticking to correct margins, proper sentences, and the right terminology.... What is the point in all this paperwork? **Why should the person making the recommendation not describe freely, and therefore more sincerely, the human and professional qualities of the person whom he proposes?** Or is a beautifully and precisely laid out piece of paperwork more important?

Much, very much in our party home has been excessively bureaucratized and subjected to excessive regulation, a fence of written and unwritten rules and conventions has been erected. Meetings of communists from a primary party organization must be held once a month, on the first Wednesday. But what is wrong with Friday? And why once a month? Common sense indicates that **a meeting of communists must be held whenever it might be actually necessary—to discuss pressing problems.** As for holding meetings just for the record—we all know the results.

Someone might say that these are trivia. I disagree. This is actually one of the stereotypes that holds back initiative. Here is another: For example, a party Central Committee plenum is held. It is immediately followed, as if by a chain reaction, by obkom, gorkom, and raykom plenums, shop party meetings, and party group meetings.... All of them follow exactly the same agenda. Is this always necessary?

We all await with great impatience the all-union party conference. I think that an exacting conversation will take place as to whether everything in our party home is suitable. The time has come to dust out all the corners, clean all the windows, and even "redesign the premises." I realize that the structure and apparatus are determined by the CPSU Central Committee as if local party organs were incapable of deciding what departments and how many people they need. But it is obvious that **the prevailing sectoral structure of party committees, be they gorkoms or raykoms, fails to meet the demands of restructuring, and these committees should not be shaped according to a standard model.** After all, today it is an open secret that the majority of apparatus workers are not engaged in their proper work but are duplicating the work of local soviet and economic organs. We have actually reached the point where the raykom is like an emergency service: No matter what happens anywhere or to anyone, the initial reaction is to telephone the raykom. They are the people who will help and sort things out—they will supply faucets; they will ship concrete.... What sort of political work is that? Hence the question: **Are there not too many leadership offices?** Are there not too many desks in each one of them? Each desk emitting its own rustle of paperwork, "processing" decisions. As to the abundance of decisions that have been made—countless. And the result is well known.

Or take a different situation, for example. An educated, energetic, fairly talented young person joins the apparatus. Look at him about 6 months later, and you won't recognize him. He has become a newly sprouted bureaucrat, drowning in information, quickly accustomed to the office atmosphere and the edicts. The substitution of pretense for actual work is generally intolerable, and it is especially intolerable in party work. Not for nothing is party work known as the science of dealing with people.

Let the gorkom or raykom apparatus be cut back: This will only improve the returns from it. The center of gravity of all work must lie within the primary organization. This is the link that must be consolidated. But

what is actually happening now? Take, for example, a subdivision like a construction administration. Who heads its primary party organization? As a rule, it is the chief of one of its departments, who is already up to his neck in his own work. There he is, rushing around and earning no more than his official salary—he is not a full-time secretary. But is it possible to tackle party work on a part-time basis, incidentally, in between other work? Especially in plants and at construction sites, in the thick of the working people? It would be logical to consolidate primary party organizations at the expense of the proliferated apparatus in the top links of party leadership.

G. Vildanova, member of the Kazan CPSU Gorkom Bureau and leader of a construction industry workers team, Kazan

**Historian Calls for Pluralism, Political Reform**  
*PM270828 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA*  
*in Russian 27 Apr 88 p 10*

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences L. Shevtsova under the rubric "Toward the 19th All-Union Party Conference": "Guarantees of People's Power"]

[Text] It is not easy to discard stereotypes in the evaluation of political mechanisms. The habit of regarding power, the state, not as an institution at the service of the individual and society but as something to be feared, dies hard.

In what way is the situation we are experiencing revolutionary? For one thing, there is the recognition that the command-and-administer system of power has had its day, although it still tries to dictate its own rules of the game. This, of course, weighs heavily on the restructuring, although there is hope of casting it aside. The more difficult thing is this: After relieving ourselves of that weight, where do we go from there? All of us, some intuitively, some consciously, feel the need for new forms of political life. To guard against differences of interpretation, let me stress at once: I am not talking about a change of system, but about a renewal of its sociopolitical, organizational foundations—in other words, a fresh concept of power that meets current demands.

First of all, it is clearly necessary to rid ourselves of the conviction that we have political forms which only have to be adjusted a little, polished a little, and corrected a little—and society can rely on them confidently in the course of restructuring. The following dogma should also be discarded: The stability of the system relies on the immutability of political forms. After all, the old structures retard economic reform by lowering and suppressing social vitality. It was no accident that at the recent February (1988) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, M.S. Gorbachev mentioned as one of the most pressing tasks the need for a reform of society's political system.

It is easy to criticize and reject, many people will say. But what do you suggest we do?

I believe we should look at the experience of other socialist countries. For a long time, our country was like an icebreaker forging a path in an unknown icy ocean. Behind it came a caravan of ships repeating all the zigzags of the flagship. But suddenly they emerged into clear water and could, or so it seemed, "uncouple themselves" from their guide. And what happened? For a long time, the ships continued to follow the leader blindly all the same—whether from fear of losing their way, or simply from habit. The moment eventually came when it became clear that free navigation did not entail the risk of shipwreck, and in the end, the socialist countries began, one after another, to create their own models of development.

Many of them embarked on a path of political reforms. Some saw this as offering the possibility of averting social crises. For others, the renewal of power was the consequence of economic reforms which were being suffocated in the straitjacket of the old political ideas. This path was proclaimed, at different times, by Bulgaria, Hungary, China, Poland, and Yugoslavia.... Here is a summary of the arguments put forward by the fraternal parties in favor of a restructuring of power: The existing political system was born during the years of revolutionary transformations. Today it does not accord with the peaceful conditions of socialism's development and the requirements of commodity-money relations. Moreover, some of its components are breeding grounds for bureaucracy and deformations. These reproduce the people who hamper innovation.

The nature of political reforms under socialism is always the same: to hand over a greater proportion of power and management functions to society, to make the masses the chief protagonist, and to ensure effective control of political organs by the people. In this we see the main instrument against bureaucracy, self-seeking personal and group interests, and the usurpation of power.

Attempts at such reforms have been made more than once (remember, for instance, Khrushchev's times), but they all became bogged down or perished under the weight of bureaucracy. It would, however, be simplistic to see the cause of the failure of these attempts solely in the reluctance of a powerful stratum of managers to give ground. Is society always ready to take on additional political responsibility? Not always. This, too, is a safeguard for bureaucracy. There is a different trend today. The democratization process that has begun is changing public awareness; people are gaining confidence in their own resources. Ordinary people are ready to exercise power in the people's interests. It all comes down to a simple dilemma: Either society finds the strength to establish self-management principles, or we will remain fated to accuse and repent, repent and accuse.

All-round democratization—how can it be achieved? Ask me an easier one. But to delay in answering this question is to give the bureaucrats time once again to gather their forces and prepare an all-around defense. Even without that, the real progress in democratization is not great. We are only setting modest goals: to extend the masses' participation in discussing or adopting decisions that have already been prepared (and not by them, but by professionals). This interpretation is limited and narrow, and a distrust in the working people's potential can be glimpsed behind it. Nor can any particular progress be perceived in the democratization of relations within public organizations. Political activeness is currently developing usually aside from, and sometimes in spite of, accepted norms and prescriptions, outside the official structures.

In a word, there is an urgent need to renew both the concept of democracy and the mechanisms that govern it. Democracy is the quest for alternatives; it is freedom of choice. Here again, the dilemma is simple: either freedom of choice, or a monopoly in obtaining information and preparing and evaluating decisions. The solution could be the submission of numerous different versions of decisions and their open discussion. Any public organization and any citizen should have the right to submit its draft proposal on any question of state life.

Such experience already exists. In Hungary and Poland, for instance, recommendations are put forward by groups of independent experts within the framework of people's fronts and public organizations, to act as alternatives to the proposals of government organs. This open form of debate promotes the quest for the optimum state decisions; the fact that discussion takes place publicly, with the participation of the mass media, confirms the far from formal participation of public opinion in the decisions adopted. And the top organs of power do not become arrogant and attempt to show that the "dilettantes" have no right to interfere in their affairs.

At one time, we considered the mass approach to be our strong point. Even now it often appears that democracy must necessarily involve a large number of people, that everyone should take part in measures, "acting as one." But here we try to disregard the fact that the mass approach engenders indifference and creates the possibility of fooling individuals and leveling them down. I think the time for action has come for individual social groups, too, to create conditions ensuring that each of them has the opportunity to speak out and be heard.

The problem of the individual and of ensuring his safety is also becoming increasingly acute. Only fearless people can carry out major, profound reforms in political life. But how can fearlessness exist, if the citizen is not sure that he will not be persecuted for openly expressing his opinion? It is not only a question of militia or judicial prosecution, but even of ordinary dismissal for criticism, which is, alas, not as rare as all that. The political

mechanism that has hitherto existed is not always effective here. That is why the socialist countries have begun to seek new forms of defending the citizen's interests, first and foremost, against encroachments by bureaucratic forces. In Poland and Yugoslavia, the institution of "public defenders" has been set up. Let me recall that a law has come into force in our country, too, aimed at protecting the individual against departmental zeal. But how can it be made to work? At the moment, this question is hanging in the air. And that being so, guarantees of the individual's safety are also vague.

Democratism is also determined by the work of the representative system. In our country, this system has largely lost the role of organ of people's power. In the localities, the soviets are not infrequently appendages, so to speak, of the party bodies and their own ispolkom apparatus. Therefore, giving power back to the soviets is by no means a demagogic slogan but an urgent demand of the time.

Since we are talking about the soviets, we cannot ignore the electoral system. This, too, needs reform. Experiments during the last elections showed, as participants in the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA roundtable rightly pointed out, that it is not only a question of how many candidates to nominate but also of how to nominate them. It is more important to create conditions for competition between the candidates and their programs. Organizations, collectives, and individual citizens should have the right of free, unrestricted nomination of candidates. Candidates, in turn, should have equal rights to propagandize and defend their programs. A number of fraternal countries are embarking on this path. Thus, at the recent elections in Hungary, about one-third of the candidates nominated spontaneously became deputies of the National Assembly.

An organ of power cannot be influential if its role is that of a beggar with hand outstretched. It must have financial and economic independence. What could we usefully learn from other countries in this respect? As yet, here, too, there is only endeavor. Organs of power have been granted the right to create their own enterprises and use local loans. Local industry is handed over to them, and their potential for coordinating the activity of enterprises under central jurisdiction is increasing. That is, internal sources of finance are being extended, but at the same time the allocation of resources from general funds is being reduced.

Ideally, elected organs should be the place where various proposals and opinions would meet, and the best substantiated, most socially significant program would prevail. As yet the sessions of many soviets are routine events to approve this or that action by the ispolkom (not infrequently even if it is contrary to the population's interests). It is time to establish the clear relationship that LITERATURNAYA GAZETA wrote of 2 years ago: The deputy is the servant of the people, and the ispolkom is the servant of the deputy. It is high time representative

power was separated from executive and judicial power. Democratic thought has yet to find another means of preventing the dominance of administrative and executive organs.

Thus, our goal is a self-managing society. But what self-management is, is also not very clear. Some people try to show that it is the same as democracy. Others reduce self-management to the activity of the state or public organizations. All kinds of questions arise. Does not this block the path to the transfer of power to the working people themselves? To what extent will we ourselves, without the help of professionals, be able to govern? Do we have the skill, the knowledge? What should remain within the competence of the apparatus, and what should be decided by the masses? How can democracy be combined with centralism?

The introduction of self-management requires the restructuring of all social mechanisms. Here is one problem that has already arisen: How do we delimit the functions of trade unions and self-management organs? After all, if a collective becomes the master of the enterprise, against whom should the trade union defend it? At the same time, if the need for that exists, it means there is no real self-management.

Let us not construct illusions. Self-management has its contradictions. It can be bureaucratized; it can degenerate into self-will. The collective decision is not always the optimum one; it can be conservative. It is worth listening to the fears expressed by the Hungarians and Poles that the expansion of self-management threatens to intensify consumerism. Finally, how can self-management be combined with the quest for economic efficiency? This is not only a complex problem; it is a crucial one. As yet no country, to my knowledge, has found an acceptable solution. Society, every one of us, still has to learn autonomy, and here errors are inevitable. But you can only learn to swim by going into the water.

What we hoped for, and nevertheless did not expect, even in our wildest dreams, is pluralism. It has finally been acknowledged that we have the right to that, too. We have acquired rights, along with a whole ocean of problems. For instance, how do we orient ourselves among the diversity of opinions, views, and ideas that the press is full of? What is pluralism in the context of a one-party system?

Much here depends on whether we manage to give up the illusion that socialist development can be free from conflict. After all, pluralism is not only the clash of ideas but also of the people who put forward those ideas. Yes, a clash can often lead to conflict. That is frightening. But surely "unanimous approval" is worse?

To acknowledge pluralism means to widen civic opportunities for the minority too, that is, for people with a non-Marxist outlook and religious believers. Nor must it be forgotten that not everyone who wants to be involved

in politics can join the ranks of the Communist Party. Thought should be given in general to the question: Do we have sufficient organizational opportunities for creative activity, for the benefit of socialism, by nonparty people?

In the main, there is a perceptible need in society for free, informal associations, movements, and special-interest clubs. These may spring up, die out, compete with one another. In the fraternal countries, they are already thinking about a mechanism to govern their status. In our country, too, the problem of "incorporating" informal groups in our life has arisen.

The dynamic of social reforms is largely determined by the party. But if the renewal of socialism is to become irreversible, the party itself must also be restructured.

How do I see the essence of the innovations? First and foremost, the broad democratization of intraparty relations and intensification of control by the party grass roots over the activity of the leadership. The question naturally arises: By what means? I know that in the fraternal countries, it is proposed to change the procedure for the election of leadership organs, to make senior officials of the Central Committee accountable to the party organizations of enterprises, to hold monthly local reports by leadership figures.... But however things stand there, many people believe that the level of democratism so far achieved is insufficient. There should be more dialectics in the activity of party committees and organizations, that activity should reflect social contradictions and struggle.

The very position of the ruling party creates a danger of being cut off from the masses and generates the desire to dictate. It is, therefore, worth thinking about firmer guarantees against the deformation of its leading role. One such guarantee could be a constitutional limitation on any aspirations to omnipotence. Another could be the implementation of Lenin's idea of control over Communists by nonparty people. The idea that exists in a number of countries of party "self-opposition," that is, that the party would have the opportunity and ability critically to assess its own activity.

What is the new image of the party that is taking shape? The idea of the party not as an official department but as an organization with elements of self-management is clearly consonant with the aspirations of present-day society. It is necessary to lessen excessive professionalism and remove unnecessary organizational components, which only block links between the "top" and "bottom" of the party. The main condition of vitality for the party lies in its renunciation of petty interference in life and the tendency to take the place of other institutions and in the delimitation of its own functions and state functions (at the February plenum of the Central Committee, M.S. Gorbachev called this a fundamental question of the reform of the political system).

Attempts to make progress in this direction have been made repeatedly, but they have not produced results. Today, in conditions of restructuring, in my opinion, we need more resolute steps—a change in the structure of the party apparatus and the elimination of its duplicated components. Hungary, Poland, and China have already taken this path. It is a question of the party bodies renouncing interference in day-to-day management, of finding more flexible, indirect forms of party control of state activity, and to the same extent, of strengthening the moral authority of party organizations, so that they can more easily and naturally reject directives and pressure.

Perhaps these are, for the time being, slogans, for the most part. But we cannot continue to ignore the logic of the development of our political life. We must not be afraid to name the problems that really exist. We must not sweep them under the carpet "until a better time." We cannot live in hope of life-saving ideas from someone else.

#### **Reader Demands Sweeping Reform of CPSU Apparatus Structure**

*PM020915 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA  
in Russian 28 Apr 88 p 1*

[Letter from A. Muranov, first secretary of the Iskitim CPSU Gorkom, under the rubric "19th All-Union Conference: I Submit for Discussion!": "Authority Instead of Authoritarianism"—boldface as published]

[Text] In his last letters, Lenin addressed the topic of internal party building, speaking of the need to improve the party apparatus and its ties with the masses, to protect it from the influence of "purely personal and chance circumstances."

While exposing and overcoming the personality cult within the party, we have, unfortunately, still not profoundly interpreted all its consequences which still affect the practice of our party life, and in particular the "tenacious" system of replacing political leadership by edict methods. So far, there has been nothing but media noise about the deeds of the personality cult. Social science is in no hurry to comprehensively analyze Stalin's "legacy" and accurately position its theoretical accents. And yet **practice is forcing us to embark on the demolition of tenacious stereotypes which run contrary to life itself. What is needed here is the boldness to lay hands on established party practices.**

For 2 years now we have been working to ensure that the party apparatus actually strives to fulfill the gorkom's decisions and gives the elected aktiv assistance in fulfilling its functions and fulfilling them more than just formally. To get away from constantly supplanting soviet and economic organs and to focus all energy on practical

assistance to party links in labor collectives, we strove to take a fresh look at the functions of the apparatus itself, functions which are constrained by its structure.

We are being carefully watched from the sidelines by the party obkom which reacts with no enthusiasm to our quests. Its stance is easily explained: Paragraph 23 of the CPSU Statute says unambiguously: "The structure and staff of the party apparatus are determined by the CPSU Central Committee." Thus, at the first stage of our transformations, we are acting within the framework of the existing table of organization and staff structure. Within this framework, we risked only to review the traditional allocation of duties: We abolished the Organizational Department and divided its functions among all the other departments. But the more political meaning we give to our work, the more it contradicts the formalities. The implacable law of dialectics demands action from us.

While interpreting the experience of party building which started accumulating during the first years of peace under Lenin and comparing it against the tasks of our restructuring, we must answer this question: Why is it that even today "the two wheels are not turning simultaneously?" Lenin answered it thus at the 10th Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Congress: "We have developed an incorrect relationship between the party and the soviet institutions." We would be going away from Lenin's approaches toward the solution of the problem by concluding that only an organizational restructuring of the party gorkom from within will make it possible to remove its tutelage of soviets and make soviets the sole organs of power at local level.

The new apparatus model which we propose does away with the offices of first, second, and third secretary. Only one secretary is left to lead three departments: Primary Organizations in All National Economic Spheres, Propaganda, and General. The party apparatus, thus reduced to one-third of its former size, will deal with political work and cadres through direct contacts with primary organizations. Energetic daily practice will enable the apparatus to achieve high quality standards in preparing questions for examination by plenums and bureau sessions. Acting as two-way conductors, the apparatchiks will not only notify primary party organizations of any decisions that have been adopted but will also organize and monitor their execution.

It is also necessary to review in light of democratization the traditional structure of gorkom bureaus which, in addition to leaders of soviet, party, and economic organs, should recruit at least one-half of their members from ordinary workers in different spheres who are capable of doing political work and are known as such among Communists. We will thus be in a position to abandon the prevailing practice whereby leaders monitor not only the party organization's work but also their own work, and to ensure effective monitoring of the gorkom apparatus' work from below.

The proposed structure of the apparatus and of the gorkom and its bureau boosts the role of the plenum as an organ of collective leadership and enhances the accountability of the apparatus and of the bureau to the plenum. Under this model, in particular, the party newspaper will move away from the subjectivist influence of apparatus officials and will regain its position as the press organ of the entire party committee. Its editor will be personally responsible to the gorkom plenum.

We in Iskitim have already adopted the practice whereby the first secretary only opens plenum sessions which are actually chaired by ordinary gorkom members.

It seems to us that **such a disposition of forces will make it possible to boost the authority of collective leadership and will rule out any chance of party command.** Even though we took a chance and ran a risk by embarking on a redistribution of functions within the apparatus, we are convinced that **life also dictates a radical change of its structure.** Frankly speaking, we were afraid that our ideas might appear as harebrained schemes. But an all-union symposium on the social and philosophical problems of restructuring was held a few days ago, organized by the Academy of Social Sciences at the Novosibirsk Higher Party School. It appeared that the experience described by gorkom and raykom secretaries runs along the same lines as our own experience in Iskitim. This experience confirms the persistent need for changes in party committees at rayon, city, and oblast level. **Their sectorial structure and the clamps of old structural forms apply the brakes on initiatives for work in the new fashion.** Yu. Serkov, first secretary of the Kolchuginskiy CPSU Raykom in the city of Leninsk-Kuznetskiy, and A. Barzykin, secretary of Irkutsk's Sverdlovskiy CPSU Raykom, spoke in ardent terms about this at the plenum. I join them in expressing this hope: We are impatiently awaiting the 19th party conference and hope that our approaches and endeavors will be reflected at this major consultation of Communists. After all, **we all must together and immediately solve a most important question: What are the ways to democratize and restructure life in our own party home?**

A. Muranov, first secretary of the Iskitim Party Gorkom, Novosibirsk Oblast

**Reader Requests Change in 'Multi-Tier' Elections**  
*PM290759 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA*  
*in Russian 28 Apr 88 p 1*

[Letter from O. Andreyev under the rubric "19th All-Union Conference: I Submit for Discussion!": "How To Elect a Secretary"—boldface as published]

[Text] I deem it of fundamental importance to resolve the question of the procedure for electing leading party workers.

Electability in primary party organizations must be freed from the two-tier system, which is unnecessary in today's conditions, with all Communists electing the party committee or bureau, and then only the members of that organ electing the secretary and his deputy. More scope must be given to Communists to express their will, and they must be given the right to elect the party leader themselves.

Under conditions of the sociopolitical unity of the Soviet people and the strengthening unity of the party and the people, a multi-tier system for electing leading party organs is hardly expedient. For example, we have a six-tier, and in some regions even an eight-tier election system. Rank-and-file Communists and the CPSU Central Committee Politburo are separated by six or eight tiers of elections of delegates and electors.

It would be fair to give every Communist, and not just party committee members, the right to express his attitude by voting for candidates for the position of party obkom, gorkom, and raykom secretaries. The procedure and mechanics of voting could be worked out through a series of experimental elections. Meetings could be held with a standard agenda—"On Elections of CPSU Obkom, Gorkom, or Raykom Secretaries (including First Secretary)"—in all party organizations in a rayon, city, or oblast.

This approach to forming elected organs would be more democratic and would help a fuller expression of the will of party masses. The situation at present is such that a Communist takes no part even in elections for CPSU raykom secretaries, cannot actually influence the election of a leader, but must follow his instructions.

For the same purpose, it would be fairer to hold elections for Central Committee secretaries and the Politburo simultaneously with the election of the CPSU Central Committee by all congress delegates. I think that such elections would help the conscious strengthening of the unity and cohesion of party ranks under the leadership of authoritative leaders at the head of the CPSU.

I also support the opinion that the CPSU Statutes must include a provision limiting the tenure of Communists in leading party positions to two or three elected terms.

And one more proposal. To establish genuine democracy in the party, every CPSU member must be given the right not only to challenge and criticize but also to nominate candidates.

In conclusion, I submit a proposal concerning the need for most critical review of instructions from the CPSU Central Committee (and also from the AUCCTU and the Komsomol Central Committee) on the election of leadership organs. These instructions are formal and bureaucratic and do not encourage the influx of new people. Such draft new instructions must without fail be submitted for all-party discussion.

O. Andreyev, Murmansk

**Representation Must Truly Reflect People's Will**  
*PM0305105388 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian*  
*29 Apr 88 Morning Edition p 3*

[Article by Yuriy Burtin under the rubric "19th Party Conference: Restructuring Tasks": "Freedom of Choice. Concerning Guarantees of Genuine People's Power"]

[Text] It has been said over and over, everyone has heard it and, seemingly, accepted it: The essential purpose of the restructuring that is under way is to democratize all aspects of society's life and to profoundly and consistently transform in a democratic fashion the whole of the current political system. In my view, changing the procedure for nominating candidate deputies for soviets is by no means an insignificant element in this.

There have been several items in the press recently about the need for substantial changes in our election procedure. A specific proposal has been made: To have more than one candidate on the ballot. It has not only been proposed, but it was partly implemented at the recent local soviet elections (as an experiment, in some electoral okrugs) and even in the Soviet of Nationalities elections in one okrug in Voroshilovgrad Oblast. All this is fine, of course. But one could also say that the aforementioned measures will not have achieved anything if the procedure for nominating candidates is not changed.

Let me cite a personal memory from a long time ago.

It happened exactly 30 years ago. At the USSR Supreme Soviet elections in 1958 my teacher colleagues at the young workers' railroad school in the city of Buy, Kostroma Oblast and I decide to put forward our own candidate. We did it at a general meeting of teachers and students, organized on instructions from the gorkom to second the candidates who had been nominated. There were two of them. The first was RSFSR Council of Ministers Chairman F.R. Kozlov—a candidate in the "honorary" category, those who are deliberately withdrawn at the final stage of the election campaign in all of the numerous okrugs where they have been nominated, except for the one in which it has been decided in advance they will run. The second, the real candidate, was S.F. Milevskiy, chairman of a Buy Kolkhoz (he was rapidly becoming at leading light at the time). Having seconded both the candidates, we also proposed our own—Aleksandr Trifonovich Tvardovskiy. And, despite opposition from the school administration, we managed to obtain a majority of votes for the proposal and get it recorded in the minutes as the resolution of the voters' meeting.

I will omit the details, many of them highly picturesque. The tumultuous meeting itself, which voted out the chairman of the meeting (the school director!), who at first refused to put our proposal to a vote and then tried to declare the majority a minority and opposed a count.

The marked atmosphere of animation in the city, the exhilaration, with the city authorities in disarray, not knowing at all how to behave in such a situation—particularly 2 years after the 20th Congress, which had made the old, simple solutions more complicated. The new meeting with students 2 weeks later, lasting well beyond midnight, attended by three party obkom workers, the second secretary making a speech and declaring the results of the previous meeting void. And yet another meeting (that same night, but nearer morning, narrowed down to the school party organization, but with the same important guests attending again), which adopted "organizational conclusions" in respect of the "firebrands."

There were many curious details, but the lesson is more important, the lesson those involved in the story learned from it: The right of initiative at elections, the right to nominate candidate deputies was someone else's, not theirs.

Precisely whose was explained in detail to me the day after the aforementioned meeting by the obkom second secretary. What he said was more or less as follows:

"You must appreciate, dear comrade, that nominations are organized, that there is a precise procedure for it. What is it? Here it is. Before the election campaign has even been announced we receive the schedule. Since it is established what the composition of the Supreme Soviet will be, what percentage of workers and employees, how many women, and so forth, we are told: You have four okrugs. Your first secretary will run in one, you will put forward candidates for the others. In your industry the emphasis is on textiles, so there should be a female textile worker. And since the oblast is basically agricultural, it would be desirable to have one kolkhoz chairman, a party member, and one ordinary female kolkhoz member. We send the schedule out to the rayons and tell them: Prepare specific proposals. When we get the proposals we examine them and send the list to the superior authorities and they approve it and send it back to us... A big, complex business, as you can see, whereas you just went ahead and made a nomination. If you had consulted the gorkom you would have been told: There is a procedure. Independent action is not necessary..."

I thanked my interlocutor. But I remained convinced that independent action was not only necessary, it was absolutely essential. It is not in vain that "independent action" and "democracy" are inseparable concepts in the language of sociology. If there is no "independent action" there are no elections, because what my interlocutor described was in fact not election, but appointment. An appointment made official at the final stage by the voting procedure—with the outcome totally predetermined.

But the way in which soviets are formed demonstrates their quality—it is a direct and clear relationship. If our candidate deputy knows, not just before the voting but before the election campaign has even started, that he is



certain to be elected, then to whom, one wonders, is he going to feel grateful, to whom is he going to feel a sense of responsibility? To his electorate or to those to whom he really owes the honor of being elected? It is scarcely necessary to say that soviets formed in this manner cannot be independent. In such circumstances they can be what they like—a means of administration, an instrument of authority, but not authority itself.

But if today we seriously want to democratize our political system, we cannot and we must not continue to play this game—nominating candidates in accordance with a list that someone has drawn up and approved in advance.

What could hamper the changes? I believe there is absolutely nothing, aside from the commitment of the conservative, bureaucratic part of the apparatus to preserve its own status, aside from the social self-interest of the forces of retardation. There can be no doubt that those forces will find arguments for the inviolable and sacred status quo. For instance, those that were adduced in 1958. Therefore, they should be examined in some detail. Especially as there are probably many people who perfectly sincerely regard such arguments as persuasive.

Argument number one: The party's leading role in Soviet society is embodied in the existing procedure for forming soviets. The abandonment of this procedure, permitting the voters themselves to take the initiative in this matter, would contradict this role. This is what was said, for example, by our Buy and Kostroma opponents, and one can hear the same things even now.

But why should the party's role at elections be expressed in behind-the-scenes, armchair operations that anticipate and effectively replace the free expression of the people's will? Perhaps it should be just the opposite—perhaps the party's leading role is to ensure that their will is expressed as fully as possible and to unleash and encourage the masses' creative initiative? State the question in that way and the justification of an undemocratic procedure for the formation of soviets with reference to the CPSU's leading role falls apart. It becomes perfectly obvious that both the justification and the procedure itself, which has turned elections into a mere formality, are indisputable and immutable only from the viewpoint of the system of relationships which is itself, in its entirety, now being disputed by us and being eradicated by restructuring.

Argument number two: The existing nominating procedure ensures the optimal composition of soviets and the election to them of the people who should be there.

What can one say about this? Number one: To judge whether it is optimal or not, first of all one has to know exactly what the reality is. The composition of the present (11th) convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet

can give an idea of this. Especially as, having been elected before restructuring began, it is in this sense no different from many of its predecessors.

Who, then, were the 1,499 deputies who made up the country's supreme legislative body on 4 March 1984 (all the data are cited for that date; the grouping and figures are mine—Yu. Burtin).

First of all, note that certain categories of officials are represented in their entirety, no selection having been made. This applies not only to party and government leaders (CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat, 23 people in all), but also to a number of other categories. Including first and second secretaries of union republic Communist Party Central committees (24—not counting those in the first category), chiefs and first deputy chiefs of CPSU Central Committee departments (19), party kraykom and obkom first secretaries (157), USSR Council of Ministers deputy chairmen (12), USSR ministers (78), USSR deputy defense ministers, commanders of branches of the army, groups of forces, military districts, and fleets and other top military commanders (53), chairman of union republics' Supreme Soviet Presidiums (14), chairmen and first deputy chairmen of union republics' Councils of Ministers (27), deputy chairmen of the USSR KGB and chairmen of republic KGB's (16), vice presidents of the USSR Academy of Sciences and presidents of union republics' Academies of Sciences (17), the top leaders of the AUCCTU and republic councils of trade unions (15) and of creative unions, and a number of other state and public organizations and institutions. The total number of deputies whose leading posts predetermined their election to the USSR Supreme Soviet is, according to my count, 565. And one should perhaps add to them the leaders of certain giant industrial enterprises such as the Likhachev Truck Plant and "Uralmash," major shipping lines, and so forth, and also the president of the Academy of Medical Sciences, directors of the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism, the Joint Institute of Nuclear Research, and so forth—20 people in all. This group of deputies (coincident, with few exceptions, with the aggregate membership of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission) totals 585 people, or 39 percent of the Supreme Soviet deputies.

How are the remaining 61 percent distributed? There is a definite preponderance of manual or predominantly manual working people—rank and file (inclusive of team leaders and so on) workers, kolkhoz members, and employees: 688, or 46 percent of the total. Of whom 514 are workers (including 150 employed in agriculture), 159 are kolkhoz members, and 15 are employees (sales clerks, telegraph operators, and so forth). This group contains a particularly large number of women—435 out of 688, that is, 63 percent, in contrast to the first group, in which there are only 6 (1 percent); thus there is a very favorable overall percentage of women in the supreme body of state power.



Some 226 deputies' seats, or 15 percent, are left for working people in the intellectual sphere who are not among the "ex officio deputies." Despite their relatively small number, they are the most heterogeneous group. One part (63 people, of whom 43 are women) is made up of rank and file or near rank and file (inclusive of school director and so forth) teachers (15), doctors (15), agronomists and animal specialists (11), engineers (5), and so forth. Another is made up of leading workers of lower and middle rank: kolkhoz chairmen (56), sovkhoz directors (9), directors of industrial enterprises (13), leaders of scientific research institutions and VUZ's (6), party (3) and soviet (2) workers, and so forth; approximately 110 people in all. A third group is composed of those whose official status puts them within close reach of the top bracket (perhaps, in fact, placing them in it, since the dividing line is somewhat hypothetical): chief designers of the Ministry of the Aviation Industry (5), general directors and directors of certain well-known, nationally important enterprises and so on—26 people in all. Finally, a fourth category, comprising prominent representatives of the scientific and creative intelligentsia: scientists (mainly in the sphere of physical and technical sciences), writers, musicians, and so forth, whose official posts, although probably taken into account, evidently did not play the decisive role in their nomination as Supreme Soviet candidate deputies—27 people in all.

That is the breakdown. From what viewpoint can it be considered optimal? From the viewpoint of proportional representation in the Supreme Soviet with regard to the different social strata and professional groups in the population? Can one talk of proportionality when all the members of a particular category of officials are there, constituting nearly 40 percent of the overall number of deputies?

Incidentally, this is not peculiar to the country's paramount soviet. For example, one would find in the rayon soviet all the personnel in the rayon component of the party and state apparatus occupying a particular range of posts—from raykom first secretary to raykom and rayispolkom department chiefs. The same goes for the oblast soviet and the republic Supreme Soviet—with a corresponding elevation of the rank and widening of the range of "ex officio deputies."

The bias in favor of top officials has to be corrected by a similar bias in the opposite direction—the disproportionately wide representation of "rank and file" workers, with the obvious erosion of the "middle strata," which becomes increasingly marked the higher the soviet's status. Predominant here are either the top leaders of departments and organizations or, on the other hand, garment workers (16), female weavers (19), female kolkhoz members (106)...

But if there is no question of any proportionality here, by what criteria should the existing composition of soviets be regarded as optimal? By the degree of competence of the deputies when it comes to solving the problems of

state and society? In light of the data that have been cited, there is not much justification for this, either. No one is going to attempt to give a clear explanation why, in conditions that rule out any "independent" and "spontaneous" action, there are 19 female weavers, for example, in the country's supreme legislative body, but only two lawyers "ex officio": the justice minister and the USSR general prosecutor. So, perhaps, the criterion is the ability to make independent decisions, striking civic energy, firmness, and uncompromising and independent defense of the public interest? This is another hypothesis that scarcely merits serious discussion—it is sufficient to leaf through the record of any session of any convocation with identical votes on all items on the agenda: "Those for? Please put your hands down. Those against? None. Any abstentions? None. Passed unanimously."

So, if there is anything good about the composition of the soviets, constituted by the methods described above, it is only their modesty, efficiency, feeling of being subordinate—in short, their governability. Not insignificant merits, of course, but from what viewpoint? From the viewpoint that accepts as normal and legitimate a "situation where it is not the ispolkom that comes under the soviet, but the soviet that comes under the ispolkom," where the "soviet is a kind of semi-official body which essentially decides nothing": "Everything is essentially decided by the ispolkom, while at sessions the deputies merely raise their hands" (IZVESTIYA, 20 March 1988). From the viewpoint of the bureaucrat who has long been accustomed to regarding soviets not as the "power of the people," something he trots out when the occasion demands, but as the instrument of his own unbridled power.

Finally, argument number three—the reference to difficulties of, so to speak, a practical organizational nature. What would happen, they say, if every plant, kolkhoz or school started putting up its own candidates without any authorization? Pandemonium! Chaos! Dozens of names on one ballot to the total bewilderment and confusion of the unfortunate voter!

No need to panic, no reason at all. Not "everyone" would nominate a candidate, and only those who have a real chance of victory would be nominated. But even if there are too many of them, that does not matter. There would be an election campaign (which in that case would cease to be a formality), with election canvassing, candidates' speeches, articles in the press, and appearances on television—it could be a very visual experience; there are well-honed democratic procedures for preliminary selection of candidates, for whittling the list down to two or three candidates for one deputy's seat. There is the experience of a number of socialist countries in which party and state leaders appear on a combined ballot. Good heavens, we are not the only country in the world with a system of elective organs of power; they now operate nearly everywhere. If the whole world can cope with the difficulties somehow, we also can cope with them—if we so wish.

Of course, for the bureaucrat the present system is more convenient and simpler in every respect. But if one thinks seriously about democratization and if one sees the soviets as indeed the power of the people, from that viewpoint there is no justification for the existing procedure for nominating candidates. After all, what we need in soviets is not a set combination of "bosses" and "bossed," but public figures. People who are thus described not by virtue of their posts or their production indicators, but because of their mentality and temperament. One such was Tvardovskiy whom the Buy teachers and railroad workers had good reason for wanting as their candidate. There are such people today in all strata of society, and the people know them. There is no need to be too concerned about ensuring always that a particular percentage of workers, kolkhoz members, women, and so forth is elected. There is no point in trying to make real life fit a prearranged scheme. If a soviet, even the Supreme Soviet, suddenly finds itself without a single milkmaid or weaver, and, let's say, only 10 or 20 of the obkom first secretaries have been elected, what is terrible about that? And if the combative economists, historians, publicists, writers, directors, and actors who are popular at the moment come in and fill the spaces, is the cause going to suffer as a result? Quite the contrary. We have had enough resolutions and laws "passed unanimously" (and then amended or repealed unanimously again). No more of that false show, constantly wondering what others will say about us, in which case, very likely, they will say OK. Our tasks are too great and the situation is too serious for us to continue to amuse ourselves with a kind of system of overreporting in the democracy sphere. The only optimal option is the truth.

I do not like references to authorities. They are morally permissible only when there is the opportunity to publicly voice one's disagreement with them. But I am bound to cite some words that were pronounced in our press for the first time in many decades:

"In a sense we are talking today about the need for the rebirth of the power of the soviets as Lenin understood it. It is necessary to make soviets at all levels real functioning, enterprising, authoritative centers of state power and administration. Obviously, this will require a better perception of how soviets should be formed. Consequently, it is necessary to improve our electoral system so that the process of the formation of organs of power ensures the active involvement of the people and the careful selection of people capable of ensuring that the soviets operate in accordance with the tasks of restructuring" (M.S. Gorbachev. Speech at the 18 February 1988 CPSU Central Committee Plenum).

Precisely: For the soviets to be a living, functioning, and truly people's power, for them to be the engines of restructuring, they must be formed by the people themselves.

### Letter Calls for Radical Party Reforms

PM021745 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 May 88  
Second Edition pp 1, 3

[Letter by V. Selivanov, deputy chief of administration at the USSR Ministry of the Aviation Industry and CPSU member since 1972, under the rubric "From the Discussion Mailbag: Addressed to the 19th All-Union Party Conference": "About the Party's Strength and Authority"—boldface and italics as published]

[Text] My letter to PRAVDA is prompted by the fact that, in my view, the press—whether deliberately or not—frequently avoids or touches only superficially on the paramount issue of restructuring: The question of the party's main driving force, of its authority and consequently its strength.

"The party is the mind, honor, and conscience of our epoch." Unfortunately, these words spoken by V.I. Lenin about the Bolshevik Party cannot be applied to all members of our party at present.

Following the victory of the October Revolution the party became a ruling party, and it was actively infiltrated by elements alien to it driven by careerist considerations. In the most difficult of conditions created by civil war, the restoration of the economy, and the struggle for the foundations of socialism, the party was losing its best representatives: They were the first to die in battles, they worked without sparing their health and energy.

Aware of the threat of its ranks' being swollen by fellow-travelers and careerists, the party took steps to purge its ranks and waged an active struggle for unity and against splits. But with the passage of time, the struggle for party unity and stability of the current leadership evolved into a struggle for unity and stability at any price, against any other opinion but the general secretary's opinion.

It was more convenient to do this by proclaiming an exacerbation of the class struggle and implanting myths about "spies" and mass "wrecking"—conditions allegedly "forcing" the imposition of secrecy on information and on the plans of the party and the country to protect them from the enemy and, to be on the safe side, from our own people.

The method of "label-tagging struggle" flourished in these conditions. Proclamations were made: This one is an enemy of the people, that one is a deviationist (left-wing or right-wing). There was active implantation of the idea that every party member is a soldier of the party, that it is up to the Central Committee leadership to lay down the line and to define what is correct and what is incorrect. The job of rank-and-file Communists was to unanimously approve and execute decisions. The opinion was implanted that the general secretary was always right and his words represented the ultimate

truth, and therefore there was no need for any study of or research into social affairs. The only necessary thing was to correctly quote the leader.

K. Marx' thesis "Question everything" became dangerous. The sad experience of the best party members during the period of mass repressions in the thirties showed that attempts to question the correctness of I.V. Stalin were dangerous not only personally for those asking questions but also for their families. People were forced to profess a dual morality: one for the world in general, another for themselves and their very close friends.

Stalin's replacements—N.S. Khrushchev, and later L.I. Brezhnev—were unwilling to give up the power concentrated in their hands. The prevailing, stable system suited them perfectly. But the stability of the command system started applying the brakes to economic development. Enterprises functioned not on the basis of direct ties but in conditions of rigid centralization coupled with a vast growth of the range of articles produced, and this gave rise to a mass of parasitical organs. There were fewer and fewer producing bodies, against the steadily growing number of leadership, monitoring, coordinating, and pseudoscientific organs.

Ambitious "projects" were created, the people's money was wasted by the billions, but by the time of commissioning nobody was interested in the effectiveness of such expenditures because the next "project of the century" was already under way.

Essentially, the "rudimentary" reforms of the sixties produced nothing apart from confidence in the unlimited stability and durability of the system. Any hopes and illusions for renewal rapidly dispersed.

And what was the result? It was claimed that, since life was proving for the umpteenth time that, despite all good intentions, it cannot be built so as to be good for everyone, then let every man look after himself. Careerism, individualism, self-seeking, impunity, and drunkenness flourished lavishly and came out in the open. They overshadowed the communist revolutionary ideals. Career, awards, benefits, special services, proper connections, and a position among the leadership or distribution elite became the goals of a series of party members and their families. Clearly realizing this, they continued to utter from rostrums the lies they had learned by heart while ignoring the realities of life.

In the conditions of unanimous elections planned from above, the absence of leaders' removability or accountability to voters, and the absence of freedom of criticism it became possible for officials from the party, soviet, and state apparatus to fuse with workers in the trade network, law enforcement organs, and even criminals. Criminal clans like Odilov's were being created.

Arrogance, incompetence, and bribery—the enemies of socialism of which V.I. Lenin spoke with bitterness and misgiving—became widespread. The humiliation of working people struggling for justice and the absence of control over princelings who had overstepped the mark diminished many people's sense of their own dignity and made them lose their faith in justice. After all, our failures and errors are primarily the failures of our party and our Central Committee, of every party member.

**After all, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Chernobyl have their party organizations which knew of the impending disasters and kept silent. Why? Simply because some party leader perceived elected office as the next mandatory rung up the career ladder, knowing that careers depended on the bosses and relations with them must not be damaged. A triple morality became the rule: I say one thing at meetings, I think something else, and I do something differently from both of them.**

**The rule for a considerable number of party members was: Personal affairs to start with, then collective affairs (at enterprise or institution level), then at sector level, and only afterward, if nothing stood in the way, could there be any question of all-party and all-state affairs. And yet, almost everyone applying for admission to the party wrote: "I want to join the front ranks of fighters for communism."**

And what happened? As long as you attended party meetings, paid your membership dues, and asked no unnecessary questions, you could expect a quiet life and exemplary assessment reports and had a real chance of advancing in office. Mediocrity and noninvolvement started to predominate. Talent was dangerous! There was no point in envying Communists who strove to live in conformity with the Statutes or to adhere to the party Program. Communists who perceived the mistakes, criticized, suggested changes, and upheld state interests and justice. These people were disliked and feared by the leadership, and this is why even now people in some places would eagerly grasp the slightest pretext to get rid of them or to settle accounts with them. But they are also often enough disliked by the "collective," which still finds it more convenient to live in peace, without any noise (without commissions and inspections), while silently cursing its own bosses.

A large number of lovers of truth were galvanized into action by the CPSU Central Committee April (1985) Plenum and the 27th party congress. This was, of course, only a beginning.

The administrative edict system based on personal loyalty to the boss rather than to the cause, the system whereby "share depends on rank," the wage leveling, the constant shortage of goods, the ineffectiveness and sluggishness of the law toward thieves, parasites, and squanderers—all these did their terrible work: They implanted slavish respect for career, official standing,

and the elite, instituted disrespect for skilled, honest, conscientious, and creative labor, and rendered hack work in all its varieties a mass phenomenon.

The result of this system was that many workers had no pride in their job, speciality, or skill; enterprises had no pride in their brand name or the quality of their output, and everyone was up in arms against any upward revision of plans or orders. It was no longer a shame to work badly, and those who received unearned money were even envied. The standards of proper life declined, there were no criteria, there were few positive examples. It is not only a pity that our art has produced few positive heroes, it is a pity that few of them exist in real life while those that do exist have been so battered by life at times that nobody would wish to emulate them. So far there have been few people like Travkin, Ilizarov, and Fedorov. This is particularly bad when it comes to educating young people, because young people need them most of all.

For the time being—judging by brand name labels on young people's clothing and footwear, by sports equipment, and by television programs for young people—Western firms and Western "heroes" are streets ahead.

The Komsomol is in a difficult position. Its main misfortune is that it has copied the work of party organs. Therefore, almost all complaints against it can also be addressed to our party leadership.

Here is another question. Leaders who are not party members have been an extreme rarity. If you wanted to be in charge you had to join the party. Since leadership meant engineering and technical staff, while the percentage of workers in the party had to be maintained, demandingness toward workers applying to join the party declined: Just show willingness and you would become a member.

The party ranks and, we were assured, the "party influence" grew and grew to reach 19 million members. During the stagnation period in the seventies I heard it said that intellect, conscience, and party-mindedness were at times incompatible in these conditions. Indeed, many outstanding specialists turned down promotions to party work.

While in military aviation, I heard it said: "An intelligent instructor, excellent flier, good candidate for flight commander; the other man is a weakling but he is quiet and disciplined—he'll do as deputy commander for political work." I consider that the "apotheosis" of such work was the notorious order by Aviation Commander in Chief Kutakhov on deputy commanders for political work. Following a series of crashes for which they were to blame, the rules were changed: Deputy commanders for political matters were not to be appointed group leaders, they were not to be allowed to do any instruction work, and their flying duty was to be planned for the most favorable conditions. The joke then went: "What is the difference

between a commander and a deputy commander for political work? The commander says: 'Do as I do.' The deputy commander for political work says: 'Do as I tell you.'"

The selection of by no means the best specialists for party work, the divergence between words and action, the formalism in socialist competition, in drawing up personal plans, and in personal assessment reports, and mindless transcription of classics and study of issues "in light of decisions" were the norm of party life for a long time. Individual work with Communists was replaced by work with "the masses"—lectures, summaries, posters, and mainly reports on work done.

Life was not easy for party workers who strove to do their work honestly and to help people. They frequently had to engage in "double bookkeeping," with one set of books for actual work and another for reports, while the main point in these conditions was to set an example of conscientious service so that people would have faith in them regardless of all else.

Hypercentralization was another calamity. Essentially, it means weakness, inaction, and lack of will by party organs at the grass roots. What petty bosses feared most of all was to incur the anger of their superiors, whereas they had absolutely nothing to fear from their subordinates' disrespect. The mass of questions which consequently remained unresolved at local level periodically surfaced in letters to the Central Committee. It so happened, however, that you would demand a reply to your letter and you would be told: "We do not give written replies; people write too much."

You would complain to a Politburo member about the defects in intersector relations, and a reply would come from a section chief who would make no decision without the minister, just as the minister would make no decision without him. You would demand that a conference be convened to look into things—the conference would be convened but the questions would often be deliberately evaded. Moreover, commissions to investigate letters would more often than not include people who were the subject of criticism or their subordinates, with access to it refused to the complainant. Even in the period of restructuring, the actions by high-level organs display overtones of the old attitudes: Let's "close the file" by any means: The cause and progress can wait.

Briefly speaking, this is the same old officialdom sickness—fear for one's position, especially if it has been held for a long time. Someone would raise a question, and he would be asked: Why did he not take any steps earlier, why did he not report it, why did he not do something about it? The applicant would then be duped with empty promises.

Many shortcomings would come to light if we were to look at ideological work. The informal "Pamyat" association offers a good example of helplessness. The noise that the press has made! Yet Moscow has thousands of full-time

propaganda and agitation workers and countless deputies for ideological work.... Here is their field for action—speak, persuade people; but no, they are afraid! Once again, just as in the good old days, they complain and beg: "Do not allow," ban, close down. Some ideological workers are "strong" only with those who do not argue with them and, more often than not, do not even listen to them.

The paramount question of restructuring is the democratization of society, and it cannot be implemented without democratization of the party. What are we used to? We elect delegates to the rayon conference, that conference elects delegates to the next one up, and so on up to the congress and the Central Committee. Take the congress: Central Committee accountability report, debate, basic guidelines, resolution, notification of party organizations, unanimous approval. After this you hear it said: "The party decided," "the party announces," "the party solemnly proclaims." It is clearly necessary to say more precisely what was decided by the congress, what by the Central Committee, and what by the Politburo; as for saying that the party has decided something, this can evidently be done when the Central Committee accountability report and the proposals are distributed among party organizations, which discuss them, add something to them, and adopt them.

In this context, I would like the following proposals for enhancing the party's prestige to be discussed:

There must be certification of every Communist. For this purpose, labor collectives must widely discuss the work of Communists on fulfilling the party Program and Statutes and must use secret ballots to determine whether he deserves the right to be a CPSU member. To prevent this work sliding down the familiar path of exchanging party documents, Lenin's principle must be applied in life: Rather have 10 workers not being party members than 1 chatterbox as a party member. Even a noticeable reduction of the party's numerical strength would only enhance its authority. After all, 300,000 Bolsheviks were sufficient in October 1917! Just a few million proper Communists will be sufficient for restructuring. The procedure and time schedule for recertification of party members ought to be defined;

Party organizations which have committed serious mistakes in their work, or which have known about crimes but have failed to take measures to prevent them, should be disbanded by a Central Committee resolution and their members should undergo emergency recertification;

A recommendation must be made that the new edition of the Criminal Code should provide that party membership is a circumstance aggravating the guilt in the event of a premeditated breach of the law;

At least 200 workers and best specialists, winners of the all-union professional competition and nominated by meetings of major labor collectives, should be included in the Central Committee membership;

Changes should be introduced in the procedures for discussion of questions at meetings, conferences, and congresses. Information and basic guidelines should be initially made available in written form, they should then be discussed, and only then should there be a speech by a leader with a draft of the general decision or resolution. This will make it possible to expand initiative and reduce the pressure of authority;

Direct elections of raykom, gorkom, and obkom first secretaries by secret ballot should be introduced, and maximum limits should be set for the holding of elected office;

Electability should be introduced for editors of party newspapers and journals;

A mandatory minimum of signatures should be introduced for letters (addresses), without which a letter (address) cannot be published or examined by a party organ. Exclusion zones for criticism should be abolished everywhere;

Every Communist must be notified of all primary information about plenums, whether unclassified or classified. If a report is classified (secret), a declassification date for the document in question must be indicated. Information on the expenditure of party funds must be made available to Communists;

There should be discussion of the question of leaving a proportion of party dues at the disposal of primary party organizations (often there are no funds for posters or brochures, and I know of cases in which there has been no money and nobody to bury a Communist who lived alone);

There should be an increase in the apparatus of aides to the general secretary of the Central Committee for work with letters concerning the activity of the top leadership and monitoring organs and on the most important questions of state. In the work with letters, and in the event of a complaint being justified, a decision should be made to punish representatives of the body which should have made the decision but failed to do so, and this should be mandatorily publicized in the press.

I think that an open [glasnoye] discussion of these and a series of other questions will help to choose correct paths in party work, will enhance our party's authority, and will really boost its leading role in restructuring.

V. Selivanov, deputy chief of administration at the USSR Ministry of the Aviation Industry, CPSU member since 1972

Moscow

### Review of Komsomol Apparatus Structure Proposed

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in Russian 3 May 88 p 2

[Article by Vitaliy Abramov, editor of the Astrakhan newspaper KOMSOMOLETS KASPIYA: "I Want To Be One of the Characters in Perestroyka"]

[Text] It is not difficult to see that as the 19th All-Union Party Conference approaches passions are rising and the discussions in the press and at meetings, and when people simply just meet, are becoming sharper. And the questions being raised are of the utmost urgency. About the authority and role of the party. About restructuring the apparatus and cadre problems. About social and moral aspects and the life of society in this breakthrough period. And it seems at the very least strange that we, by which I mean the members of the Komsomol and the Komsomol aktiv, first and foremost the workers in the apparatus and the communists working in the Komsomol, are standing on the sidelines and actually taking no part in the great and principled debate that the party is conducting.

Just take the problem of internal party democracy. So many opinions being expressed while we remain silent. It is as if we have nothing to say about how to democratize in a radical way the activity of the youth league. Even though at the 20th Komsomol Congress M.S. Gorbachev had reason when he offered a rebuke for the fact that there was little discussion in the Komsomol; that it was only in the time before the congress that its life had been enriched with discussion. For discussion within the Komsomol is the main method for shaping political positions and a sense of civic duty.

That preconference discussion was somehow quickly dismissed. It ended with the congress. At the local level they probably "folded up" the best incentives. The congress, they said, has defined the directions of work, and now we must act, not talk! But even then we did not finish the debate. Many of us quickly understood that even if it were possible, it would be difficult to comply with the fine congress decisions in the old way.

The Komsomol Central Committee offers us examples of boldness, of the businesslike approach, of the antibureaucratic approach to problems. And it says: at the local level you define your own tactics yourselves. There cannot be ready-made recipes for every situation. That was the form. For the substance, open any edition of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and you immediately learn about an undertaking or some matter, large or small, that is being led by young people. The pages of the newspaper would be too small to hold the names of all the enthusiasts. But this is still a far cry from radical changes. As before, **the apparatus is formed and interacts and operates using the old ways.** This is obviously at variance with the new requirements.

This conclusion is drawn from my own observations and my personal work in the Komsomol. For even at our congress the following was stated: sometimes the impression is created that young people are moving down one side of the street while the Komsomol activists are moving along the other. Of course, I am not writing about this in order to expose some particular apologies for activists. In my opinion, before the 19th Party Conference it is very important to debate the **essential nature of our Komsomol apparatus**, first and foremost the costs involved in it. I am convinced that the costs involved in the formation and functioning of the apparatus are hampering development in the youth league, and on the broader scale, the entire generation that is destined to take up the baton of perestroyka. They are also hampering me personally. This is why I would like to examine the errors and flaws and the very existence of these very far from simple phenomena. Let me cite some examples in order to make my alarm more understandable.

*This happened about 3 years ago. A certain Shulpin, the former first secretary of one of the Astrakhan raykoms, killed for personal reasons a woman who also worked in the raykom. At that time I thought "a maniac, a crazy careerist," and decided that this murder had nothing to do with the Komsomol. But time passed and you begin to realize: well, perhaps it does concern the Komsomol, because it happened... Honest Komsomol members and communists, many of whom had previously investigated Shulpin, had tried to halt his advance first to the Komsomol and later the party "bridgeheads," but none had succeeded. This means that within our system we have no blocking device capable of stopping a person who has no moral inhibitions.*

I involuntarily think of this dreadful case every time I and other members of the Komsomol obkom buro are involved in cadre confirmation. How can you see how honest and principled a person is, how bold and able, by looking through several columns of figures? It is to be hoped that people come to the Komsomol with a sincere desire to help their comrades in a real way and not so as through their trust to scale first the Komsomol and then the party ladder.

They are torn with doubts. And I assure you that they are not idle doubts. When he comes into the Komsomol apparatus a person actually changes his profession. He casts aside what he has learned at the institute. Why does he do this? In order to be employed in the communist indoctrination of youth? But how does the person confirmed in a post in the Komsomol apparatus perceive the profession he mastered in the VUZ?—a mistake?; while work devoid of any professional pathway and all for indoctrination is a vocation?

When a person has talent as an organizer and when he is a youth leader these questions are removed. You can see this kind of person a mile off. This kind of person becomes a political figure without our confirmation in

the buro. He becomes such a person not now, but in the fifth or sixth grade. But what of the others? The others, unfortunately, are oriented not on youth but on somehow pleasing the senior comrades who nominate and confirm them. And this happens everywhere, from the primary organizations to the obkom. Let me cite some examples.

*Eighteen months ago our newspaper wrote about the worthless work of R. Kuramshin, secretary of the primary organization in the Caspian Nautical School. A brief account of his activity: he failed to show up in the Komsomol committee for weeks at a time and for an entire 10 months he did not pay his dues to the raykom at his own school. No one remembers him doing even the smallest amount of work. At the accountability-and-report meeting the Komsomol members evaluated Kuramshin's activity as "unsatisfactory." And what happened? The next day he started work in the Komsomol gorkom apparatus. The nomination of a person who had fallen down on his work in a primary organization was quite to the liking of the gorkom first secretary, who, incidentally, had been in attendance at the accountability-and-report meeting.*

At a recent party meeting of the obkom apparatus there was strong talk about the prospects for each of us. "What Are My Prospects?: this is the question that floats around in the Komsomol apparatus. And precisely because the worker in the apparatus is a person with a lost profession. It takes very little time for the full-time Komsomol worker to be transformed from a defender of the interest of youth into a defender of himself. He must find a place, and he looks for it, pushing everything else into second place.

*One of the first secretaries in the Komsomol Kamyzyakskiy raykom, Vladimir Zemskov, was transferred to work in the party raykom. Shortly before that the chief of the organizational department in the Komsomol obkom had come to him to conduct a check. This trip was not happenstance; somehow the ranks of the rayon organization had been rapidly thinned and it was hard to extract dues. And what was found out at the local level? The Komsomol members were often sincerely surprised when the obkom organizational chief asked them about Zemskov. They did not know him. The first secretary was considered to be a fellow who in fact was the second secretary. This was the picture of the Komsomol leader: Vladimir Zemskov. And so what: he was confirmed as a sector chief in a CPSU raykom.*

Here, the personal destiny of an apparatchik is tied to the public interest. Now Zemskov's duties in his new post will, with seniority, be to teach communists how to live correctly, and he will accept into the CPSU young people who know his worth. I am convinced that his promotion has struck a blow not against the authority of the Komsomol raykom but also the rayon party committee.

*Another example. At what they call the obkom level. True, there had been several earlier "April winds." As is known, before a television broadcast a rehearsal takes place. Along with others, Petr Konovalov, at that time a Komsomol obkom second secretary, was invited to the studio. While commenting on one of the television subjects, the anchorwoman criticized the oblast Komsomol "Searchlight." Konovalov thought for a little while, snatched the script from the anchorwoman, ripped out the page with the critical text and said: "There is no need to talk about that during the broadcast." Taken aback, the anchorwoman did not know how to respond. It was an obkom secretary that faced her. The broadcast went ahead without the critical subject. Now Petr Konovalov is working as the chairman of the rayispolkom, and there is no sign that he has become zealous about democratization and glasnost...*

In naming these three I have not gone out of my way to choose the "worst." They are just ordinary workers in the apparatus. It is simply that for them, the traditional type of promotion has been typical. The basic principle is simple, like two plus two equals four: "it is mandatory to please those higher up and not mandatory to please those lower down." When he acts in this way, the apparatchik always wins.

There is another reality just as bad. Strange as it may seem, within the apparatus we most often find not individuals who have opinions on everything but simply executors who are not stupid. So that they are dull, but not too dull. Obkom secretary Lyudmilla Fedorova told me that many smart young people have refused offers to transfer to work in the apparatus. They do not want to be "cogs in the bureaucratic machine." This means, they take what they can get...

This year, three people have occupied the desk of the sector chief for work with the vocational and technical schools. Different people, but what any of them did remains a mystery. They did not announce themselves in loud voices or with major deeds. Obviously they simply diligently carried out their assignment. This is how the executors attain manhood, first in the Komsomol and then in the party and soviet apparatuses. And we make helpless gestures: where do we get our bureaucrats?

But can we equate the bureaucrat and the careerist? I am talking about careerism in the Komsomol and I mean the kind of activity that is directed not toward helping in the organization and indoctrination of youth but toward personal promotion.

I want very much to be precise. There is nothing wrong with self-assertion and striving for the acme of skill in any kind of activity directed toward the public interest. And can we, for example, say that Nikolay Kryzhanovskiy, the chairman of the organizational committee in the Leninskiy rayon youth housing complex, is a careerist? Of course not. Or Aleksandr Kozodoy, the "engine" behind the creation of the youth scientific and technical



creative society? Again the answer is no. And N. Sukharev and A. Nedochetov are nothing like careerists. Their not always courteous stubbornness that opens the doors of many offices has led to success: a youth ecology center has been opened in the city under the aegis of the Komsomol obkom.

They are all full-time Komsomol workers. But given this, they are clearly distinguished from the apparatchiks. They are distinguished by the presence of some real business, and by specific goals and methods to reach them. Their affairs are of use to youth.

And what of the apparatchiks? Taken together, the honest and the not so honest, they have objectively been placed in conditions in which what is required of them is not a sense of zeal but a sense of expedition. If only because the apparatus assumes a plurality of actions, while a sense of zeal assumes concentration on one thing. The apparatus may permit itself to have a propaganda department consisting of three people, but it cannot have three directors of various interest clubs instead of the propaganda department. We prefer to have in the apparatus people "without any specified kind of employment," as one former Komsomol worker neatly put it.

Thus, the apparatchik-zealot or the apparatchik who is simply a conscientious executor? Like others, I do not know, but I do believe in reality that if he were thrice what was wanted, the apparatchik would succeed in being a zealot through labor.

I am reminded here of the first secretary of the Volsk Komsomol Gorkom, Aleksandr Kiselev. I have conversed with Kiselev. It seems to me that he intuitively foresees contradictions between the new forms and the new substance of Komsomol work, on the one hand, and the bureaucratic system of the apparatus on the other. I think that Sasha and his comrades have wrung everything they can from the method of forcibly implanting the new on the old. But if this is the way, it is only for the Kiselevs because they are Kiselevs, and there are not many people in the country people with their will and sense of purpose.

But what about the others who are reluctant to come to terms with their own essentially bureaucratic nature? What is left for them is to justify themselves and wait "for better times." Yes exactly that. Already a year has passed since the Komsomol congress, and seeing that apart from implanting good ideas on the old, obsolete scheme nothing is changing, many Komsomol workers are reaching the sad conclusion that evidently this is the kind of Komsomol that is needed today. A Komsomol of cosmetic improvements but not a revolution of renewal.

And that evening when I was in the office the telephone rang. It was Komsomol obkom first secretary Vladimir Demin. He said that the information passed on the details of a tragedy that had recently occurred should be withdrawn.

"Why?"

"That is what the party obkom advised. The opinion is that it is not worth pouring oil on the flames. The whole city is in turmoil."

"But the city is full of rumors!"

"You don't need to convince me! But you must withdraw it."

How can this be? I thought. For only an hour before Vladimir Demin and I had been saying that the information was most necessary. Simply essential! And suddenly a 180-degree turn.

*Now to the essence of the matter. A vehicle carrying teenagers had overturned on a some agricultural workings. Several people had been killed. We wanted to tell our readers the details of this accident. Rumors were circulating in the city, making the numbers of victims to be four times the actual number. The first secretary was perfectly well aware of this but he was unwilling to take responsibility himself for publishing, and he rushed off to get consent. He was unable to defend his own viewpoint... And so down along the chain I received news of the ban. I received the instructions and also capitulated to authority.*

I do not know how it was for Demin, but for me this was a serious lesson. After that no comment was ever removed from the newspaper. But I was nevertheless justified here. I have convinced myself that I am OK. And I should also have been "OK" that evening when we were laying out for print the information about the tragedy.

*Probably Vladimir Korolev, the first secretary of the Privolskiy Komsomol Raykom, also has his justification. A year ago the son of the party raykom first secretary was on a trip to the "Artek" in his rayon. It was a free trip, a summer session—what a coincidence. Korolev says: "Take a look at the documents. They are in order." The documents may have been in order but it is difficult to believe in the coincidence. Already too [word illegible] compared with his comrades at school—the children of simple kolkhoz farmers and employees—it just turns out to be the son of the first secretary...*

So what is going on? Why in most people who come to work in the Komsomol apparatus do honesty and a sense of principle ultimately start grow a thick skin and diminish with each new compromise? Why does each iron hand shake out our boldness and our sense of our own worth?

Some of our Komsomol workers are inclined to see the root of all evil in the personality of the first secretary. He is not sufficiently democratic, they say. Or they say that he is too oriented on opinions "from above." But if we leave aside mutual ambitions, then it is easy to see that



this is not the only cause. The cause lies in our dependence and the dependence of our destinies, one and all, on that very opinion from above.

Apparatchiks "bow" to the first secretary without understanding the main thing, namely, that he manifests what up to now has been hidden in the instructor. Let me talk about the first secretary in more detail. First of all, we do not actually elect him. By voting at a plenum we are simply agreeing with the opinion of the oblast party committee. Even less do we discuss his nomination as one among other candidates. And the newly confirmed first secretary senses that he has not been elected but named, with all the consequences stemming from this. He takes little account of opinions "from below" if the opinion "from above" is at variance with them. We once convened a meeting of the Komsomol aktiv to pose the youth just one single question: is it worthwhile for the newspaper to publish weekly? The answer was unanimous: yes. The notes on that meeting reflected accurately the opinion that had been expressed. But subsequently the first secretary considered this opinion to be a "working opinion," and not for publication, so to speak. Why? Because the possibility existed of a very high but different opinion. Taking this possibility into account, the first secretary did not bother to hide his emotions as he expressed indignation over the fact that the opinion of the group of Komsomol members had been published.

It is not fortuitous that I say "first secretary" rather than "Vladimir Demin." I am sure that any person appointed from above would behave in about the same way. So the essence of the matter lies not with Demin but with his post. And in the fact that we ourselves develop or thwart democracy within the Komsomol.

"How can this be!" Demin is outraged. "I work tirelessly, I talk from morning till night on the telephone with various leaders. All for the Komsomol members, not for myself!"

In fact our secretaries usually do work hard. But where is the result? For the past 3 years not one single youth club has been organized in the city. Even the rock-and-roll clubs that now thunder out across the entire country; here it has virtually collapsed. For 3 years not one single stadium has been built in the city. Not one student theater or any other creative youth collective has obtained premises with help from the Komsomol. You can work round the clock but this no justification for zero results.

Of course, it is not only obedient executors with an eye on further promotion who turn up in the apparatus. Many honest young men and women go in for full-time Komsomol work. At first they try to examine and then resolve how to deal with an apparatus that is rusted from within. But how many of them become exhausted with the mechanism of subordination and servility!

*The following is a graphic example. Elmira Zhade has been working in the organizational department of a obkom for a year. And more than one department chief has been convinced of her incompetence and lack of initiative. The new chief of the organizational department Pavel Kuryanov raised strongly the question of her suitability for the post she occupied. But uncompromising as he is, even in the time of democratization and glasnost he has been forced to make a compromise. The negligent colleague had to be left in place. All that was needed was a couple of telephone calls from the party obkom...*

Here is another justification: the style of party leadership over the Komsomol here in the oblast. The following is a typical situation: about 30 party and economic leaders were invited to the 3rd Komsomol Obkom Plenum; two came. And no one sounded the alarm. Why?

Unfortunately the only way to deal with the cost of apparatus work is still to leave. Without any kind of promotion or advance there. Just go back to where you came from. While it remains the only thing there is, we can expect no enhancement in the authority of the Komsomol among rank-and-file members of the Komsomol.

For along time we were lacking an obkom secretary to oversee questions of ideology. Various candidates were nominated with agreement "from above" but something was always not right with the questionnaire; for one it is his age, for another his party commitment, for a third his family situation. Finally everything came together. And so? A honest young man, an sympathetic person, took up the post. But he lacks knowledge and strength of will, and perhaps other things.. Everyone can see this. Some smile, other sympathize with him. It is obvious that he is trying, how nervous he is about not succeeding. How can he be helped now? His forms looked fine, but he is not a leader, a guide.

For a long time in our obkom the buro meetings have been regarded as some kind of quittance that you pay to get the weight off your shoulders. Perestroyka is taking place in the country and during its course there is a re-thinking of the role and importance of cadres, and they are being replaced. But our buro has not removed a single Komsomol raykom secretary. "He is out for blood"; that is what they say about me. No, it has nothing to do with blood. It is the capability of the Komsomol organ, which right now can be expressed in three words: sitting, talking, and leaving.

We do not hold meetings just in the obkom. We also hold out-of-town meetings. We have a new form: the out-of-town buro. Last year, for example, we traveled to Kharabali. It is 2 hours or more from Astrakhan by car. I recently asked the first secretary of the Kharabali Komsomol raykom first secretary Sergey Mamtsev whether these out-of-town meetings were of any use. "No," he replied. "You just drive out the villages to have a look at the young people."

These are the kind of bureaucrats that we are; we must take the entire buro out to meet with the Komsomol members, and drive a whole cavalcade of cars out to the rayon.

*But now the work day has ended. Today there is a party meeting. It would be better not to attend so as to avoid seeing some tremendous event—the next person to get his party card... A fine young man was recently accepted as a candidate member of the CPSU. I think that he will bring honor neither to those recommending him nor to the organization that confirmed him as a member of the CPSU. The affair had got as far as the vote when suddenly it unexpectedly became known that an application requesting the admission of several more people had been submitted by that time. However, only his nomination was raised at the discussions at the party meeting. Why precisely him? We made something of a hash of our explanation. But it was not even worth doing it; everyone knew why: in our department only the modest total of one is admitted each year. And then the rumors started. This is how the line is formed for admission to the party. The line, which, however, has always been disrupted at the will of one person. The first secretary. Ultimately it is on his opinion that this advance depends. And this happens for one simple reason: the obkom must accept "cadres" into the party. That is, people who have prospects for climbing up the professional ladder.*

Check it out, I know what I am saying. I know it myself from my turn. Of more accurately, from the displacement of that turn. I have considered myself a communist for a long time, I am deeply convinced about the ideas of perestroika, and I had long dreamed of being admitted to the CPSU. Communists in the obkom and in the editorial offices knew all this. But the "admission vortex" whirled about me only when it was necessary to have a solid reserve of replacements for the post of newspaper editor. It was then that my candidature was accepted...

By why this shuffling of young people the absolute majority of whom are honest people? Why is it that we are pressed into the Komsomol but cannot break into the party even with complete candor. Why these limits? For they stand on their heads and pervert the young souls and introduce an unhealthy element of competition into a comradely environment.

Is it that the party does not even trust itself?

I was recently talking about the functional competence of the Komsomol with an obkom colleague, Andrey Kopylov. Eventually the conversation turned to personalities and I asked him what useful things he had been able to achieve during the past year. He answered candidly: "I have done one thing. I arranged work for a young girl."

Just one thing out of all those accountability reports and certificates. A really good thing. But not very much? Of course not very much. But take my word for it, not every

worker in the obkom can make the same boast. And so against this general background Andrey seems not too bad. This kind of level of functional competence brings me to the thoughts that I want to set forth below.

Working as a Komsomol journalist it seems to me that I have also understood better and in greater depth the tasks and opportunities of our youth league. And I categorically disagree with the opinions that hold that the youth league is outdated and that instead of it or regardless of it it is necessary to set up other youth organizations. I think that if a real perestroika takes place in the Komsomol and not just a cleaning of the facade, as is being done now, then the funereal attitudes themselves will disappear. And so it is dangerous to slow down perestroika. And I also have specific proposals.

I have often thought about why we copy the party apparatuses. They in no way coincide with our functions. Why must the structure of the apparatus match so absolutely? What if the obkom apparatuses were abolished? We have a central committee apparatus and apparatuses for the raykoms. Let Komsomol strategy move straight into tactics.

Even now, most serious raykom issues are resolved essentially through the central committee. I was recently in Moscow. I met with the second secretary of our Krasnoyarsk raykom, Veleriy Prokopenko. He had traveled in to the central committee to arrange the organization of a water sports center in their rayon... And even when a Komsomol obkom does go to the central committee, what it most often does is "move" initiatives proposed by the raykoms and gorkoms.

Life long ago gave the hint about the most efficient form of Komsomol interaction: an idea is born in the primary organization and generalized and formulated in the raykom and resolved there. If it is not possible to resolve an issue at the local level then let the obkom secretariat take it up, and if necessary, include the central committee.

If the obkom does not assume the functions of the raykoms, as it did with us in the matter of the rock-and-roll club, only three functions remain for it, namely, to account to the central committee, to receive reports from the raykoms and to organize training for the Komsomol aktiv. Given good coordination, the raykom elements cope quite successfully with the range of mass measures.

*Instead of the obkom apparatus let there be only a secretariat with very truncated organizational and financial-and-economic departments. Then the obkom secretaries can be transformed from being masters-of-ceremonies at weddings at their offices into true coordinators for youth initiatives. They will have to leave their command offices and armchairs and "go out among the people."*

During the time that we are not engaged in our primary work we shall act according to a plan drawn up by us and approved by the buro. And so that painful issues do not have to be resolved during the evening, it would be possible to establish a duty day once a month for each member of the obkom in his own department. Along the same lines as consultation hours for deputies. So that members of the obkom will be working in the building everyday rather than a fully empowered apparatus.

The obkom would be transformed from a bureaucratic office into a real organization capable of great things. And then the buro would discuss not planning matters (read "plans scheduled for half a year) but immediate issues. Organizations that in fact begin to move things from dead center.

Yes, and the raykoms would be transformed from being intermediate organs accountable in every way to the obkom along with the primary organizations, into the main wing of the Komsomol, capable of both making decisions and acting. Those informal leaders who fear servility like fire and who therefore now shun the apparatchiks, would be drawn into the raykoms.

There is more. After "abolishing" the obkom apparatus we shall bring the aktiv closer to the main mass of

Komsomol members even in terms of age. The people working in the apparatus are now aged about 30. And the main mass of Komsomol members? About 20. These are quite different generations, with different interests and aspirations, and ultimately with different emotional attitudes. I say nothing of the following contradiction: 30-year-old apparatchiks have social responsibilities—family and their own young children. But for 20-year-olds most of their activities take place precisely during the evening when the apparatchiks are reading story books to their children.

I am by no means suggesting that other Komsomol workers have no better ideas or better proposals from the standpoint of how well they have been considered. I would be happy to know about them, anywhere. I am the first to express myself because I think that we must hurry. We must hurry for the sake of the Komsomol and for the sake of the 20th Congress decisions. Let us argue! It is only through discussion about democracy within the Komsomol and the balance of power among the apparatuses and their tasks that it is possible to rescue our enormous organization from total bureaucratization, and for each of us to define his own true place in it.

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### Party Journal Opens Rubric on Conference

WA18000278 [Editorial Report] Moscow PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN in Russian No 3, February 1988 carries on pages 7-24 a new rubric entitled "Towards the 19th All-Union Party Conference." The introduction to the rubric is brief:

"The 19th All-Union Party Conference will examine the course of implementing the decisions made at the 27th CPSU Congress, sum up the achievements of the first half of the 12th 5-Year Plan, and discuss the further democratization of the life of the party and society.... Beginning with this issue, PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN is opening a forum for discussing preparations for the All-Union Party Conference. We invite our readers to take part in an exchange of opinions and to openly express themselves on the most topical issues involved in the restructuring of party life."

The first item in the rubric is an unattributed editorial entitled "The Primary Party Organization [PPO]—The Main Link in Restructuring." In a general discussion of the PPO's role as the advance guard of restructuring, the editorial emphasizes several of its most important functions. The PPO is to "experiment, to boldly undertake the introduction of innovations." It is to ensure a "high degree of discipline in fulfilling party decisions." In particular, the PPO is to help implement new systems of economic management:

"Many enterprises have now transferred to new systems of cost-accounting and self-financing.... This places particular demands on managers. Party organizations must help management cadres to master the requirements of the second stage of restructuring.... It is important for Communists in labor collectives to make maximum use of the experience of enterprises already working in the new conditions. Economic training must be significantly expanded, and workers must be taught to organize labor in the framework of the new economic mechanism.... The Law on State Enterprises requires the particular attention of the PPO. It must be thoroughly studied, and every step, every decision, must be checked against its statutes."

The editorial stresses that primary party bodies are to be organized by means of democratic elections. "In the selection and placement of cadres the PPO must boldly expand its democratic foundations. The election of leaders must become the rule and not the exception."

There is to be no tolerance for Communists who do not work according to these principles. "The fact that certain party organizations are taking a long time to master these new approaches in organizational and ideological work, that they are trying to avoid the difficulties of the moment, cannot be accepted.... Party committees are called on...to eliminate the obstacles slowing down their work." In this regard the editorial cites with approval an experiment undertaken by the Sverdlovsk party obkom

which led to major changes in the composition and activities of local primary party organizations. The obkom "carried out an examination of the fighting spirit of the PPO's. In the course of this examination each Communist was asked, 'What has been your personal contribution in trying to realize our goals? How has it been concretely manifested?' As a result, the practical activity of 31,000 Communists was found to be unsatisfactory. They took on new obligations which correspond to the demands of today. 40,000 were given new party assignments. 5,000 Communists received various party reprimands and almost 800 were expelled from the CPSU. In accordance with proposals from party organizations, more than 480 managers were removed from their positions, and almost 2,500 people were promoted to more responsible work." The editorial ends on a cautionary note: "The examination of political maturity, fighting spirit, and efficiency is not over."

The rubric continues with a report on a recent plenum of the Pavlodar Communist Party Obkom in Kazakhstan. After describing various successes and shortcomings in the obkom's work, the report closes with a series of proposals made for discussion at the coming party conference. One of the proposals suggests granting to the party raykom the right to determine the size and structure of its own apparatus. The report points out that "in solving internal problems of life, the party raykom is constrained." It is therefore suggested that "the raykom itself should decide, within the limits of the funds allocated to it for salaries, how many and what kind of established posts to have in the apparatus." It is further proposed "to decide, at the discretion of the party raykom, to reduce the number of department chief positions and to transfer their functions to the secretary directing that given sector of work. This will make it possible to reduce the size of the raykom apparatus." The participants of the obkom also want "to carry out the election of (party) secretaries by secret ballot."

The last section in the new rubric, which is entitled "We Submit Proposals," contains letters from various PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN readers. The first letter is from A. Smirnov, chief of the organizational department of a raykom in Vologda. He proposes holding frequent raykom elections in order to replace Communists who for one reason or other are no longer active in their posts, or who simply do not fulfill their responsibilities. "In my opinion, party documents ought to grant permission for elective organs to be renewed between conferences, at party raykom plenums, so that the raykom can elect new members to replace those Communists who have left (the apparatus), or who don't work actively. This opportunity should also be granted to party committees of primary organizations. This will make it possible to replace personnel in a timely fashion and to free ourselves from the ballast of undisciplined people."

Smirnov also suggests "reducing (the number of raykom plenums held a year) to two or three, which will enable workers in the apparatus to spend more time in the

localities, to occupy themselves with the actual organization of affairs, and to strengthen their control over the fulfillment of both party resolutions and their own decisions." He mentions the need for changes in the structure of the raykom apparatus and proposes that "raykoms be given the right to decide for themselves how to place their cadres most effectively, taking into account the specific conditions of the rayon and its long-term tasks for restructuring." He also feels that "party organizations of up to 150 members should be allowed, at the Communists' discretion, to conduct elections by means of both secret as well as open balloting."

Finally, Smirnov considers that party secretaries are often prevented from efficiently carrying out their tasks by their dependence on economic managers. He suggests "defining a series of measures to substantially enhance the role of the party secretary. Possibly a statute 'On the Status of the Party Organization Secretary' should be adopted, which would define precisely his responsibilities, authority, standing with the administration, and right to receive prizes, bonuses, and other incentives."

#### Party Journal Publishes More Conference Proposals

WA18000284 [Editorial Report] Moscow PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN in Russian No 4, February 1988 carries on pages 37-39 several letters from readers proposing topics for discussion at the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference in June. The section is entitled "We Submit Proposals."

V. Chernyshev, a raykom first secretary from Primorskiy Kray, complains about too much centralization in party work:

"In studying the reasons for the insufficient degree of activity among Communists and of fighting spirit in party organizations, one most frequently concludes that the basic fault lies in the over-organization of party work.... Over-organization is being rooted out only with difficulty. Why is this?

"In our opinion, this is the result of the extreme centralization of party work. One of the ways it is manifested is in the unjustifiably large number of questions which are recommended 'from above' to be discussed at party meetings and at raykom buro meetings and plenums. These questions are not always topical for a given party organization. In such cases, at both party meetings and even plenums it is frequently impossible to translate the resolutions of higher organs into the language of the practical tasks of a specific rayon or enterprise.

"Every year more than half of our party meetings and a large part of our plenums have been carried out on the basis of a 'recommended' agenda. A great deal of effort and time are invested in preparing for them, but the results are not always commensurate with the investment.

"In order to avoid interruptions in discussing an issue, a list of speakers are prepared in advance. Needless to say, discussion in such circumstances is uninteresting and bland. It turns out that the fear of calling forth the dissatisfaction of a higher organ exceeds a feeling of responsibility towards Communists for the business at hand.

"Every day practical experience confirms: the more independence a party organization has, the more responsibility Communists have for the final results of their activity, the more room there is for creativity in their work."

Chernyshev also complains about the practice of sending candidates for party positions to Moscow to be interviewed by the central organs, a practice which, even with increased emphasis on democratic elections, has remained the rule rather than the exception.

"How can the preliminary approval of a candidate by the higher organs, a procedure which remains obligatory, be reconciled with greater democracy in elections? For example, when preparations for the election of the secretary of the metallurgy industry workers' kraykom trade union were underway...the responsible workers of the trade union central committee insisted that the proposed candidate be interviewed by them in Moscow. In the course of the elections three candidates were nominated at a meeting of the kraykom trade union party group. All three of them stood as candidates at the election, but only one of them was interviewed. This 'tradition' has also been followed at the election of two CPSU raykom secretaries at our plenum. It seems that in such cases democracy is regulated, and, consequently, is incomplete."

T. Sharukhiya, a party secretary from the Abkhaz ASSR, wants to change the procedure for conducting party meetings:

"In 1 month we have party, trade union, and Komsomol meetings and sessions of the party buro, trade union committee, and Komsomol Buro. Doesn't that seem like a lot of meetings and sessions? For this reason I propose: to call meetings in all primary party organizations...no less frequently than once every two months. Then we will be able to prepare for them better and to conduct them better, and we will have a great deal more time for actual organizational and educational work among the masses."

PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN No 5, March 1988, carries on pages 39-41 a similar feature entitled "The 19th Party Conference. Suggestions and Thoughts from Communists." N. Kudryashov, a kolkhoz party committee secretary, wants to do away with quota systems in the formation of party bodies:

"In my opinion, the practice of forming elected organs on the basis of qualifications on paper is not always justified. Filling percentages for age, sex, education, and specialization frequently result in people with little initiative becoming members of party and Komsomol committees or deputies. Now, when we are democratizing the process of forming the elected bodies of social organizations, we should renounce approaches using percentages and base our choice on the political, practical, and moral qualities of the candidate."

A. Bespyatko of Moscow considers it necessary to "differentiate between the work of party and soviet organs" in order to "strengthen the political leadership and organizational, ideological, and educational activity of party committees on all levels, and to increase the responsibility of the councils of ministers of union and autonomous republics and executive committees of local soviets for the integral solution of economic and social tasks."

"I propose that the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference examine the question of radically changing the nature of the work and organizational structure of party committees in order to completely eliminate the possibility of (party bodies) supplanting soviet and managerial organs. In this way they (party committees) will be able to devote all their strength and energy to the activization of the human factor."

#### **PRAVDA Readers, Staff Air Views on Party Apparatus**

18000303 (Editorial report) Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 15 March 1988 carries on page 3 a 1300-word feature consisting of letters from readers entitled "I Raise the Question of the Apparatus." The feature appears under the rubric "Discussion by Mail: Addressed to the 19th All-Union Party Conference."

Z. Kuzakhmetov, a student at a Sverdlovsk party school, wants to reduce the number of party workers holding purely administrative positions in order to strengthen the cadres of primary party organizations at workplaces:

"In connection with the radical reform of the economy, the reduction of managerial apparatus, and the granting of greater rights to enterprises, I think that it is necessary to introduce corresponding changes in the structure of party organizations as well. I consider that it is possible without detriment to reduce the apparatus of oblast, city, and rayon committees by a factor of 1.5 or 2, and to give a part of the functions of the apparatus to an elected group of activists. In this way political organizations in enterprises would be strengthened."

PRAVDA on 2 April 1988 carries on page 2 a 550-word column by Viktor Kozhemyako under the rubric "From the Editor's Mailbag." The article, which is entitled "Addressed to the Conference," surveys the general concerns of PRAVDA's readers who have been writing about the conference:

"Right now the editorial staff is daily receiving hundreds of letters addressing the forthcoming All-Union Conference. What are they about?"

"The range of themes is extremely broad. People tell us about the best experiments in democratization that have taken place in their rayon or city, labor collective or primary party organization. They write about the difficulties and obstacles that have stood in their way."

"Of greatest importance, of course, are the proposals....L. Korbut of Moscow is concerned by the need for the more extensive renewal of party organs. 'If someone is repeatedly elected to a responsible position, doesn't he lose a fresh outlook, doesn't he sit in one place too long, doesn't a kind of stagnation overtake him?'"

"Letters, thoughts, proposals....There are a lot of them. I must apologize beforehand to their authors, because it will probably be far from possible to publish everything of interest in our newspaper."

"However, I also have a remark to make. It seems that the authors of some of the proposals in our mail are, one might say, trying to force a door that is already open. For example, A. Varigin of Krasnoyarsk wants to make a change in the Party Statutes: election to the party should be not just by a majority of votes, but by a majority of no less than two-thirds. But this is already contained in the Statutes! What change is he talking about?"

"Let us remark in general: the Party Statutes are wide-ranging, well thought out, and the result of comprehensive study. A series of changes were recently made in them at the 27th CPSU Congress. Now, therefore, discussion should not be about new changes in the Statutes, but rather about how to take fuller advantage of the possibilities they offer."

On 17 April 1988 on page 3 PRAVDA again carries the rubric "Discussion by Mail: Addressed to the 19th All-Union Party Conference." The 1700-word feature is entitled "This is My Point of View."

T. Mishchenko of Stavropol, a party member since 1939, proposes to make changes in the structure of party organs at local levels:

"Isn't the current party apparatus too cumbersome? This question was raised at a plenum of the Stavropol CPSU kraykom when its buro was reporting on the guidance of restructuring. Since the April 1985 CPSU CC Plenum the situation in the country has changed radically...but the party apparatus is still structured according to the same old system that was definitively formed during the period of stagnation."

"The multitude of sectoral departments is amazing. The names of a number of them are connected with the word 'industry.' Well, this sounds impressive, and therefore

it's used in several variations. So we have the department of industry, and next to it is the department of the chemical and petroleum industries, and then there's the department of light industry and consumer goods, which is closely connected with the department of agriculture and the food industry. Moreover, we have departments of construction, transportation and communications, trade and human services, science and educational institutions, culture, and a number of others.

"Apart from this 'series', I would first of all name the organizational party work department, which is indispensable. Without any doubt this department is necessary, because it has many functions and participates in the solution of the most various and complex tasks. No less important is the propaganda and agitation department, which might be better called the ideology department. And, of course, we should preserve the general and financial departments, merging them together and transforming them into a party kraykom administration of affairs.

"It is desirable that the structure of the party apparatus acquires a more efficient form corresponding to the spirit of our times."

V. Nefedov, deputy minister of justice for the Karelian ASSR, is concerned about renewal in the ranks of the party:

"From the point of view of the consistent development of interparty democracy, the question of the regulation of procedures for the renewal of party organs is very important. Over long periods of time it is the same managers of enterprises, kolkhozes, and sovkhozes, and the same exemplary industrial workers, who are elected to their membership.

"No one will argue that these are worthy people. But the circle of active workers must be broadened.

"There is obviously no need to establish a limit for the term of office of each member of a party organ. However, it would be useful to determine a percentage of personnel — for example, two thirds — who should be renewed. No less than three years of party membership should be required for election to office."

A. Sharapov of Tyumen wants to have more information about the work of the central party organs:

"In particular, I think it is indispensable to resolve the issue of the open publication of speeches made at CPSU CC plenums. Certainly, differences in opinions may arise during plenum discussions — after all, seeking and finding the best solutions is a vital and creative affair. But making the speeches publicly known ("shirokaya glasnost vystupleniy") would enable all the communists of our country to draw their own conclusions about the positions of Central Committee members on various issues of party life and economic organization.

"The current lack of complete information on speeches made at CPSU CC plenums sometimes leads to political speculations, conjectures, and rumors. I think that complete information would serve the further development of party democracy. An exception might be made only in the case of the discussion of issues relating to defense.

"Let me add one thought. I think that it is also necessary to publish all the materials on the Conference itself."

### **IZVESTIYA Readers Move to Defend Restructuring**

*PM241201 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Mar 88 Morning Edition p 2*

[IZVESTIYA "From the Editorial Mail" feature consisting of readers' letters: "19th Party Conference: Tasks of Restructuring"—first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Excerpts] The flow of letters united by one theme—thoughts about the forthcoming 19th all-union party conference—has increased in the editorial mail recently. In expressing their opinion on particular topical issues of our life, readers note that changes are far from proceeding everywhere as they would like. In imparting their proposals and doubts they are stressing the irreversibility of the changes that have been initiated in all spheres of our life and the need to defend the new against the obstacles which restructuring is encountering.

#### **Returning Confidence [subhead]**

The expression "crisis of confidence" appeared in the press once with regard to the party of which I am a member. There is no doubt that the abuses and crimes of Communists who held major state posts and lesser posts did their evil work. The passivity and apathy of many party members also helped. Among themselves they discussed everything; there was anger and castigation. But they lacked the most important thing—the courage to join the struggle for the truth, for the purity of the party ranks. I mention this not to beat my breast in remorse and seek absolution for my sins. It is something else that concerns me: Will we be able now to regain the confidence that has been lost? Are we doing everything to put an end to deceit, to excessive bureaucratic organization, to all the negative phenomena which led the country to the need for restructuring?

Of course we are far from doing everything. Another difficulty is probably the fact that many people are experiencing a sense of confusion: How do we overcome everything that has accumulated and been instilled over the years? The general provisions of work in this direction are known: economic reform, democratization, and glasnost. As for specific forms, blank areas arise here. In addition, inertia and old habits are making themselves felt everywhere. The result is that each person is keeping to himself and would be glad to help the cause, but how?

In my opinion the effectiveness of the work of primary party organizations depends largely on the personality of the party organizer. It is no secret that many party organizers are far closer to the bosses than to the masses, the people. Frequently, it is still not rank and file Communists who elect them but the bosses. Yet the party organizer is a model, an example for emulation. When he works next to me and in such a way that I cannot keep up with him, when he is the first to stay on after work to fulfill an urgent task, when we are side by side at a subbotnik, I trust him and he has the right to make demands on me. But if he is not to be found at his work place (perpetual public affairs, conferences and sessions); if, having encouraged me to stay behind for a second shift, he himself has gone home; if at a subbotnik he is the embodiment of the "staff"; then, forgive me, I do not trust him one inch and do not allow him to give me instructions. The same applies to trade union organizers and many other public figures whom the party Central Committee February plenum aptly termed "paid functionaries."

I believe the forthcoming party conference will also unfailingly discuss these questions. They are of great importance!

Yu. Solonskiy, worker, Rostov-na-donu.

#### Term in Power [subhead]

A question that probably does not perturb only me can be formulated as follows. It is a question involving guarantees against the personality cult and its consequences. The path which our society has traveled persuades us that scarcely have we denounced one personality cult than we create another. The past can no longer be put right, but it can and must be understood in order to draw the correct conclusions. In my view these conclusions are that the term in power of a leader of any rank should be restricted through legislation. And to ensure that there is no leap-frogging of cadres, the term should be quite adequate for him to implement his ideas or at least to put them on a firm footing. That is, of course, if they are supported by the people—and here the broad nationwide discussion of all important questions of the country's life (I have in mind referendums) should be made the rule.

Yu. Shakharyan, doctor, Aleksandrov, Vladimir Oblast.

#### Who Has the Right To Oblige the Ispolkom To Do Something [subhead]

The formula "The party obkom (gorkom, raykom) bureau has obliged the obl(gor, ray)ispolkom..." is customary and does not generate even the slightest perplexity. But why, exactly? Yes, the party is the leading force of our society. But the organs of power are the soviets of people's deputies. And you must agree that it is only the soviet session which has the right to oblige the ispolkoms to do something or not. There is no doubt that a

particular party organ has the right to express its opinion on questions of importance. But how? I think the following is the only way: submitting these questions for discussion at a routine soviet session where a decision will be taken jointly and will have strictly legislative power. As for the concept of "obliging," it could be applied either to specific Communists (the oblispolkom chairman and other workers) or to the party committee of that same oblispolkom.

Now that we are seeking new paths of improving our political system, now that the task has been set of differentiating between the functions of party and state organs (they should not duplicate each other!), we should abandon customary formulas of the "oblige" type directed at an organ of state power. And of course the point here is not so much one of formulas as of the firmly entrenched practice of replacing one organ of power with another. As party Central Committee plenums have frequently stressed, it is a matter of restoring and consolidating the authority of the soviets of people's deputies, which are "the linchpin of our society's political system."

S. Vladimirov, engineer, Moscow. [passage omitted]

#### Only the Full Truth [subhead]

I know that the following arguments are frequently encountered today: Why, people say, are there all these exposures? After all, the past cannot be brought back or put right. There is no need to paint people black, they say (do you sense that they already have a label prepared?) We should not be afraid of the truth—either in the past or in the present. We should not be afraid that the whole truth will lead to pessimism. No one is taking our gains from us.

Moreover, only the truth will help in rooting out the phenomena that led the country to stagnation. Talking about everything openly, fully, and objectively and giving an honest, albeit bitter, analysis of errors means strengthening, in millions of people, faith in justice and in our society's ability to cleanse itself and to be cured.

Many rank and file Communists hope that the forthcoming all-union party conference will outline specific ways of defending restructuring. Against what? Against much that is impeding it today. This includes old methods of management dressed up with new slogans; it includes the powerful pressure from the command apparatus—after all many people "restructure themselves" only verbally; and it includes the absence of specific, real forms of truly popular, truly democratic, participation in the solution of state issues. Restructuring is encountering enough obstacles; we must not bypass them with compromises or silence. As the party Central Committee February plenum stressed, the more rapidly blunders are detected, the more rapidly they will be put right. We must not deviate from this course.



A. Borisov, scientific assistant, Leningrad.

**Rumors Instead of Information [subhead]**

We speak of glasnost and about how there should be no forbidden topics; nevertheless, there is enough secrecy. And where there is no information, rumors and misinterpretations immediately circulate. Surely this does not benefit restructuring. Many examples could be cited. For instance, in late January the local press published a Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Decree on the immediate termination of the powers of Comrade Kasyanenko, deputy of the republic's supreme soviet for Simferopol electoral okrug No 369. Why? "In connection with Comrade O.Ya. Kasyanenko's personal statement on his surrender of powers as deputy"—and that was the entire explanation. So each person has his own interpretation of the news—and what don't you hear...

We have just the same information, serving as fodder for the most diverse fabrications, in connection with the surrender of his powers as USSR Supreme Soviet deputy by Comrade Makarenko, former first secretary of the Crimean Ukrainian Communist Party Obkom. As a result, do we, as before, have a half-truth instead of the truth? Please explain to me why do we not tell everything the way it is. What are we afraid of?

**SOVETSKAYA KULTURA Carries Proposals, Protests**

*PM311507 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA  
in Russian 26 Mar 88 p 7*

[Letter from G. Kotovshchikov under the rubric "The Reader Proposes, Protests, and Polemicizes": "From Declarations to Guarantees"]

[Text] The problem of guaranteeing the irreversibility of the renewal of all spheres of society's life which has begun in the country should now be given priority because only complete confidence that there will be no return to the past will free us from fear of the consequences of expressing our opinion and liberate the people's intellectual and physical energies, which have lain dormant for decades.

Undoubtedly we do have certain guarantees today. By the will of the party and with the support of the majority of the people, glasnost is expanding, democracy is deepening, and transformations are taking place in the economic sphere. But is that enough to ensure that at any given moment we will not take a step backward, as happened in the second half of the sixties? Why is there still a sense of anxiety about the fate of restructuring?

The whole point clearly is that the factors cited above which consolidate restructuring at the present stage need safeguards. To ensure the irreversibility of restructuring there must be stable, long-term, and legally based guarantees.

In this connection I think that the more dynamic development of society would be promoted by a switch from declarations to the enshrinement in legislation and regulations of a clear system for replacing the leadership of party and state apparatuses.

Under the existing situation the call to abolish "zones beyond criticism" remains a fond hope. Without a reliable and implacable mechanism for replacement independent of the will of those at the top and the bottom, those "zones" can only be criticized after their downfall. But, as they used to say in Ancient Rome, a collapsed column is always easier to measure. It is not enough to proclaim that there should be no "zones beyond criticism" in our country; it is necessary to create the appropriate conditions to achieve that. If we only show courage with hindsight, we shall always be left trailing in the wake of events.

All this prompts the thought that there has long been an urgent need, in view of the historical and present-day experience of developing the state and its system of administration, to establish a faultless mechanism of replacement, that is, to set a definite time limit on the holding of an elected post. After all, it is absolutely obvious that the existence of such a mechanism will actually promote the development of criticism and self-criticism and help to eradicate such phenomena as deference to rank and workers' dependence on their leader. At the same time, periodic replacement provides scope for fresh talents and ensures the involvement of a larger number of people in the management of state affairs. It is also important to note that on the one hand this system of replacement will not denigrate an honored leader and will not give him cause to feel insulted when his turn comes around (the law is the law, after all) and on the other hand it will create a safeguard against recurrences of the personality cult and will ensure society's onward development.

I propose that the question of elaborating a clear procedure for replacing leading workers of state and party organs be submitted for discussion at the 19th all-union party conference.

G. Kotovshchikov, born 1953, worker in internal affairs organs and party member since 1987, Irkutsk.

**IZVESTIYA Readers Suggest Issues for Discussion at Conference**

*WA18000283A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
3 Apr 88 p 2*

[Collection of letters: "From the Mail to the Editor"]

[Text]

**On Economic Risk**

I think that at the conference, it is necessary to raise the question of economic risk. This is a concept long known

to economists in world practice. We, however, all fear it. We fear to introduce unified norms for a given sector—and suddenly the weak enterprises go bankrupt. And how are we going to organize socialist competition between enterprises, and even sectors? If different norms are established for different enterprises, then again we return to the earlier leveling. A low norm is weak, a higher one stronger. Of course, weak enterprises may go bankrupt. A state reserve should be created for initial help for those lagging. And if subsidies from the reserve cannot help, then the enterprise must be assigned other production or handed over to associations (or firms) engaged in similar production work. Perhaps a trustee council of directors could be set up for enterprises operating at a loss.

To the point, the intersector associations of enterprises managed by councils of directors. Extensive use is made of them in world practice, and we again fear the risk, even though this point is covered in the Law on Enterprises.

I suggest that as an experiment, several large enterprises should be removed from ministry subordination. Let them sink or swim on their own in the "economic sea." I am convinced that it would work, and life shows that in the form in which they now exist and operate, we do not need the ministries. In the not too distant future, enterprises should be economically independent and, as Vladimir Ilich Lenin said, as required can be independently amalgamated into self-managing trusts, and also supply-and-marketing syndicates.

Perhaps we could nevertheless take the risk and open up opportunities for market pricing for a short period. Here, of course, strict control is essential, since under conditions of our chronic shortages of certain goods, the speculator could distort the picture. It is, of course, a large risk, but risks were taken in Lenin's time with the New Economic Policy. To make up for this, in a short time the true cost of production taking into account both supply and demand will be clarified....

In short, as I understand it, in economics it is impossible to advance and restructure rapidly without risk. That there will be losses during the course of perestroika (and there already are) is inevitable. But we do not have the time, and we simply have nowhere to retreat.

(Signed) B. Yegoshin, economist. Leningrad.

#### **The Collective Makes the Promotion**

During the period of stagnation, double-dyed protectionism flourished. The harm that this did to the party and state and to Soviet people is common knowledge.

The so-called "mossbacked hand" that decides the fate of a person by proceeding from its own "mossbacked" interests prevents people from believing in the possibilities of perestroika and gives rise to a skeptical attitude toward the real changes today and in the future. It seems to me that in order totally to exclude protectionism from

the life of the party and state, a point should be introduced into the CPSU Rules to the effect that promotion to leading posts should occur only after extensive discussion of the candidate up for promotion by the communists and the entire labor collective where he works and where he is well known. I think that this will also be democracy in action.

(Signed) B. Vidyukov, master at the No 5 Iznozemtsev Agricultural Vocational and Technical School, Zheleznovodsk, Stavropol Kray.

#### **There Is No Need for Duplication**

From time to time, reports appear on the pages of the central newspapers about reviews of the results of checks conducted on the economic activity of enterprises or entire sectors of the national economy by the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee. They offer an analysis of the situation existing at enterprises and in sectors and reveal shortcomings, and information is also presented on the results of checks on measures. At first glance everything seems proper, but the following question arises: but how necessary is it for intervention by the party control organ into purely economic matters, and is this work not duplication of other control organs, as, for example, the USSR People's Control Committee?

We run across this idea in paragraph 39 of the CPSU Rules, which states that the Party Control Committee checks observance of party discipline by CPSU members and candidate members. This does not mean that the competence of the party control organ should be narrow. By using this example from the CPSU Rules, I am merely trying to show the imperfection of the control system existing today.

In my view it is necessary to organize a unified control organ. Whether it should be a more perfect form of the Central Control Commission and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection or some kind of party-state control is evidently for the All-Union Party Conference to determine.

(Signed) A. Zaripov, candidate of technical sciences.

#### **The Authority of the Rural Authorities**

Before the party conference, we would like to continue the discussion on the authority of the rural authorities. The rural soviets themselves are unable to enhance their prestige themselves by recruiting skilled personnel for work and creating conditions for completing in full the tasks assigned to them.

Consider this. In fact all social programs bypass the lower apparatus of the soviet organs. We are remembered only when targets are not met and violations are revealed at industrial enterprises and in agriculture, trade and consumer services. In the event that they are

operating well, we get nothing for our pains. Providing housing and allowances for seniority and skills, and privileges for municipal and everyday services and so forth—we do all this.

The managers subordinate to us come to the meetings of our rural settlement soviets in their Volga's with their personal chauffeurs. In the best case, we combine a modest salary for the duties of driver and metalworker simultaneously. Almost daily, we personally carry reports to the rayon, and while we do this, people and business have to wait for us. The amount of work we do is increasing, but we have no staffs of secretaries and typists; these also have to be combined work. This is the kind of attitude we see toward the organs that are assigned to monitor observance of Soviet laws.

Ignoring Lenin's instruction that the requirement for personnel must be combined with concern for them has had the most baneful consequences for the rural soviets. In particular, the mismatch between the growing volume of work and the numerical strength and skills of the apparatus has in our rayon led to a situation in which over a 2-year period, all the chairmen of the executive committees of the rural settlement soviets and all the rayispolkom deputy chairmen had to be replaced, while the chairman of the rayon council ispolkom himself recently left. There are vacancies in many soviets, and the other workers submit claims that no one hears. Trying to save the situation, we work 12 or 14 hours a day and use up our Saturdays and Sundays; but in vain.

We think that only a radical solution to these problems will enhance the authority of the local soviets and enable them to play an active part in perestroyka. We think that our ideas will be of interest to delegates at the party conference.

(Signed) A. Solopiy, member of the CPSU and chairman of the Mezhdurechenskiy Rural Settlement Soviet Ispolkom; V. Porotikov, member of the CPSU and chairman of the Karoyskiy Rural Settlement Soviet; T. Yakonov, member of the CPSU and chairman of the Kaztsykovskiy Rural Settlement Soviet. Alma-Ata Oblast.

#### Let Everyone Be Responsible for the Ruble

This is now the second year that we, the rural workers, have been working according to final results, and accordingly the entire management apparatus of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes receives a monthly salary of 80 percent of the salary for the post. The remainder is received according to the results for the year. Everyone is vitally interested in fulfilling the plans and making the farm profitable. Everyone except for the freed up party and trade union workers, who when they work on the kolkhozes and sovkhozes receive the full amount of their wages from their own raykoms.

I understand that it is impossible to demand a direct dependence between ideological work and crop yields or milk yields. Nevertheless, whoever is in charge (and it is the party and trade union workers who often also make decisions on economic matters) should have a direct interest in the total results of work.

(Signed) A. Megel, safety equipment engineer, Bretskiy Rayon, Brest Oblast.

#### An Unnecessary Element

During the process of perestroyka in our lives, we face one important task, namely, to reduce the unjustifiably large administrative apparatus, make it less expensive and eliminate the excessive number of tiers in the apparatus.

It is becoming increasingly obvious that in small cities where the population does not exceed 300,000 to 400,000 and where party gorkoms and gorispolkoms function, there is no need at all to retain the raykoms and rayispolkoms, the more so since as a rule these levels do not make decisions on any significant issues. It makes no difference; they have to apply to the city authorities.

As an example, take Syktyvkar, the center of the Komi ASSR. The city is quite small. You can walk from one end to the other in 25 or 30 minutes. Not counting the wood chemistry settlement of Ezhvy (18 kilometers away), which has its own administrative institutions, namely a raykom and a rayispolkom, the population of the city itself is less than 170,000. And so was it necessary in this case to set up another two additional raykoms and rayispolkoms in the city?

Most people living in Syktyvkar think that these are unnecessary elements. This, incidentally, was also the subject of discussion at the recent party obkom plenum.

Some people may object that if the rayon institutions are abolished, the work of the city organizations will increase. But first, it is possible to strengthen considerably (without expanding) the apparatus of the gorkoms and gorispolkoms using the stronger workers from the lower wing. And second—and this is very important—it is finally high time that the members of the party gorkom and all the deputies carry out their own duties more actively, time to do more work. At present many of those elected by the people in the collectives are not even known by sight. They are merely listed as distinguished members of the elected organs.

(Signed) A. Lytkin, member of the CPSU since 1944.

### SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA Readers Discuss Party Conference

18000304 (Editorial report) Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA on 3 April 1988 carries on page 2 a selection of letters from readers entitled "Searching for Key Links." The feature appears under the rubric "I'm Writing with Ideas about the Coming All-Union Party Conference."

A. Yevmetsenko, a communist from Yakutsk, rejects suggestions being made by various party workers that "the intervals between (party) meetings and plenums should be increased. I am convinced that such proposals are not being made out of the desire to develop party democracy. They are not the fruits of a businesslike attitude. I, for example, see in this a lack of interest in working with people, in mixing with them, consulting with them, giving them information and answering to party organizations and to managing organs. I am sure that the CPSU Statutes have entirely correctly determined these intervals, and that they fully correspond to the current stage of restructuring.

"Moreover, I am not convinced that the conference has the right to countermand decisions made at past congresses. I have found no such provision in the CPSU Statutes."

A. Ivanov of Moscow is convinced that "given the leading role of the CPSU in our state, the restructuring of society without the restructuring of the party itself is impossible." Ivanov feels that one of the features of the structure of the party apparatus that must be eliminated is "the party's official system in which the first secretary of lower committees is immediately subordinate to the first secretary (and to the instructors) of higher committees, but not to his own buro. On the contrary, the members of the buro are 'under' the first secretary.

"Further, the buro cannot remove the first secretary from his office, even when there are good reasons for doing so. As a result, life has shown us that there is essentially no control over him, particularly between plenums.

"Why can't the leadership of party organizations, including committees, be implemented not on an individual basis by one person alone, but by a group of political leaders who enjoy equal rights and who make up a buro? Why must some people in this group be given positions as leaders? Why can't they work as a collegium?"

Yu. Burdukov of Krasnoyarsk, a party member since 1953, wants all party members to have the right to run for office: "I consider that the election of party leaders at all levels should begin with declarations from those persons who wish to be elected. That is, the Party Statutes and Instructions should stipulate that any member of the party has the right to declare himself a candidate."

Yu. Marchenko of Novosibirsk, a communist and candidate of historical sciences, writes: "With what, in my opinion, should the true democratization of party life begin? I propose that it is necessary to introduce direct secret balloting for all party leaders, right up to the members of the Central Committee. We must establish the principle of one vote to one communist.

"It is also necessary to limit the term of office for communists in elected positions. We should further, in my opinion, establish age limits for the various levels of the party leadership."

### MOSCOW NEWS Publishes Party Conference Proposals

18120072 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 15, 17-24 Apr 88 p 8

[Text]

### What I would say at the 19th Party Conference

The country is preparing for the forthcoming 19th All-Union Party Conference to be held in June. Perestroika, glasnost and democratization are opening up the way to spiritual emancipation and awakening public thinking. "MN" mailbox shows that each reader regards the Party forum as the concern of the whole people, and as his or her personal concern.

### Party Rules Must Be Changed

First, if today a Communist is elected secretary (from a district committee to the CPSU Central Committee), under certain conditions this may become his post for life. Is that right? I think it would be expedient to make the following changes in the Party Rules:

—the age limit for Members and Alternate Members of the Politbureau and Secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee should be 65 years;

—a member of the CPSU should be elected to the Politbureau of the CPSU Central Committee for no more than two five-year terms.

Corresponding limitations should be established for secretaries of district, city, regional and territorial committees, and for the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics.

Second, concerning the budget of primary Party organizations. The Party Rules say that the funds of the Party and its organizations are derived from membership dues, incomes from Party enterprises and other revenue. At the same time primary Party organizations have no other revenue. At the same time primary Party organizations have no funds at their disposal even to buy political books for Party education, posters, gouache ink for wall newspapers and so on. So, we have to ask for money from the trade union committee.

To avoid this situation, I suggest that up to 20 per cent of the monthly membership dues be left at the disposal of the primary Party organization.

S. A. Vyazanichev, CPSU member since 1957 Moscow

#### No Less Than Two Candidates

Among other measures, direct elections of secretaries of Party committees—from district committee secretaries to the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee—are necessary to radically improve the activity of all links in the political system, and to raise democracy to a qualitatively new level. For this, no less than two candidates should be nominated for each post.

Leonid Kartsev, Party member since 1948 Moscow

#### Non-Party Opinion Also

The existing system, where recommendations are given by Party members and where discussion of candidates is carried out only among a narrow circle of Party members, has proved its ineffectiveness. Any system functioning on the basis of self-selection and self-control eventually indulges in self-glorification, hushing up its failures under the cover of mutual protection, as was vividly demonstrated by the lessons of "Stalinism" and "stagnation".

In the context of preparations for the 19th Party Conference my views on this are:

1. In addition to recommendations from Party members, there should be a recommendation from the general meeting of the work collective, to which the given primary Party organization is attached, with detailed minutes of all statements and the results of voting.

The meeting may be considered as having quorum if about 80 per cent of the members of the collective are present, if about 80 per cent voted for the recommendation and if there were no objections.

2. Three and not two categories of Party membership should be established:

- candidate-member of the Party,
- Party member,
- Communist.

The category of Party membership, transfer from one category to another, upwards or downwards, must be confirmed once every three years according to public approval of the Party member from a given work collective, and according to the principles applied when giving recommendations.

3. The virtually ineffective system of Party reprimands should be linked with the categories of Party membership. Three reprimands, or one reprimand plus one severe reprimand to be entered on the registration card, and for which the category of Party membership must be immediately reduced by one degree—disqualifying the candidate.

4. Only Communists should have the right to hold elective Party posts and be members of a Party body.

What will be the effect of these measures? Party members as candidates for leading posts in industry, culture, ideology, etc., will have their activity regularly assessed not by a narrow circle of colleagues in the Party, but by the public. This will considerably improve assessment of their work, and secrecy and conceit should become a thing of the past.

Alexander Ismiyev Malakhovka, Moscow Region

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#### IZVESTIYA Readers Note Conference Expectations, Concerns

PM221337 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Apr 88  
Morning Edition p 3

[Article by Yuriy Orlik, IZVESTIYA deputy editor for letters department, under the rubric "Reading the Mail": "Thinking About the Conference"]

[Text] "Preparations are now under way for the 19th party conference. I will say without exaggeration that people expect a great deal from it," writes M. Roman-chak to the editorial office from the village of Meykshtay in the Lithuanian SSR's Ignalinskiy Rayon. "It seems to me that it will be equal in significance to a congress. Politically conscious people believe in the correctness of the course taken by the party, believe that the things have started moving. Obviously, central organs are being sent a flood of very different letters and suggestions. Not one of them can be brushed aside."

What is the chief aspect of these expectations, and about what are readers most concerned?

"Now that revolutionary transformations are embracing all aspects of life and not only economic but also political mechanisms in the country are changing," CPSU member M. Kostikov writes from Lipetsk, "the state of the party is particularly important." "If there is no healthy, wise party, there will be no restructuring," Danilov of Krasnoyarsk is convinced.

"How much I wish that the party conference will boldly declare an uncompromising struggle against the opponents of restructuring," S. Fedoruk, CPSU member since 1962, writes from Brest, "and will be able to break the mechanism of resistance and thereby open a direct and free path to social justice, glasnost, democratization,

initiative, and creativity. Therefore who will participate in the conference is very important. After all, many people have had time to adapt themselves to the new conditions while continuing to live with old baggage and old ideas—it is easier that way...”

Here is an example. The report of the bureau for directing restructuring at a Korenovskiy Party Raykom Plenum (Krasnodar Kray) was turned into a eulogy of the first secretary. An article in the rayon newspaper confirms this. The mail attests that this happens not only at rayon level. The temptation to propose a toast to the leader is both great and safe. However, “a party which does not have serious, unostentatious criticism in its ranks,” A. Ivendikov of Bobruysk in Mogilev Oblast is convinced, “degenerates and loses its fighting qualities and then also its authority with people.” “We now seem to speak and write freely,” A. Artemenko of Donetsk remarks. “But these phrases continue to turn up: The plenum or the conference was held under the sign of unanimity. Who, then, is resisting restructuring?” “We must create conditions in the party,” P. Rekalo of the city of Akhtyrka in Sumy Oblast writes, developing this thought, “so that there is a really independent competition of minds in the elaboration of policies. An opponent who has a different viewpoint must be respected before a decision is made just as much as those party members who vote ‘in favor.’ If such conditions are not created, the likelihood of a mistake increases many times over. The party’s wisdom consists not in mechanical unanimity nor in its proclaimed monolithic nature but in the uniting of diverse opinions.”

Letters voice concern in connection with the fact that harm was done to “the party’s tremendous authority which was won by its best sons who selflessly served it and devoted their whole strength and life to the ideals of socialism” (I. Verevchkin, Yalta) during the years of the cult and stagnation. The chief task is to restore the Leninist essence of socialism and the Leninist principles of organizing political life, including internal party life.

A considerable number of readers believe the party has “opened its doors to almost everyone” and that this is weakening it. “At the same time, voices are heard saying,” S. Shishkin writes from the city of Yelabuga in the Tatar SSR, “that we must not cut ourselves off from the people, the party is not a sect, and the more members the better. But, you know, Lenin bequeathed the idea that we must put the quality of the party’s ranks in first place.” “You end up with a strange picture,” S. Shishkin continues. “Having such a vast apparatus of kraykoms, obkoms, and gorkoms, we do not have the time to really occupy ourselves with primary party organizations. We know neither the needs nor the thoughts of ordinary communists. So is it, perhaps, time to abandon the existing, plainly overpopulated structure of party committees in cities and rayons? There must be party leaders where the fate of restructuring is being decided.”

Other readers also point to the cumbersome nature of leading party structures and the party apparatus and to their remoteness and detachment from the life of working people. “Many party workers have lost touch with the land and the people”—this is how L. Bulin of Kiev formulates his thought. “Let us finally admit honestly,” L. Kanunnikov writes from Blagoveshchensk, “that the administrative-injunction system is not a legacy from Stalin but the usual habitat of officials accustomed to lecturing to everyone about everything. If they had their way, they would change nothing.”

B. Abanosimov, a fitter from Orenburg, associates many misfortunes in the life of our society with “the sway of talentless people in official posts” and with their “shuffling, switching, and preservation.” “There are so many clever, talented people in our country,” worker N. Kravchuk writes from Krasnodar Kray, “but they are not given a chance. It is talented people who must be promoted, not simply people on the party schedule [nomenklaturnyye].” Saying that we live at a crucial time (“how I want the renewal to proceed more quickly”), N. Novikov of the city of Shostka in Sumy Oblast believes that “the new times need new leaders, not yesterday’s heroes of stagnation.”

The mail includes many letters whose writers suggest purging the party of people who have ended up in it by chance or for careerist reasons which shame the title of real communist. “Careerists, deceivers, show-offs, and toadies are entrenched in the CPSU’s ranks,” D. Tkachev writes from the Sosnovskiy Sovkhoz in Sverdlovsk Oblast’s Kamenskiy Rayon. “The party must rid itself of those who cannot stomach restructuring.” “I cannot help thinking of the fact that the leading workers exposed in certain republics were party members”—these are lines in a letter from Shitulina of the city of Kokhtla-Yarve in the Estonian SSR. “Such people must be driven in ignominy from the party. And not when they are already in the dock, but sooner. Let us recall Lenin: ‘...It is necessary to purge the party of elements who lose touch with the masses (not to mention, of course, elements who shame the party in the eyes of the masses).’”

However, it is not just a matter of getting rid of ballast. “The majority of the people favor restructuring,” O. Zhurov writes from Minsk. “Of course, it cannot proceed painlessly. For how many problems have accumulated over the decades! We must all—both Communists and nonparty people—summon up patience, roll up our sleeves, and work, and not sit with arms folded. And pension off those who do not wish to restructure themselves and who hinder M.S. Gorbachev, reduce them to the ranks, and take them down from high posts.”

“If I were asked which were the very best times,” A. Chigirev of Kiev shares his memories, “I would confidently reply: the time after the revolution. Cold, hungry, poorly dressed, homeless, but united by a single idea, when, disregarding the time, the privations, and the labor, we wanted to create a country for the working

people's happy life as quickly as possible. When the director ate soybean fritters in the same canteen as his workers and when, together with everyone, he saved the plant from inundation by a spring flood (1930, Artem Plant, Nizhnedneprovsk). People must be given back faith that social justice exists. The people must be given back the sense of being the master. An extremely difficult task, but that is restructuring's purpose." "The leading staff must not appear a select elite but be in the midst of the people's masses," V. Lysenko of Kramatorsk believes. "The will of the party must dovetail with the people's will in practice and not just in words. And be controlled by the people," L. Borisov of the city of Furmanov in Ivanovo Oblast believes.

Only the resolute democratization of our whole sociopolitical life can guarantee the party and society against "crises of absolute power," A. Ivendikov of Bobruysk, whose letter we have already cited (other readers also subscribe to this opinion), believes. And, in particular, secret elections, the existence of several candidacies, and the limiting of leaders' tenure of power—at various levels of party, state, and economic activity, moreover: "This will involve new people in management and make leaders think that they will have to answer during their lifetime for everything they have done, and not after their death."

Take note. Letters—even the most critical and pointed letters—are imbued with concern that uncompromising lessons be drawn from what has been lived through and experienced and that principles of the organization of internal party life be elaborated which will exclude forever the possibility of a repetition of our misfortunes and mistakes.

"I am 42 years old, my family—two little girls—is growing up, and I have worked all my life as a welder: I have participated in the construction of main gas and oil pipelines," B. Tsvilev of Chelyabinsk speaks about himself. "My grandfather and father were subjected to repression. It is bitter to recall all that. But it is important that, having admitted the tragic mistakes, the party is rectifying the situation. It is telling the truth about both the past and the present. It is changing our life. I am not a party member. I used to believe that everything in my personal life was settled and that things did not concern me. But now I realize that I must make every effort and give all my soul to helping the party. It has found the right path."

This thought—not to wait for changes, but bring them closer—is repeated in other letters. Noting the "real changes in favor of democracy" in the life of the party and the country, A. Yusfin, who works at Novorossiysk Higher Engineering Maritime School, writes: "I am not a party member, but what is now happening makes me want to join the CPSU, although I did not have such a desire before."

## SOVETSKAYA KULTURA Readers Discuss Party Conference

### My Candidate

18000292 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in  
Russian 19 Apr 88 p 2

[Article by Valentin Semenov, writer; member of the CPSU since 1963]

[Text]—Voronezh—My old comrade Oleg Shevchenko, head of the letters department of KOMMUNA—the Voronezh Oblast newspaper, read the 6 April 1986 PRAVDA editorial, went to the party organization secretary and demanded that a party meeting be held immediately. He said that he wanted to deliver the report, that in the report he wanted to openly say everything on his mind about those who wave the SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA article "I Cannot Waive My Principles" like a flag and once again, and as he did 20 years ago, raise his voice and drive away the threats.

He told me about this excitedly and went to write his report while I went to our division of the Union of Writers to inform our colleagues about the meeting.

Oleg is in general a fighter and a citizen by nature. If I could will it, I thought to myself, I would send him to the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

If I could will it?...And why should not my will and the will of other rank and file communists determine, for example, who attends the party conference in Moscow from Voronezh Oblast? Only 2 months remain and nothing is heard in the party newspaper, from the obkom, from the raykom—there are no news or indications whatsoever about how, when, and the way in which our oblast party organization plans to elect delegates to the 19th Party Conference.

Perhaps there will be no elections at all. Perhaps the delegates will once again be named by the obkom.

Where can a rank and file communist turn to nominate his candidate? After all, the obkom plenum will nominate candidates from its ranks and will strictly observe certain percentages: a certain percent of workers, a certain percent of women, a certain percent of young people. But how many of them will be real champions of perestroika? Not those who merely fulfilled two norms but those who achieved perestroika through suffering, those who laid the ideological and political foundation and who are now carrying it out.

This is why I decided to address all communists in the nation through SOVETSKAYA KULTURA and tell them that we in Voronezh, like other cities, have honest, diligent, sensible people, who are not vested with mandates, but who sincerely and passionately believe in the ideas of the 27th CPSU Congress and will fight for them like staunch and courageous communists.

**The people at the conference must not be weathercocks who vote for anything at all. They must be people of honor and duty who know what to do and who do it. Such people will be urgently needed at the conference. Our Politburo must rely upon them if it wants perestroika to be irreversible .**

### **More Socialism Means More Politics**

18000292 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in  
Russian 19 Apr 88 p 2

[Article by O. Mamedov, doctor of economic sciences]

[Text]—Rostov-na-Donu—You watch an informative telecast and ask yourself: can it be that in a great socialist power that occupies one-sixth of the earth's land, there has not been a single political event the entire day? This is difficult to believe, especially today. And we see with our own eyes the usual lamentable disproportion: internal economic against foreign political information.

When will we realize: no matter how important a new blast furnace or a newly built plant may be, the activation of the human factor requires giving priority attention to sociopolitical facts. After all, acceleration entails the reforming of social relations whereas previous calculations were intended to make sophisticated technology fit obsolete social forms. The 27th CPSU Congress was revolutionary in that it fundamentally repudiated this hopeless attempt.

The local press and television above all visibly demonstrate the negative consequences of the predominantly "technological" approach. They have almost imperceptibly become manuals on the procurement of haylage and on the introduction of the contract system. But everything cannot be reduced to production. We cannot write just about production if we really want to become a society of well-rounded individuals rather than "professional cretins." What our glasnost lacks today is politics—on a large or small scale, at the all-union or regional level.

Journalism has a stereotypical penchant for reporting events after the fact. This means that the role of the mobilizing impulse today belongs primarily to the adopted decision.

And we are indeed accustomed to being informed about events that have already taken place. We are so accustomed that we have forgotten that current internal political life is frequently formed from the torturous, stage-by-stage, compromise coordination of the positions of different organizations that represent the concrete interests of concrete groups of people. But it is specifically this vast preparatory work that is the essence of the nation's political life that is today in the majority of instances a "sealed book" to us. We do not see the centers of our political life in their everyday work and

know nothing about it. This not only impoverishes our ideas about the complexity of internal political processes but also distorts the perception of their work as political activity.

Especially alarming is an inexplicable paradox that has already been noted in the press: people are better informed about the concerns and decisions of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers than they are about their own party raykom or rayispolkom. The lack of such information is today becoming a frank challenge to perestroika. Therefore the special examination of the question "Concerning Glasnost in the Work of Party and Trade Union Organizations and Soviet Organs in Vladimir Oblast" at the CPSU Central Committee is entirely in accordance with the needs of perestroika. It is only important that it not become just one more report.

Finally, the time has also come to overcome the prejudice against primitively understood "sensationalism" in reporting materials on internal political topics. To the contrary, the purposeful shaping and arousing of interest in impending political events and decisions would be a major step forward in the work of the mass media. What is more, [the publication of] information on differing positions (after all, they do exist!) of various organs and officials on specific issues is desirable rather than reprehensible. The democratization of the political thinking of the masses cannot be achieved in any other way and any difference of opinion will produce a shocking impression as was recently the case. And this is what is surprising—there is no one who does not know that real life moves through the resolution of real contradictions. Thus is it possible and conceivable that internal political life in such a gigantic nation would be excluded from general social dialectics?

The main principle in the political organization of socialist society—democratic centralism—shows that unity here does not come automatically, is not guaranteed, but is continuously sought and developed.

This is why total unanimity on everything, including internal political questions, which has occasionally been demonstrated to too great a degree by our mass media, not only distorts reality but also tends to undermine interest in internal political issues and in the mass media as well. People do not want to be kept informed about the beginning and course of negotiations in the international arena alone: no less important is "internal" information on the positions and arguments of interested persons on questions that directly influence the working people's everyday life. Such information would be addressed to people as citizens, thereby making them active co-participants in the current internal political life of the nation, oblast, or rayon. And perhaps then talks on internal political topics will no longer yield in popularity to lectures on international topics (a fact that should have long ago been assessed as alarming).



**Don't Make a Show of It**

18000292 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in  
Russian 19 Apr 88 p 2

[Article by L. Mikhaylova]

[Text]—Moscow—I would name the need for more reason, openness, and honesty as one of the principal needs in our entire daily life. We are renouncing many absurd rituals, stereotypes and conditionalities. For example, I am entirely unable to understand why the party buro secretary does not simply open the meeting and say: the buro proposes a presidium made up of the following comrades, let us discuss these candidacies. Why put on the show that people are nominated for the presidium from the floor? The editorial commission, that frequently does not edit anything, and the counting commission are nominated in the same way. We can tell me that all these things are trifles not worthy of discussion. I do not agree with you. All staged actions undermine the authority of the meeting, generate skeptical smiles in the hall, and thus detract from the businesslike atmosphere of the forum.

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**IZVESTIYA 'Mailbag' Views Restructuring,  
Conference Tasks**

PM0305153188 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
30 Apr 88 Morning Edition p 3

[Unattributed "From the Editorial Office Mailbag" feature under the rubric "19th Party Conference: Tasks of Restructuring"]

[Excerpts] The Labor Collective's Recommendation  
[subhead]

I am a nonparty member, but I am not indifferent to party life and the party's strength. On reading articles about the 19th all-union party conference, I perceive much of what I personally think. This is what I would like to talk about. Many people today have already realized that the party is not an abstract righteous mechanism, always infallible, never mistaken. The party is made up of people with all human attributes and shortcomings. Unfortunately, it very often happens that the sins and vices of individual persons have a grave effect on the lives of people around them. There are plenty of such examples in our history and in daily life. The mechanism for putting the party apparatus into a skid could be very simple: A careerist and degenerate who has made his way to the top selects and elects new cadres in his own image and after his own likeness, who would never recommend honest, principled, and active people. On the other hand, quiet, soft, complaisant, and intimidated people are also valued. But today the party needs fighters, the struggle ahead is most serious.

My view is: While somebody is still a candidate member, the grass roots production collective must organize a poll to find out whether the candidate is worthy or not of being a Communist. Things that might be concealed from or unknown to superior comrades cannot be hidden from one's own collective—everything is known there! If the party is to be flesh of the people's flesh, then let the people recommend party members; this is what I perceive as the basic guarantee of democratization and restructuring.

V. Gamygin [passage omitted]

Control Is Necessary [subhead]

I welcome IZVESTIYA's decision to publish sharp and polemical letters targeted on the 19th party conference. I would like to second one of them, which raised the question of reverting to the Central Control Commission, the Leninist organization of party control, which was autonomous vis-a-vis with the Central Committee. The author cites weighty arguments in favor of such a reorganization, and I will not repeat them. Let me just say that, since history unambiguously indicates that the existing party control mechanism failed to effectively counter the negative subjective processes within the party, this means the mechanism must be changed. Of course, we are not talking about organizations standing above the party. On the contrary. It is well known that the CPSU congress exercises the supreme controlling function. But how many different events may occur between congresses! There must be a new organ to which the congress can delegate the right of control. There is no need at all to delay this important work—the party conference is fully able to accomplish it.

Honored Artist of the RSFSR V. Simonov, Sverdlovsk  
[passage omitted]

To Elect by Secret Ballot [subhead]

Many people assume that the removability of top leaders is capable of preventing any attempt at establishing a new cult. I think that the solution lies elsewhere—in changing the actual system for electing a leader.

Neither broad glasnost nor open discussion of nominations would save us from making mistakes. Is there a guarantee that, hoping for a fresh breath of air in the leadership, people will not cast their vote for someone who may be new but may also be shortsighted and limited? No, and no again. What we actually need are direct secret ballots, and not within a narrow circle (plenum or bureau session) when the candidate for any high post keeps an intent and questioning eye on you, paralyzing your will. I have no doubt that, had there been secret ballots before, there would have been no cult of Stalin's personality, Brezhnev would have been removed in good time, and now we would not have had to restructure that which they managed to "construct."

V. Luzin, Leningrad

### **PRAVDA Readers Want More Candidate Information**

*PM0305142188 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
30 Apr 88 First Edition p 3*

[Readers' letters feature under the rubric "Deliberations Before the Party Conference": "About Trust and Control"—first two paragraphs are PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] The volume of editorial mail devoted to the upcoming partywide forum is growing with every passing day. Problems of the further democratization of intraparty life and, in particular, the process of the appointment of leading cadres, the formation of elective organs, and the implementation of control functions occupy a significant place in the letters.

Diverse and sometimes diametrically opposed views are expressed on this account and this, incidentally, is also reflected in the published selection of letters. Well, truth is born out of argument. What is important is that the overwhelming majority of the letters received are imbued with concern for ensuring that the views and will of Communists are taken account of as accurately as possible at all levels and that only the most worthy, respected, and competent people capable of ensuring the success of restructuring are appointed to senior posts in the party.

#### **How Should a Committee Be Elected? [subhead]**

I have pondered more than once why our elective party aktiv is frequently passive in practice. This is the conclusion I have reached: Is it not because in actual fact it is not elected, rather a vote is taken on a list that has been compiled in advance. Delegates are acquainted with the list at a brief meeting during a break at the conference. Frankly speaking, is this kind of acquaintance with future members of the party raykom or obkom sufficient to work out "who is who" and to make sure that only really worthy people are elected onto the committee? This, in my view, explains why members of elective organs sometimes act timidly vis-a-vis the apparatus and why they do not feel responsibility in respect of their primary organizations.

Of course, this may be putting it too categorically. However, essentially this is what happens: Obliging people, people who are willing to "give their vote" at plenums to a text drafted by apparatus officials rather than real, thinking fighters capable of defending a just cause get elected onto committees. I therefore believe the question of the formation of elective organs—from raykoms to the Central Committee—should be discussed at the 19th all-union party conference.

How do I think this should be done? When nominating delegates to the rayon party conference, Communists could name comrades who, in their opinion, could successfully implement the duties of party raykom or

obkom members. At the local level it is more obvious which people in the organization are worthy according to all criteria to be elected onto party committees. This, I believe, could also apply to nominations to the Central Committee, although, naturally, by no means every primary party organization has the honor of sending a representative to the Central Committee. It would be a good idea to introduce the candidates proposed by primary party organizations for election to a superior party organ in the local press, publishing their photograph and a brief account about their work and possibly also their family. This should not be kept in general terms but should reveal, especially in the case of leaders, what successes the collective or the region has achieved during the time it has been headed by the candidate and how rank and file workers have distinguished themselves. Moral qualities should also be mentioned. I am confident that people would react, that they would express their opinion as to whether specific people are fit to be on party committees.

In my opinion this procedure would in no way detract from the role of conferences or congresses in forming elective organs. On the other hand, the elective aktiv would be more deeply aware of its responsibility to primary organizations for the fate of restructuring and would more fully express the organizations' will.

It would also not be out of place to elect the first secretary (and possibly also all the other secretaries) of party raykoms or obkoms in secret ballot directly at the conference. This would make it possible to demonstrate more fully their prestige and their professional and moral qualities. Subsequently, in the period between conferences, it might be useful to hear their reports at party committee plenums and, if necessary, to decide by secret ballot whether the comrade is worthy of remaining in the post to which he was elected.

Lastly, we will be talking about "pocket" secretaries for as long as they remain materially dependent on enterprise or farm managers. It seems to be that it might be worthwhile in respect of major party committees to introduce the status of party Central Committee, obkom, and kraykom party organizers who would be on a par with economic managers in terms of wages and prestige. The means can be found. Should they really be of primary concern in view of the fact that primary party organizations have to shoulder the main burden of restructuring? This means these components should be headed by leaders who do not hang on economic managers' every word, who are able firmly to implement the party line.

G. Malyy, machine operator at the kolkhoz named for Kotovskiy, party obkom member, Khotinskiy Rayon, Chernovitsy Oblast.

#### **This Alone Is Not Democracy [subhead]**

One kind of proposal has been published in PRAVDA and other newspapers more than once. This is what it

boils down to: Party committee secretaries, especially first secretaries, should be elected on a competitive basis in a direct ballot by the whole organization, that is to say separately from the election of committee or bureau members.

Naturally, these proposals are a result of the fresh wind of restructuring. People are tired of acting as extras rather than participants in policy making and, furthermore, they are motivated by the desire to acquire certain guarantees that the direction of this wind will not change. But how can what is being proposed in this case be brought into line with the fundamental principle of collective leadership?

If it is a question of a party committee electing a secretary at its plenum from several candidates who are on the same committee, I can understand this. Here everything is correct. But to elect secretaries in direct ballot by the whole organization? I do not know; maybe it would simplify matters, but it is difficult not to perceive this election of one individual as distinct from the others as anything but the election of some kind of "leader," a boss, a kind of local "Napoleon." After all, a party leader who has been elected in this way can always reply to all the committee's objections: I was elected by the organization, it has given me the power, and it is my job to wield this power and your job to obey my instructions. To change his views on anything it will be necessary again to call together the whole organization. And so in the guise of the simple involvement of the broad party masses in the election of a party leader you may acquire something that is very remote from the principles of democratic centralism.

If committee or bureau members are elected by different methods, there will be no equality and consequently no collective leadership in the true sense of that word in the work of these organs. A secretary is a committee member, he leads and organizes its work and therefore he must be elected by the committee members and no one else.

The same applies to proposals on limited tenure of elective party posts. The question, it seems to me, is not how many times an individual is elected a committee or bureau member or secretary, but rather whether there is an alternative candidate for the post. This alternative candidate must appear not because someone's term of office has expired while the candidate has been waiting for his finest hour to come, but because the candidate has fresh ideas and proposals, more energy, and more drive. All this must, of course be verified by the party organization. Otherwise the change in personalities will be nothing but utter formalism.

A. Makarov, Leningrad.

#### In Short [subhead]

Despite everything, the existing system of elections to leading party organs in a way limits the responsibility of

ranking leaders in respect of the mass of rank and file Communists. After all, the latter are in the minority in these organs and this is not right. The more workers and kolkhoz members—in short, rank and file party members—there are in leading organs, the more firmly established will democratic principles become in all spheres of our social life. I say "in all spheres" because the example of the party will force both the soviets and trade union organizations to restructure themselves correspondingly. There will be less bureaucracy and out-and-out stage management and more courageous questing, fresh ideas, and unorthodox decisions and actions.

I. Sankov, war and labor veteran, CPSU member since 1941, Leningrad.

Communist leaders must be more "down to earth", that is to say they must be closer to the people, their aspirations and concerns. Rather than standing aloof and surrounding themselves with some kind of a wall for the only reason that they, you see, wield power. This is still happening in our life.

Many of our current senior comrades are relatively far removed from the life of ordinary people, they know about their problems from hearsay, they do not have to wait in line to buy things. Has not the time come to move on to practical actions from words and appeals to live in Leninist fashion? It seems to me that the moral aspect of the question should also be aired during the discussion at the the all-union party conference.

M. Karamushko, Moscow.

I wholeheartedly support the article by N. Sokolov entitled "Strictly According to Conscience" published in PRAVDA 18 March which proposed that the TsKK [Central Control Commission] be revived in the party. The author is right! In terms of its consequences the abolition of the control commissions was one of the most harmful actions taken by Stalin the perjurer, who blatantly flouted Lenin's last behest. Life has proved incontrovertibly that the absence in the party of strict self-control that is independent of operational organs creates conditions for the self-reproduction of bureaucracy, voluntarism, and stagnation.

Sergo Ordzhonikidze, addressing the 16th party congress, described the TsKK-RKI [Central Control Commission-Worker Peasant Inspectorate] as a "marvelous force." I have raised the question of its revival more than once in letters to congresses, dating back to the 20th Congress. I mentioned it personally to N.S. Khrushchev, who replied that he "agreed but that it would be very difficult to put into practice." I am convinced that the 19th All-Union Party Conference which is being convened in the favorable atmosphere of restructuring will be capable of finally resolving this important question.

V. Ratnikov, CPSU member since 1926, Moscow.

If the TsKK is restored in the party as has been proposed, only absolutely honest party members entirely without blemish, so to speak, in terms of their professional and personal qualities—that is, people devoid of ambition, arrogance, and hot temper—can be considered for this organ.

Personally I do not believe the revival of the control commissions will lead to dyarchy in the party, as some people fear. The TsKK would be entirely occupied with control work (after all no one can guarantee that the Uzbek, Rostov, and Kirgiz affairs will not repeat themselves unless the party's control functions are stepped up). In addition it would be necessary for both party committees and control commissions to defend their positions and viewpoints with better reasoning, reports and plenums would become more pointed and, consequently, the decisions adopted would be more correct, accurate, and effective.

G. Goncharov, Lvov.

**LITERATURNAYA GAZETA Readers Express  
Conference Fears, Proposals**

PM0405141588 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 4 May 88 p 10

[Roundup of readers' letters under the rubric "Current Mailbag": "Toward the 19th All-Union Party Conference. More Democracy!"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] The nearer the all-union party conference gets, the more letters we are receiving with proposals, assessments, and opinions for it linked with the restructuring process and glasnost. The PRAVDA article "Principles of Restructuring: The Revolutionary Nature of Thinking and Action," which reaffirmed yet again our resolve to combat all conservative forces impeding the current reforms and retarding social progress, indisputably gave this subject a new boost. The theme of the editorial mailbag is: Reliable guarantees must be provided for restructuring and democratic transformations.

On the eve of the forthcoming 19th all-union party conference, I would like to ask a question which, in my view, is extremely topical not only for intraparty life.

It is well known that any self-respecting enterprise has statutes or provisions, as well as instructions relating to the workers' jobs. As far as statutes are concerned, these exist in our party, but nobody has any instructions relating to their jobs. Everyone is guided by the demands of the statutes, and they are thought to be wholly adequate. Yet this state of affairs creates the prerequisites for all kinds of abuses.

It is my profound conviction—and I have found confirmation of this in many of Lenin's works—that the party is the leading public organization that bases its work on collective foundations. That is why all decisions should

only be made by the party's collective leading organ. And the responsibility for their fulfillment should be taken by this collective organ rather than by a single first secretary, as is the case at present.

Things have gotten ridiculous (and this continues to be the case at all party levels)! At sessions of a higher party organ—the bureau of our Maritime CPSU Kraykom on the subject of "The Work of Enterprise Party Committees....", for instance—the proceedings were attended and reports delivered by just one enterprise party committee secretary. He takes the rap [poluchayet shishki] for the entire party committee. And there is just one brain trying to rectify a sometimes very difficult situation. The collective party organ—in this case the enterprise party committee—is left on the sidelines. Or here is another example: On returning from a CPSU gorkom bureau session to examine the question of the allocation of people for the countryside (which in itself is blasphemous for the party), the first secretary of a CPSU raykom quickly assembles enterprise leaders and party committee secretaries and simply...orders them to carry out the decision. For some reason he has no time to put it to the collective organ—the party committee. If you allow yourself to disagree with the first secretary, you are immediately reminded of your personal responsibility to the party. The downright abuses of willfully appropriated power are nothing short of absurd!

We cannot go on this way if we want to seriously restructure our economic and social life. That is why I propose that the forthcoming party conference discuss the question of the status of party organs, the elective party aktiv, and party aktiv workers who have been relieved of their duties.

If this principled question is not resolved by the conference, I (and all the Communists I consulted before writing this letter agree with me) will think that this state of affairs is to somebody's advantage, and there can be no confidence in restructuring since overall policy in the country will once again start to depend on the personality of the general secretary of the Central Committee or secretaries of certain party organizations.

M. Robkanov, deputy to the city soviet and chief of the maritime trading port. Vladivostok.

I think that many people are now expecting the forthcoming party conference to make decisions which will make it possible to realize more quickly the hopes and expectations that have appeared in society over the last couple of years, as the "Gordian knots" discovered in our life are getting bigger not by the day but by the hour. Newspaper and magazine articles confirm this....

Anyone who wants to say something new or urgent should be allowed to speak at the conference. Perhaps an official commission will have to be set up to work out a final document which would take account of as many opinions and proposals as possible.

Here is another issue for discussion. The press is brimming with reports about the wrong position of certain party workers. After long investigations they receive some punishment or other. How much skilled labor and time is spent on these matters! Such situations could be simplified by introducing case law for party workers. Suppose it is established that a raykom secretary or a gorkom department chief victimized people for having been critical or interfered in the course of justice. There need be no investigations or explanations. This clear contravention of democracy could only mean expulsion from the CPSU. Or, for instance, selfish abuses would immediately mean dismissal and a bar on holding administrative office.... Hope for a "lifebelt" from above would diminish, and there would also be fewer people there to throw one. Should not the party resolve questions about its members in summary fashion?...

G. Goryunov, Volgograd.

I consider the most important problem of all to be the lack of guarantees of democracy. It is now clear to everyone that our losses in the economy and ideology were mainly a result of the personality cult, voluntarism, and stagnation—that is, the deformation of socialist principles started from above rather than from below. It is also clear that democracy and glasnost in society cannot and should not be determined merely by the personal qualities of the general secretary, and that talk about democracy will remain a fiction given the existing concentration of power.

The second problem is the effectiveness of democracy. Public opinion should not beat against our ministries and departments like water against a wall; voters not only in Moscow but locally should be able to obtain satisfaction from those they elect.

The third problem was formulated by V.I. Lenin in roughly the following way: Any reforms are necessary but secondary, everyday work; discussions about them are a political waste of time; cadre selection and verification of execution is the key to solving any problem.

May I be so bold as to claim that the execution of many government decisions is blocked in the highest spheres of administration, or the fundamental essence of the decisions is emasculated by them....

Without a radical solution of the above political and administrative problems there will be no firm confidence that restructuring represents unity of word and deed or that restructuring is in earnest and will be around for a long time.

I. Benevolenskiy, driver. Omsk.

A businesslike discussion of the fundamental problems of our life is possible only in conditions of democracy and glasnost. Who finds this unsuitable, who is in opposition to the current changes? The leader of any enterprise, institution, or institute. What makes me draw this conclusion? You have to agree that the existence of rigid discipline in production is an absolute necessity. In capitalist conditions everything is easily resolved: If you don't work, goodbye. Matters are different here. It is extremely complex to fire or even transfer an incapable worker. This is because we have trade union committees, party bureaus, and now even certification commissions. These organs bear collective responsibility for the placement of cadres and production indicators. But a director is personally responsible for the work of the institution he heads, and nobody will allow him to shift the blame onto the aforementioned organs. Consequently, and in order to be master of the situation, the director strives to staff these organs with obedient people. It goes without saying that in these conditions there can be no talk about democracy and glasnost, about the determining influence of public opinion.

But this is no reason for pessimism. As economic accountability and self-financing are being introduced, voluntarism and personal likes and dislikes are giving way to the ruble's diktat. But what happens when the introduction of real economic accountability is impossible, as for example in secondary and higher education, in some medical and scientific institutions, in ministries and departments? The question is left hanging in the air.

The system of party supervision, or rather centralized anarchy, has played a far from insignificant role in our country's economic regression. One thing is clear: Party organs must be freed from the performance of functions outside their province. In my view, party committees in the conditions of restructuring must, in addition to organizational-political activity, be more scrupulous in monitoring the observance of legality by taking on additional control functions.

Engineer V. Mamedov, Baku

Now, in the period of glasnost, your newspaper and other periodicals often write about the past. About the negative phenomena through which our country lived. It is all true, I can testify to that. I have a good knowledge of Stalin's, Khrushchev's, and other people's times. Much has been written by both academics and ordinary mortals like me. But strive as I may, I have yet to come across an instance of someone ever raising the question: What is the cause which gave rise to these mistakes and excesses? There we are, saying: The reason is to ensure that there is no recurrence. But you must agree that a disease must be diagnosed before it can be cured. But we don't want to know about the diagnosis. A bit of talking, writing, and reading—and everything will sort itself out. No, it won't. We have already experienced this in the late

fifties. That was another period when we talked, we wrote, and we read—and what was the result? Voluntarism and the so-called “stagnation period” for decades. Where is the guarantee that this, or maybe something worse, will not happen again? Glasnost? But we already had both glasnost and democracy in the early Khrushchev years, and you know what happened later.

It seems to me that, in order not to return to the mistakes and excesses, we must know their cause, the source whence they draw their strength. And this cause can be seen with the naked eye. Primarily: Party and state leaders are beyond criticism. Absence of criticism coupled with hypocrisy and toadying by those around them spawn total permissiveness. And something else: It is necessary to put a limit on the tenure of a given position. For example, elect the general secretary for no more than two terms, as is currently the case in Bulgaria, as I understand it.

I do not think that you will publish my letter, I have evidently overstepped glasnost somewhat, but at least you will know that the working class is worried about its country's future.

Mine tunneler N. Kononenko, Shakhon Settlement, Karaganda Oblast

I take it upon myself to assert that many of our shortcomings were caused by the imperfect structure of the country's party organization, which enabled a mass of renegades and careerists to join the party ranks and use it as a cover to perpetrate their acts and continue to do so to this day. And yet they were all appointed by conferences, plenums, congresses. Where did their indifference, cowardice, ingratiating, toadying, sycophancy come from?...

Despite the fact that the cult was condemned at the 20th party congress, it nevertheless contrived to transform itself from the personality cult into an equally misshapen form—the cult of the leader.... No matter where you look, no matter what party organization you look at, everywhere you will come across the imposition of the leader's opinion on the entire collective. This practice undermines people's faith in justice, reinforces the bosses' faith in their own infallibility, and revives monstrous egocentrism. How tenacious all of this is!

Yu. Velchinskiy, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy

There are differences in glasnost when we speak about the distant past and the present. For some reason, when we talk about shortcomings in our time, we almost never hear the names of those who are to blame for people's misfortunes. Instead of their names, we use pronouns, as if these people have neither surnames, nor titles, nor official positions. Anyone who believes this to be glasnost is, in my view, either deluded or devious. This is only a semblance of glasnost. Look no further than the television program about restructuring in literature, with

some of our very famous men of letters taking part. The writers spoke about glasnost and about democratic principles, but when one of them (I don't know who) was asked a question about Vladimir Vysotskiy—Who prevented him from publishing his poems?—the answer was full of pronouns: “Those who disliked him, those whom he impeded....” I don't think it is too much of a secret that many of “those” occupy their high offices and positions to this day, while some have gone even higher. Such people vote with glasnost with one hand, while with the other hand they are ready to use that same glasnost to shut up the next one who gets “too bold.”

I believe that today these questions require a blunt answer. Even though it is, of course, understandable: Restructuring has only just started, and the bureaucrats have no intention of surrendering their positions without a struggle. But boldness is necessary! Without it, our people will never overcome the bureaucracy.

B. Zavudskiy, engineer at the “Signal” Plant, Kishinev

The discussions going on in the period of glasnost cannot fail to produce clashes of differing opinions, serious polemics, and sharp arguments. But some examples from polemical newspaper articles or speeches on radio and television or from the rostrum at meetings show that many of us have lost the habit of democratic forms of struggle between ideas and opinions. Democracy must also be learned, otherwise squabbles involving mutual insults may develop instead of proper discussions. The struggle of ideas, just like any struggle, must be waged according to certain rules without the use of prohibited methods. What do I mean?

Criticism of views must not be replaced by personal criticism. We must conduct discussions using arguments rather than emotions, labels, and insults. Finally, it is important to ensure equal opportunities for the sides involved in an argument.

Look at the published material on discussions. The discussion is almost always conducted by the one side, while the other side is essentially given no equal opportunity to express its views in the same newspaper. This “onesided game” is, of course, far removed from objectivity. It is time to finally grasp the fundamental idea expressed by M.S. Gorbachev that the period of democratization and glasnost resolutely rejects anybody's monopoly of truth.

Comrades, it is necessary to develop a normal atmosphere for the conduct of discussions. It is necessary to learn to respect one's opponent and to overcome one's own ambitions and belief in one's own infallibility. There are an extremely large number of questions for discussion, and some very complex questions at that. At this time we need discussions as much as the air that we breathe. The truth is born out of argument, but only out of arguments which are devoid of incorrect methods and dominated by a benevolent creative atmosphere.

Candidate of Technical Sciences V. Ivanov, Moscow

**Leningrad Party Apparatus Undergoes  
Certification Before Conference**

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[Article by D. Fedorov, sector chief in the Leningrad CPSU Obkom Organizational Party Work Department, and V. Tsalobanov, docent at the Leningrad Higher Party School: "Professionals or Amateurs? Thoughts on the Results of the Certification in the Party Apparatus"]

[Text] Leningrad—"It was a difficult ordeal, I admit it. I could not sleep at night. I even wept. But you cannot get away from the truth. I saw for myself as I really am, with all my achievements and shortcomings. It is not easy to admit that I am not suited for party work. I never had either the capability or the taste for it. How can you make a politician out of me, even at rayon level? So, I am an amateur..."

This was said by a woman who was recently released from her duties as instructor in a party raykom. The need to give up the work and replace someone against their wishes is always something of a personal drama. But if a person remains it is even worse. Both for himself (a feeling of dissatisfaction!) and for the cause (which is not pursued as it should be).

Now imagine that virtually one in ten workers in the apparatus of the Leningrad city and oblast gorkoms and raykoms faced the need to change work. This was one of the results of the recent certification.

The need for this was long overdue. However, even modest attempts with the aid of scientific methods to evaluate the professional suitability of workers in the party apparatus had been met with firm opposition. "Psychological methods? Testing? Expert evaluations? They cannot be used in our business for it is we who choose the party cadres. It has its own subtlety, its own special art!"

Yes, this was the view that was quite widespread. And it is understandable that it was associated with long-standing tradition, which by no means always immediately accepts innovation. And everyone agrees that choosing a suitable person for work in the party apparatus is an art. And a subtle art, a delicate art. And why should science slam the door in its face?

We think that this is because for many years the mechanism used to advance people for work in the party apparatus was sanctified as something secret. Many of the mysteries were hidden. And it was not so simple to guess at them. Thanks to what talents did the person educated "purely" in the arts find himself in the industry and transport department in the raykom? Why was the engineer or technologist thrown into the "front of the arts" while the former Komsomol worker who could not distinguish between rye and wheat command agriculture?

We do not exaggerate when we say that these kinds of zigzags occur often enough. For there is a form on which the specialties of the promoted person are listed. But on the other hand, it does not contain the thing that is most important for the party worker: does he have the ability to find the right approach to people and carry them with him? And mistakes in making promotions will always be possible if cadre selection is based only on some kind of personal taste, on subjectivism, and if the emphasis is mainly on naked intuition. And so another comrade finds himself in the party apparatus more because of his own imposing appearance: his pleasant bass voice is commanding, he looks good in his suit, he is, in general, a fine person. But "fine person" is not a profession.

And then it strikes us: what has happened that in a satisfactory party committee things have suddenly deteriorated?; whence the lack of principle, the readiness at the whim of a superior to break some human destiny like snapping a match?

It is as if the responsibility for this does not lie with the apologies for workers who have succeeded in so damaging the party profession. We have often heard these people say the following: "But is party work a profession?" These doubts are the direct result of regarding complex, difficult and extraordinarily responsible work as their own kind of "elevation" above mere mortals, a guarantee of indulgence for all their sins, past and future. The certification conducted by the CPSU obkom was to break these prejudices. And it pursued another aim, namely, to uncover the reserves and reveal more fully the potential of the detachment of party workers.

This time the certification was for agents in charge of sectors, and their deputies. It is no exaggeration to say that in many gorkoms and raykoms it caused a certain amount of consternation. The surprise started immediately for the subjects. Take just the composition of the certification commission. Each one contained on a mandatory basis a member of the Leningrad Obkom or Gorkom, two workers from the apparatus in a higher organ, two members of the local party committee and a representative from the Higher Party School. And this proved the serious approach to the matter. And the tasks facing the commissions were not quite usual. What were the creative possibilities of those being examined? Were they capable of solving innovatively, actively and purposefully the specific tasks of perestroika in their own rayon and their own primary party organizations? Were they adequately trained theoretically? Were their overall cultural standards adequate?

Many workers were astonished to see the descriptions of themselves. And how! Instead of the standard, often empty words of the type "undeviatingly raises his ideological level, morally steadfast," quite new assessments appeared in the documents, and note was made of features of character that could not be remembered from similar documents.



But it was the questionnaires of the psychologists and sociologists that startled people the most, and even disheartened many. They helped in assessing the range of professional possibilities in each worker in the apparatus.

First of all the person undergoing certification offered an evaluation of himself. Various tests were used for this. Then his qualities were assessed by the experts. All information was computer processed. And it was only after this that the commission made its conclusions about the suitability of a person for party work.

The emotional feelings and arguments, from unreserved acknowledgment to destructive skepticism, that this method caused at first! Nevertheless, ultimately it was impossible to deny its reliability. And the attempts made by some workers to look "good"—better than they actually were—during the certification did not help.

"Today it is already difficult to imagine how we managed previously without this method," O. Virolaynen, who was at that time first secretary of the CPSU Krasnogvardeyskiy Raykom, told us. "It helps not only to evaluate a person more broadly and deeply. The use of modern scientific means offers an opportunity to reveal those features and facets of the personality that are not noticed in the daily round of business but without which it is difficult to make the objective assessment of what a given individual will be capable of in the future. With regard to certain comrades, as first secretary I even had to change sharply my own ingrained viewpoint."

The example of the deputy chief of an industry and transport department, B. Orlov, was typical. His test self-assessment revealed that he had great possibilities that, it seemed, would provide a high level of return. However, the expert assessments of his personal contribution to perestroyka in party work in his own sector was more modest. An interview with him during the certification made it possible to clarify the reason for such a significant divergence. B. Orlov had not succeeded in mastering political work methods. He had no real desire or fervent interest in improving things. In short, he was removed from the reserve for the post of department chief. It was decided to watch how he conducts himself in the future.

Incidentally, this law-governed pattern was seen constantly: the higher the worker evaluated himself, the lower his return and the lower his professional level. We compiled our own graph, which provided a striking picture of some of the party raykoms. One interesting detail was that workers in the apparatus of the Nevskiy Raykom, particularly those working in the organizational party work department, assessed themselves and their activity highest of all, but the certification showed that they had a low level of professional suitability for party-political activity.

For example, agent B. Polibin frequently visits the primary organizations and does not begrudge his time. The man would seem to be trying. But what is the sense of his perambulations if he has only a vague understanding of how to cooperate with the primary organizations and what their most urgent tasks are. His colleagues S. Filin and V. Martistov, and deputy chief of the department A. Sidorov found themselves in this situation.

It should be said immediately that the conclusions of the certification commissions were not in the slightest way any kind of final verdict. Yes, the evaluation of individual aspects of the personality was brutal. And so a great diversity of variants was envisaged for the general conclusions. Right from the start any oversimplified approach of the type "suitable—unsuitable" was eliminated. For a person can change, learn from his mistakes and improve himself under the influence of criticism. Therefore, when evaluating professional suitability for party work use was made of a broad scale. For example, a comrade's ability and skill to meet requirements higher than his post. This means, his preparedness for promotion. Or, he matches up to his requirements and perhaps in time will be ready for promotion. Or, he is not ready for promotion and must improve his work and undergo certification again. And finally, when a worker's possibilities are lower than the requirements made of him, it is advisable to change the kind of work he does.

The main purpose of this difficult and important measure was to review the ranks before the 19th All-Union Party Conference. At first some people regarded the certification as some of large-scale "purge" of the apparatus. This is too narrow a view! Suffice it to say that from its results more than one-third of workers were recommended for placement in the reserve for promotion.

The certification also induced a new look at the problem of forming the reserve for work in the party apparatus. The final results were still being summed up, but in the primary party organizations in the city and oblast a frank and open discussion was being conducted about the candidates in the reserve for replacements in posts from party agents to raykom and gorkom first secretaries. The opinion of the primary party organizations have now become basic when these questions are raised at party committee plenums.

Of course, we in no way think that we have found the solution to all cadre problems. Work to improve methods and approaches to the selection of worthy people for the party apparatus will continue, as the CPSU Central Committee February Plenum demands. **And it seems to us that conducting these kinds of certifications should become a regular occurrence, the norm of party life. And it would be a good thing to make this norm a requirement of the Rules.** We think that this kind of cadre review is an effective means of helping the party worker to overcome amateurism and become in fact a high-level professional.



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**MISCELLANEOUS**

And for the party committees, certification has become a good base for improving the selection, training and placement of cadres. Taking this into account, the results of the certification have also been reviewed at plenums of of party city and rayon committees, where the accountability reports of the buros on work in leading

perestroyka and questions concerning preparations for the 19th Party Conference have been discussed.

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**END**